Evaluation of European Union aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries. Case studies synthesis by Montes, Carlos et al.
Evaluation of 
1
1338 
September 1998 
European Union Aid 
to African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Countries •• 
EVALUATION OF EU AID 
TO ACP COUNTRIES 
Field Phase: Synthesis 
Carlos Montes 
Stefano Migliorisi 
Andrew Bird 
Investment Development Consultancy 
7,  rue Rougemont, 
75009 Paris, France 
email: idcuk@ montes.demon.co.uk 
in association with Mokoro Ltd. 
September 1998 Table of contents 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  .......•......................•••••........•.•.......•........•..•..•......•......•..•....•..•.•.• 1 
I.  FORMULATION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES ............................................ 11 
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY FORMULATION ................................................................... 11 
THE POLICY FORMULATION SYSTEM ................................................................................ 12 
ROLE OF Tl-IE COMMISSION .............................................................................................. 22 
II.  POLICY DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE ACP 
STATES  ....................................................................................................................... 35 
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY DIALOGUE .......................................................................... 35 
INDICATIVE PROGRAMMING ............................................................................................. 36 
OVERALL ECONOMIC DIALOGUE (STRUCTIJRAL ADJUSTMENT) ....................................... 37 
SECfORAL POLICY DIALOGUE .......................................................................................... 41 
COORDINATION, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COHERENCE .................................................. 48 
KEY POLICY CONCERi'lS: POVERTY, GOVERNANCE, GENDER AND ENVIRONMENT .......... 52 
III.  AID Il\fPLEMENT  ATION ....................................................................................... 57 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AID IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................... 57 
lNSTITIJ110NAL ARRANGEMENTS ..................................................................................... 58 
PROGRAMME AND PROJECf CYCLE MANAGEMENT ........................................................ 68 
ANNEX A:  SUGGESTED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PHASE III ..............•..• 79 
ANNEX B:  TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PHASE II .............................................. 81 Preface 
This evaluation of European Union Aid (managed by the Commission) to African, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries is part of the global evaluation of EU aid requested in June 1995 by the 
EU Council of Ministers responsible for  Development Cooperation.  The global evaluation 
was to draw lessons from experience in order to prepare the future aid policy of the EU and to 
improve  the  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  transparency  of European  aid  instruments  and 
procedures. It  was to include aid to  African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, to  Asia 
and Latin America, and to the Mediterranean region. 
The evaluation of EU aid to ACP countries is in three phases.  The desk study phase involved 
collecting  existing  information  on  aid  programmes  and  instruments  and  selecting  a 
representative sample of countries/sectors.  The field phase (see Terms of Reference in Annex 
B) involved visiting  the  selected sample of countries to  carry out an  evaluation of EU aid 
programmes  and  instruments  focusing  on:  (i) the  quality  of policy  dialogue  between  the 
Commission  and  the  ACP  governments;  and  (ii) the  operation  of arrangements  for  aid 
implementation.  In  addition,  it  involved  a  review  of  the  process  by  which  ACP-EU 
development  policies  are  formulated.  The  synthesis  phase  will  provide  a  summary  and 
synthesis of the ACP evaluation. 
This document is the  synthesis of the field phase of the ACP evaluation.  The case studies 
involved visits to a sample of six ACP countries and one region between February and April 
1998.  The missions reviewed 2-3  sectors of EU assistance in  each country.  Each mission 
involved  extensive  interviews  with  Delegation  staff,  ACP  government  officials, 
representatives of Member States,  other donor agencies  and  some  private sector and non-
governmental organisations.  The missions were complemented by interviews and workshops 
in Brussels.  The review of the process of EU-ACP policy formulation involved interviews in 
Europe with key stakeholders.  Following the  country visits,  draft case studies and a draft 
synthesis were submitted to the EU Heads of Evaluation Services (early June and July 1998). 
The evaluation was commissioned by  the Working Group of Heads of Evaluation Services 
(Development)  of the  European  Union  and  the  European  Commission.  The  European 
Commission funded the evaluations. 
The country case studies were supervised and prepared by a team led by Carlos Montes.  The 
authors of this synthesis report are Carlos Montes, Stefano Migliorisi and Andrew Bird.  They 
were  supported  by  the  European  Centre  for  Development Policy  Management  (on  policy 
formulation),  Charles Vellutini, Karolyn  Thunnissen and Toby Wolfe. 
Those wishing to  obtain further copies of  this synthesis, or copies of  the case studies, should 
contact  the  Head  of  the  Evaluation  Unit,  Common  Service  Relex  of the  European 
Commission.  The  seven  case  studies are:  Zimbabwe,  Tanzania,·  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Cameroun, 
Liberia, Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean. EXecutivesunvnary 
Executive summary 
This is an executive summary of the field phase of the Evaluation of EU aid (managed by 
the  Commission) to  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  countries.  This evaluation 
forms part of the second stage of a global evaluation of EU aid requested by the Council 
of Ministers responsible  for  Development Cooperation.  This  evaluation  was  asked  to 
look at:  how  development  policy objectives  are  defined,  how  they  are  translated  into 
relevant actions  through policy dialogue in  ACP countries,  and  at  the efficiency of aid 
implementation.  The  field  phase involved evaluation missions  to  6 countries  and one 
region (Zimbabwe, Tanzania,  Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroun,  Liberia, Jamaica and the  East 
Caribbean).  The seven  draft  case  studies  were  produced  in  early June,  and  the  draft 
synthesis report one month later. 
The evaluation was  asked to  look at  the  processes  by  which  development policies are 
formulated  and  aid  is  implemented, but  we  have  tried  to  keep  in  focus  the key  policy 
concerns of EU development cooperation  policy  as  set  out in  the  Treaty on  European 
Union and the  Lome Convention.  In pursuing these policy concerns,  the principles of 
coherence, coordination and complementarity should be respected.  A key theme of this 
evaluation is the importance of prioritising - of focusing on key policy concerns, of being 
selective  in  the  delivery  of aid,  and  of acting  upon  the  most  important  findings  of 
evaluations. 
The evaluation was  asked  to  focus  on three issues:  policy formulation,  policy dialogue 
and  aid  implementation,  because  they  were  perceived  in  the  desk  study phase  as  key 
issues for further study. However, we have tried to emphasise their close interconnection: 
~  The  development  policy  formulation  system  (which  includes  both  Lome  and  the 
'internal'  EU  policy  cycle)  strongly  constrains  the  Commission's  actions.  Lome 
defines  a  number of objectives,  instruments  and  operational  procedures,  while  the 
'internal'  EU policy formulation  process gives rise  to  an  expanding policy agenda, 
and sets extensive administrative and financial controls. (Chapter I) 
~  The inefficiencies that we found in aid delivery - and that have been observed many 
times before- therefore derive not only from the internal organisational limitations of 
the Commission, but also from a series of external constraints. (Chapter II) 
~  The administrative demands on aid implementation in  turn affect the Commission's 
capacity to  engage effectively in  policy dialogue  with ACP Governments.  This is 
critical because the emerging consensus is that aid delivery can only be effective if it 
can influence the policies and institutions of recipient countries. (Chapter III) 
~  In turn, it is crucial that those involved in policy formulation should be aware of the 
realities  in  the  field.  Given  the  impact  of the  policy  formulation  process  on  aid 
delivery, policy-makers must pay attention to  the aid implementation performance of 
the Commission if their policies are to be realistic. (Chapter I) 
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I. Formulation of development policies 
The first chapter looks at both the EU-ACP policy formulation process and at the role of 
and  constraints  on  the  Commission  in  policy  preparation  and  implementation.  The 
outcomes of the policy formulation system as a whole strongly affect the Commission and 
the effectiveness of EU aid (both aid implementation and the Commission's capacity to 
carry  out  in-country  policy  dialogue  with  ACP  governments).  An  efficient  policy 
formulation  process requires  communication and feedback at  many levels, both among 
actors and inside each actor's organisation.  Experience with aid implementation needs to 
inform policy formulation through a constant evaluation of the performance of policies on 
the ground. 
The extent to  which the Commission is able to carry out its role of policy formulation is 
affected not only by internal organisational limitations, but also by constraints imposed by 
the  policy formulation  system as  a  whole.  In  this  chapter,  we  review separately the 
cooperation system under the Lome Convention and the formulation of EU development 
policies  towards  ACP countries.  The latter is  presented in  this  chapter as  a  system in 
which  the  main  EU  actors  interact  in  a  complex  fashion  and  in  which  the  system 
outcomes cannot be attributed to any particular actor. 
The policy formulation system 
~  Negotiations on  the Convention are now the principal opportunity for ACP countries 
to  influence  the formulation  of development cooperation policies.  The contractual 
nature of Lome,  the joint institutions  and co-management are  still  valued by ACP 
governments,  and  allow  them  closer  partnership  with  the  EU  in  development 
cooperation  than  with  most other donors.  However,  the  ACP-EU  partnership  has 
become gradually more unequal over time. 
~  The  'internal'  EU process  of formulating  development policies  towards  the  ACP 
countries, outside the Convention negotiations, is influenced by the interaction of  key 
EU actors, mainly the Council, the Commission and the Member States.  This process 
is complex and fragmented. 
~  The  'internal'  policy  formulation  process  does  not  appear  to  be  guided  by  a 
s~ifficiently  clear  sense  of diiecflon.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  provided 
overarching policy objectives,  and  it  has  given  greater focus  to  the  policy agenda. 
However,  each  Member State has  its  own  particular policy emphasis,  and there  is 
weak coordination  between  the  main  actors.  As  a  consequence,  policy  outcomes 
appear to reflect political compromises, rather than a strategic development vision. 
~  These policy outcomes result in a mismatch between an expanding policy agenda and 
the  Commission's capacity to  implement this agenda.  There are weak links between 
those responsible for policy formulation and those responsible for fmancial control. 
And there is insufficient awareness of the Commission's limited human, fmancial and 
institutional resources. 
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4  The  policy fonnulation  process  involves  limited feedback from  aid implementation 
performance.  Most  policy-makers  appear  not  to  be  sufficiently  informed  of the 
Commission's constraints in the field.  Policies are therefore sometimes not realistic. 
~  Member States are  involved at all  stages of policy fonnulation  but sometimes the 
consequences  of  their  efforts  are  a  multiplicity  of  objectives  and  administrative 
procedures, rather than strategic vision and effective monitoring of performance. 
4  The  Commission has not been able to persuade other actors to adopt a strategic view 
or to recognise the Commission's constraints (and thus has been unable to solve some 
of  the  problems  identified  above).  In  part,  this  is  because  of  organisational 
limitations,  but it is  also because of constraints imposed by the  policy formulation 
system as a whole- Lome and the EU policy cycle- and particularly by the political 
pressures of other actors. 
The role of the Commission 
4  In  both preparing and implementing policies,  the Commission is affected not only by 
external constraints, but also by internal organisational limitations.  These limitations 
include: (i)  a fragmented structure in which policy and operational units are unduly 
separated~ (ii) inadequate systems and procedures (e.g. up-to-date operations manuals 
and  job  descriptions);  (iii)  shortages  of specialist  staff  in  key  sectors;  and  (iv) 
inadequate investment in  professional  development and training.  A  reorganisation 
that is currently under way is intended to address some of these weaknesses. 
4  In  the preparation of  policies, there is still insufficient consultation with other actors. 
While the  Green Paper was  a  valuable attempt to  widen the  policy debate,  there is 
scope for further involvement of stakeholders. 
4  The  Commission has been more successful in  implementing sectoral policies than in 
implementing policies which are to be applied to all sectors.  Policy implementation 
has been difficult  in  the  key policy areas  of poverty,  governance,  gender and  the 
environment.  These  policy  areas  require  'mainstreaming'  rather  than  direct 
interventions.  Mainstreaming is particularly time- and resource-demanding. 
-1  While  some  steps  have  been  taken  to  improve  the  monitoring  of  policy 
implementation,  weaknesses still remain.  In  the  past, the EDF Committee was the 
only  instrument  for  quality  control  of new  projects  and  programmes.  While  the 
Committee has  some impact,  its  technical  ability to  scrutinise proposals is  limited. 
The introduction of the Quality Support Group is a welcome step, but its effectiveness 
is affected by staffing constraints of policy advisers, and by the weakness of the EC 
project monitoring system. 
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IT. Policy dialogue between the Commission and the ACP States 
Effective policy dialogue  with  ACP States appears  to  be  the  only sustainable way for 
donors to improve the effectiveness of their aid.  An effective policy dialogue is aimed at 
strengthening institutions and policies in ACP States.  The emerging consensus is that aid 
is  only  effective  when  it  is  able  to  strengthen  institutions  and  policies  of recipient 
countries.  Similarly, given the fungibility of aid funds, donors should be concerned about 
the quality of all public spending and not just about particular projects. 
~  The  Commission's  transition from  being  a project-based donor to  being a policy-
based donor is  made difficult by a multiplicity of policy objectives, the demands of 
on-going projects in too many sectors, extensive administrative procedures (required 
both by Lome and by the Council's financial regulation applicable to the Convention) 
and organisational limitations (fragmentation, staffing constraints, inadequate systems 
and procedures - see above).  On the  other hand, the Commission's involvement in 
structural adjustment operations is  facilitating  the  transition to  being a policy-based 
donor. 
~  Policy dialogue on  National Indicative  Programmes has been strengthened.  These 
programming exercises have had greater policy focus and greater involvement of ACP 
governments. However, integration of NIPs with donors' programming exercises and 
with government budgetary processes would make them more effective. 
~  The  Commission's Structural Adjustment Facility has supported the policy dialogue 
between  the  Bretton  Woods  Institutions  and ACP gpvemments.  At  Headquarters 
level,  the  strategy has  been to  support  the  BWI country  programmes,  while  using 
international forums effectively (such as the Special Programme for Africa) to support 
the  social  dimensions  of adjustment,  better  ownership  of the  adjustment  reform 
programmes and improvements in  ACP countries'  budgetary institutions.  However, 
staffing  constraints  have  limited  headquarters'  support  to  Delegations  in  the 
preparation  and  implementation  of  Structural  Adjustment  Support  Programmes 
(SASPs). 
~  The Commission's in-country involvement in the overall policy dialogue on structural 
reforms and its participation in public expenditure reviews have often been limited by 
staffing  constraints  in  Delegations,  by  the  degree  of government  ownership of the 
reform programme,  and by over-detailed earmarking of counterpart funds.  A  more 
general constraint has been the mixed results of the BWI reform programmes in the 
countries that we  visited. The close monitoring of macroeconomic conditions and of 
general  structural  reforms,  and  participation  in  public  expenditure  reviews,  are 
particularly  important  for  supporting  sectoral  policy  dialogue  and  the  effective 
implementation of SASPs. 
~  In  many countries,  the  Commission  has been  active  in  sectoral policy dialogue,  in 
spite of the many constraints on its work.  This sectoral policy dialogue is facilitating 
more effective ways of managing aid,  and of strengthening government institutions 
and policies, and of improving donor coordination.  However, there is  considerable 
variation in the success of sectoral policy dialogue.  Success was found to depend on 
several key factors. 
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The  Delegation's  staffing  and  sectoral  expertise  are  important factors.  The 
Commission needs to  be more focused on  its  choice of sectors for intervention, 
and it needs  to  staff its  Delegations  accordingly.  The  preparation  of Strategy 
Papers  has  helped  in  defining  objectives,  but  aid  interventions  are  still 
insufficiently  selective.  In  addition,  demands  from  the  EU policy  formulation 
system should be  more  realistic,  recognising  the  Commission's constraints  and 
building on its strengths.  The Commission's traditional co-administration of EDF 
projects  hinders  its  effective involvement in  policy-based sectoral dialogue  and 
operations. 
The  greater the capacity and commitment of  ACP governments,  the more likely is 
policy dialogue to be effective, particularly in the presence of  a clear sector policy 
framework.  Clear sector policy frameworks signal a government's priorities and 
facilitate  the  coordination  of donor  activities.  Where  governments  have  low 
capacity,  in  a few  cases  the  Commission has  successfully broadened the  policy 
dialogue, to involve, for example, private sector partners.  By contrast. the practice 
among donors in some countries of supplementing civil servants' salaries is likely 
to aggravate problems of low capacity and undermine government ownership. The 
strengthening of ACP  governments'  civil  services  has  not  received coordinated 
donor support. 
Technical Assistance provided to ACP governments has,  in some cases, been used 
effectively to facilitate sectoral policy dialogue,  but in  others it has undennined 
ownership.  The Commission has provided T A and financed counterpart positions 
in government in  order to  facilitate  sectoral  policy dialogue.  When the T  A  is 
properly selected and managed by the government, the  T  A has succeeded in this 
aim.  However, selection and management presuppose a certain level of capacity 
in the government.  Government ownership is  difficult to maintain when theTA 
supports both the government and the Delegation. 
Some progress  has  been  made  towards  improving  in-country  donor coordination. 
Positive  developments  include  the  discussion  of the  Strategy  Paper  and  National 
Indicative  Programmes  with Member States.  However,  coordination has  generally 
not  extended  to  joint  programming  or  joint  operations.  Coordination  depends 
critically  on  governments'  capacity  and  commitment.  The  Delegation's  sectoral 
expertise, backup from  headquarters, and the organisational set-up and commitment 
of other donors are also important.  In some cases, the BWI have failed to ( )e.jinate 
effectively with donors supporting sectoral reforms.  Operational coordination of the 
Commission and the Member States in Cote d' Ivoire, a pilot country for coordination, 
is  particular} y  successful.  The  Commission  has  also  played  a  very  successful 
coordination role with Member States in the post-conflict situation in Liberia, with no 
functional government and limited in-country donor representations. 
The  Commission,  like  most  donors,  has  had difficulties  in  integrating  key policy 
concerns  - poverty,  governance,  gender  and  the  environment  - into  the  policy 
dialogue and into the design of  programmes and projects.  In general, the capacity of 
Delegations to focus  on these areas is  constrained by staffmg, expertise, and limited 
back-up from headquarters. Mainstreaming these key policy concerns is particularly 
personnel-intensive.  More specifically: 
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On  poverty  reduction,  it  has  proved  difficult  to  protect  social  sector  budgets 
through SASPs, although the social sectors have been kept high on the agenda. 
However, some EC projects have been particularly effective in addressing poverty 
issues, e.g. micro-projects programmes in Zimbabwe and the use of Stabex funds 
to compensate coffee farmers in Tanzania directly. 
On governance, the Commission's activities have been limited, and have mostly 
been carried out through budget lines,  a sign that dialogue with governments is 
still difficult in  this  area.  The most important success in this area has been the 
effective response in Liberia to consolidate the peace. 
Gender and the environment are  policy areas that are  only addressed effectively 
through mainstrearning.  Recent evaluations have noted the difficulty of building 
gender and environmental awareness in DGVID.  There are still very few projects 
integrating or relating to gender issues, and there is limited staffing in the Gender 
unit.  However,  some  corrective  steps  are  being  taken.  With  regard  to  the 
environment,  the  Manual  is  being  revised  and  a  training  programme  is  being 
prepared.  In  Cameroun and  Tanzania,  environmental  appraisal  techniques  are 
increasingly being applied in the transport sector. 
m. Aid implementation 
Aid implementation is the last stage in the delivery of aid.  It includes the preparation of 
projects and programmes, their implementation on the ground, as well as  the monitoring 
of their performance and ex post evaluation.  It  is  sometimes seen as  a technical issue 
which need not concern policy-makers.  This is unfortunate. 
Policy-makers  must  pay  attention  to  the  aid  implementation  performance  of  the 
Commission if their policies are to be realistic.  The Commission confronts organisational 
limitations  and  staffing  constraints,  which  are  reflected  in  significant  delays  and 
weaknesses  in  both  project  preparation and  implementation.  These  in  turn  affect  the 
Commission's capacity to  implement policies and to carry out effective policy dialogue 
with ACP governments. 
At the same time, many of the constraints on aid implementation can only be addressed 
by  actors  outsicc  ~1e Commission.  Aid  implem~ntation continues  to  be  affected  by 
factors which arise from the Lome Convention and from the policy formulation system 
within the  EU.  The complexity of aid  instruments,  including budget lines,  introduces 
numerous,  varied  procedures.  Lome  provides  for  the  sharing of responsibilities  with 
governments that have weak capacity.  The Council's fmancial regulation applicable to 
the Convention results in extensive ex ante financial controls.  The EU policy formulation 
system  gives  rise  to  a  policy  agenda  that  lacks  sufficient  focus.  All  these  factors 
compound the Commission's organisational limitations. 
The practice of  sharing responsibilities in aid implementation does not bring efficient 
results.  More flexibility is needed in the division of these responsibilities between the 
Commission and  ACP Governments.  The effectiveness of sharing responsibilities 
depends on Government capacity.  As suggested in  the Green Paper, where there is 
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high  Government capacity,  the  Commission  is  justified  1n  adopting  a  'hands off 
approach. 
~  Where  the  government's  weaknesses  lead  the  Delegation  to  assume  more 
responsibility for aid implementation,  the Delegation's capacity becomes even more 
overstretched.  Functions  are  duplicated,  and  the  Commission  is  burdened  by 
excessive  administrative  controls.  As  well  as  causing  delays,  these  reduce  the 
resources available for strategic thinking and policy dialogue.  They also allow for 
less quality control during the project cycle. 
~  Where  there  is  low  government  capacity,  the  strengthening  of institutions  should 
precede the  transfer of responsibilities.  Capacity is  reflected in the extent to which 
NAO functions, donor coordination, and project implementation are integrated within 
civil service structures.  The management of progranunes is most sustainable where it 
is  carried out  by Government departments.  Where  capacity is  low,  therefore,  the 
Commission should support the gradual strengthening of civil service structures. 
~  While  TA  provided to  the government can be useful as a short-term measure,  in  the 
long-term it is only beneficial if  it contributes to  institutional strengthening.  T A can, 
at its best, play a capacity-building role.  Frequently, however, TA is used to by-pass 
government institutions and is not adequately monitored.  When T  A supports both the 
government  and  the  Delegation,  accountability  in  aid  implementation  may  be 
affected. 
-+  Project preparation: 
Improvements  in  the  quality  of project  preparation  have  resulted  from  the 
introduction of Project Cycle Management but identification screening is still weak. 
The identification process is  important because it significantly affects implementation 
performance.  While better analysis in some  feasibility studies was observed, project 
preparation continues to  include unrealistic assumptions, particularly with regard to 
local capacities. Consultation with beneficiaries is also still limited in most countries. 
Project  preparation  often  relies  too  heavily  on  consultants  without  adequate 
supervision  from  the  government  or  Commission  staff.  In  some  cases,  the 
Commission still allocates insufficient resources for project preparation and internal 
quality control. 
~  Implementation: 
The  implementation  and monitoring of EC aid has  been  affected by the  extensive 
nature of ex ante financial controls.  In general, more emphasis is  given to  ex ante 
financial controls than to monitoring project performance or ex post fmancial audits. 
Because of EC financial arrangements and requirements from Member States, ex ante 
financial controls are applied without selectivity. In the Delegation these controls are 
carried out by advisers  who often do not have the  fmancial  expertise.  As well as 
taking  substantial  Delegation's  time,  this  approach  diffuses  accountability  and 
diminishes ACP governments' responsibility for fmancial management.  Substantial 
time would be saved by a move towards more selective ex ante controls and more 
extensive ex post financial audits. 
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Monitoring the peifonnance of  on-going projects has generally been weak, due to: the 
sharing of monitoring responsibilities between the government and the Delegation; an 
excessive focus  on the financial management of projects rather than on their overall 
performance; and the lack of a standardised  monitoring system. Generally, projects 
are not substantially modified to reflect the results of monitoring and supervision. 
-+  Evaluation: 
The  Commission  undertakes many good evaluations,  but their lessons are still not 
sufficiently internalised.  Resources should be focused on a few key evaluations and 
on the implementation of their recommendations.  Commission evaluation summaries 
are made available to the public, including recently through DGVIll'  s web page.  The 
dissemination  of  evaluations  is  an  important  step  towards  transparency.  The 
evaluation  function  in  the  Commission  needs  to  have  a  strong  profile  and  to  be 
separate  from  the  line  management  responsible  for  planning  and  managing 
development, as recommended by DAC principles. 
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I.  Formulation of development policies 
The policy formulation system 
-1- Negotiations  on  the  Convention  are  now the  principal  opportunity  for  ACP countries to 
influence the formulation of development cooperation policies. 
-1- The policy formulation process does not appear to be guided by a sufficiently clear sense of 
direction. 
-1- Policy  outcomes  result  in  a  mismatch  between  an  expanding  policy  agenda  and  the 
Commission's capacity to implement this agenda. 
""*  The  policy  formulation  process  involves  limited  feedback  from  aid  implementation 
performance. 
""*  Member  States  are  involved  at  all  stages  of  policy  formulation,  but  sometimes  the 
consequences of their efforts are a multiplicity of objectives and administrative procedures. 
""*  The Commission has not been able to  persuade other actors to  adopt a strategic view or to 
recognise the Commission's constraints. 
The role of the Commission 
-1- In both preparing and implementing policies, the Commission is constrained not only by its 
own organisational limitations, but also by factors which arise from the Convention and the 
policy formulation system. 
""*  In the preparation of policies, there is still insufficient consultation with other actors. 
-1- The  Commission  has  been  more  successful  in  implementing  sectoral  policies  than  in 
implementing policies which are to be applied to all sectors. 
-+  While some  steps  have  been  taken  to  improve  the  monitoring  of policy implementation, 
weaknesses still remain. 
The importance of policy formulation 
This chapter looks at the  EU-ACP policy formulation process and at the  role of and 
constraints  on  the  Commission  in  policy  formulation  and  implementation.  In  this 
report. 'policy formulation' refers only to higher level policies that are to be applied to 
development  cooperation  with  all  ACP  countries  (therefore  excluding  indicative 
programming
1
).  The  sharp  separation drawn  between policy  formulation  (chapter I) 
and implementation (chapters II and III) is for presentational purposes. since often they 
are not easily distinguished. 
Cooperation policies (derived from both Lome and the  'internal' EU process) directly 
influence the effectiveness of EU aid (e.g.  aid implementation and the Commission's 
capacity  to  carry  out  in-country  policy  dialogue  with  ACP  governments).  In  this 
context,  the  extent to  which  the  Commission is  able  to  carry  out its  role  in policy 
formulation  and  implementation  is  affected  not  only  by  internal  organisational 
limitations but also by constraints imposed by the policy formulation system as a whole. 
Indicative programming involves  the  setting of priorities  at a national or regional  level,  within the 
constraints set by policies which are to be applied to all ACP countries.  It is therefore examined in the 
context of policy dialogue (chapter II). 
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An effective policy formulation process demands communication and feedback at many 
levels,  both among actors  and inside each actor's organisation.  Moreover,  the  policy 
formulation process needs to  be informed by  a constant evaluation of the performance 
of aid implementation policies on the ground. 
The first part of this  chapter looks  at  the  way  in  which policies  within  the  EU-ACP 
cooperation system are formulated. The second part of the chapter looks at the role of 
and constraints on the Commission in both policy formulation and implementation. 
The policy formulation system 
ACP-EU cooperation policies are formulated both at the level of the Lome convention 
(including  its  joint  institutions)  and  through  the  EU  'internal'  policy  formulation 
process.  In  this  section,  for  presentational  purposes,  we  discuss  these  processes 
separately.  This allows us  to  describe the essential features of the complex 'internal' 
EU policy formulation process through a simple analytical model.  Although political 
and economic realities have over time reduced the  influence of ACP countries in  the 
policy  formulation  process.  we  recognise  that  'internal'  EU  policy  formulation  is 
affected by the institutions of Lome (see below). 
In the Lome Convention 
Many of the development policies that apply to  ACP-EU cooperation (as  well as  key 
implementation procedures) are derived directly from the Lome Convention.  Therefore 
the negotiation process of the Convention is a key component of the policy formulation 
system. 
The  formulation  of ACP-EU  cooperation  policies  in  the  framework  of  the  Lome 
Convention  involves  the  interaction  of  many  actors.  This  explains  many  of the 
strengths and weakness of a system which, unlike cooperation with most other donors, 
is  strongly  based  on  the  principles  of  contractuality
2  and  partnership.  Moreover, 
Lome establishes a partnership involving the  15  Member States of the EU and 71  ACP 
countries which goes  beyond aid to  include trade  and political issues.  Although the 
system  was  established  more  than  20  years  ago,  and  although  many  of its  initial 
conditions have changed, the principles of contractuality and partnership have proved 
very resilient and are highly valued by the ACP states.  It  is in this context that other 
large  donors  are  beginning to  explore the importance  of partnership in  development 
aid
3
. 
The origins of the Yaounde and Lome Conventions go back to European solidarity with 
ex-colonies,  to  the  need  to  build  new  post-colonial  relations,  to  the  perceived 
importance  of ACP  trade  and  raw  materials,  and  to  the  politics  of the  cold  war. 
However, changing political and economic conditions have gradually altered this high 
political  commitment  to  former  colonies.  Many  ACP  countries  have  experienced 
economic and institutional decline, and have become more dependent on aid.  The cold 
war has ended.  The Treaty on European Union has introduced new political objectives, 
Humanitarian aid falls outside the contractual Lome relationship. 
Other donors are now trying to  include a similar partnership concept in their operations, as  seen, for 
example,  in  the  3n1  July  1998  European  round  table  'World  Bank  Partnership  for  Development'. 
Unfortunately, the main paper did not refer to Lome. 
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and financial  pressure on European aid budgets has increased.  All these factors have 
contributed to  strengthen the  bargaining power and policy agenda of EU countries in 
recent Conventions, and have led to  a more unequal partnership.  As noted in the EC 
Green  Paper,  'The  principle  of partnership  enshrined  in  the  Lome  Convention  has 
diminished in substance and has not been fully realized'. 
The contractual  nature  of the  Convention
4  and  the  co-management of the EDF have 
allowed  ACP countries  a  degree  of participation  (and  therefore  certainty)  in  policy 
formulation  and in the  management of the aid programme higher than they have had 
with most other donors.  However, this situation is beginning to change as a result of 
the increasing focus of Member States on the need to make their aid programmes more 
conditional (or selective) on ACP countries' performance (economic and political).  In 
this  context,  the  negotiation  of  the  Convention  is  becoming  the  most  important 
opportunity for ACP states to influence the process of development cooperation policy 
formulation. 
Successive  Conventions  have  only  partially  adapted  to  changes  in  political  and 
economic experiences or to  the realities of implementing EC aid.  For example, the 
Convention has  not sufficiently recognised as  yet the difficulties created by  the joint 
management of the EDF aid programme, the  fragmentation of aid instruments, or the 
weaknesses of the Lome institutional framework.  This has significantly influenced the 
effectiveness of EC aid. 
The  effectiveness  of  the 
Lome  institutional 
framework  (see  Box)  has 
also  been  affected  by 
changes  1n  external 
circumstances  since  it  was 
introduced in the first Lome 
Convention  more  than  20 
years ago.  The introduction 
of ACP-EU institutions was 
an innovative feature of the 
new  post-colonial 
relationship  between  ACP 
countries and  the  European 
Community.  The  Lome 
institutions  facilitated  and 
encouraged  communication 
between diverse developing 
countries,  giving  them  a 
forum  to  discuss  common 
The joint ACP-EU institutions 
The Lome Convention  provides for a Joint institutional framework, 
established  on  a  basis  of  parity  between  ACP  States  and  the 
Member  States  of  the  European  Union.  According  to  the 
Convention: 
The Joint Council of Ministers takes binding decisions necessary 
for  the  attainment  of  the  objectives  of  the  Convention.  and  is 
responsible for resolving disputes relating to the application of the 
Convention.  Under Lome  IV bis,  tt has also provided a forum for 
'enlarged  political dialogue'.  It meets at least once a  year,  and 
representation is, fonnally, at ministerial level. 
The  Joint  Committee  of  Ambassadors  is  responsible  to  the 
Council  of  Ministers,  and  may  propose  recommendations, 
resolutions,  etc.,  to  the  Council.  In  addition.  the  Council  may 
delegate  any  of  Its  powers  to  the  Committee.  The  Committee 
meets at least twice a year, and membership is drawn from ACP 
Ambassadors  and  the  Pennanent  Representations  of  Member 
States in Brussels. 
The  Joint Assembly considers  the  annual  report issued by the 
Council of Ministers, and may adopt resolutions to be examined by 
the Council.  It meets twice a year, and membership is drawn from 
the European Parliament and the parliaments of ACP countries. 
positions vis-a-vis European development partners.  This was particularly important in 
strengthening  links  between  countries  in  different  regions  (for  example  between 
countries in West and East Africa).  The Lome institutional framework also allowed a 
unique post-colonial relationship which provided direct and formal contact between the 
higher  levels  of the  European  and  ACP  political  systems  (Ministers,  Parliaments, 
Ambassadors).  This should have allowed European policy-makers to be made directly 
Conventions set out in detail (for 5 or even  10 years) not only the objectives of cooperation policy but 
also the operational details of the use of aid instruments and the aid implementation system. 
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aware of political and economic realities within the ACP countries, and implementation 
lessons to be fed into the policy formulation process. 
However,  the  potential  of these  institutions  has  not  been  realised.  The  increasing 
weakness of ACP institutions and a shift within the EU towards other priorities have 
reduced  the  effectiveness  of the  Lome  institutional  framework.  According  to  the 
Convention, the Joint Council of Ministers has an important role in policy formulation 
and in monitoring the implementation of the cooperation programme.  In practice, while 
this  institution  still  provides  a  forum  for  the  discussion  of ACP-EU policies,  it  has 
gradually  become less  influential  as  a  policy  maker,  with  an  unfocused  agenda and 
limited participation of EU ministers.
5  Similarly,  the  institutions of the  ACP Group 
have been weaker than  anticipated.  The ACP Group is  still  important in  Convention 
negotiations,  and  the  ACP  Secretariat  and  the  Committee  of Ambassadors  are  still 
important  in  discussing  detailed  aspects  of aid  management,  including  support  to 
specific countries.  However, the ACP institutions do not have sufficient technical and 
organisational capacity to  support their policy formulation role in the joint institutions. 
In part these problems reflect the inevitable difficulty of coordinating 71  countries, but, 
according  to  our  interviews,  they  also  reflect  both  an  increasingly  cumbersome 
organisational structure and the unfocused agenda of a multiplicity of committees. 
The  positive  role  that  the  joint institutions  may  potentially  play  is  indicated  by  the 
recent improvements in the Joint ACP-EU Assembly.  Traditionally, Lome institutions 
have  played  a  significant  role  during  negotiations  on  Conventions,  with  the  Joint 
Assembly and the European Parliament providing important inputs to the debate.  More 
recently, the increased representativeness of ACP parliamentarians, active participation 
by the European parliament, an improved focus of the agenda, and the opening of the 
Joint Assembly to  some NGOs have all contributed to make the Joint Assembly a more 
effective forum  for  the  discussion of cooperation issues and for  influencing Member 
States  and  the  Commission  in  the  EU  'internal'  policy  formulation  cycle.  This  is 
important because the joint institutions have the  potential to  bring closer to European 
policy makers the realities of aid implementation in ACP countries. 
The  'internal' EU policy formulation process 
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  'internal'  EU process  of formulating  development 
policy towards ACP countries. This process is  mostly influenced by the interaction of 
EU actors (mainly the Council, Commission and Member States).  The role of the Lome 
institutions is more limited and indirect. 
EU aid  to  ACP countries  (managed by  the  Commission)  is  drawn from  two  distinct 
sources: the European Development Fund (which accompanies the Lome Convention) 
and the  EC  budget.  These differ substantially in their impact on the  implementation 
and management of aid (see Chapter ill). 
6  Differences are less marked in the process 
of formulating  'high'  level  development policies  towards  ACP countries,  other than 
No  EU  mirusters attended the Samoa Joint Council meeting, and only 6 ministers attended the  1998 
Barbados meeting. 
European  Development  Funds  are  outside  the  Commission's  budget.  The  requirements  for  the 
management of EDF projects differ significantly from those for the management of budget lines.  In 
this  report,  we  do  not  explicitly  discuss  these  differences.  The  question  of whether  European 
Development  Funds  should  be  budgetised  is  a complex one.  For a  review of the  arguments,  see 
'Briefing  on  the  Budgetisation  of  the  EDF:  Issues,  Implications,  and  Opportunity',  ECPDM, 
forthcoming. 
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those  policies  adopted  in  the  Lome  negotiations.  While,  in  the  normal  budgetary 
process, the European Parliament can impose policy priorities through the introduction 
of budget lines, Council Resolutions on development policy apply to  all  development 
cooperation. 
A simple model of  a complex process 
The 'internal' EC process of formulating development policies towards ACP countries 
is  complex.  Much of the complexity is  unavoidable and even desirable, arising from 
the large number of actors and institutions involved.  The policy formulation  process 
involves  the  interaction  of a  number  of European  Community  institutions  and  15 
Member  States,  and  should  be  informed  by  implementation  realities  in  71  ACP 
countries.  There are, then, many actors pursuing different objectives through a range of 
instruments, each actor in tum responding to a range of influences. 
While  much  of this  complexity 
is  common  to  all  EU  policy-
making  (see  Box),  there  are 
additional  complications  in 
development policy  fonnulation 
for ACP countries.  For example, 
Member  States  often  have  a 
strong  interest  in  their  own 
bilateral  programmes,  and  they 
have  different  views  on  the 
orientation  of  development 
policies.  What  is  more,  the 
environment is  one in  which,  at 
the  moment,  development 
policies  towards  ACP  countries 
do  not constitute one of the  key 
priorities for the Union. 
However,  the  Treaty  on 
European  Union  has  given  the 
development  policy  agenda 
greater  focus  and  urgency. 
The  process  of  EC  policy  formulation 
(general) 
a)  lnltJatJon starts when  the Commission sends a proposal 
to the Council of Ministers or to the Council and the European 
Parliament. The Commission can  Initiate a  policy on Its  own 
initiative  or upon  request from  the Council  or Parliament,  as 
both  have  the  power  to  ask  the  Commission  to  Initiate  a 
legislative  act.  In  preparing  proposals  for the  Council,  the 
Commission  can  associate  Member States  through  informaJ 
contacts,  through  expert  group  meetings,  or  by  providing 
progress  reports  to  the  Council.  Other  interest  groups  and 
NGOs may also provide inputs to policy formulation  either on 
their own Initiative or at the request of the Commission. 
b)  Decision.  Policy  proposals  from  the  Commission  are 
discussed by the  Council,  first  in  its  working  groups,  then in 
COREPER and at Ministerial level. Depending on the nature of 
the proposal, the Council can adopt it on qualified majority or 
with  unanimity.  The  decisions  can  be:  strategic  documents, 
proposals  for  cooperation  agreements,  Council  Resolutions, 
and  Regulations  and  Decisions.  Regulations,  which  provide 
the  legal  basis  for  budget  lines,  require  the  approval  of the 
European Parliament.  By contrast, the Parliament only has a 
consultative  role  with  regard  to  Resolutions.  The  European 
Parliament  discusses  Commission  proposals  first  in  the 
relevant  committee,  and  a  resolution  embodying  the  EP's 
position Is then adopted in plenary. 
Community development policy formulation  has  been given  special  treatment within 
the Treaty, with requirements on coordination (Article 130x) and complementarity with 
Member  States'  bilateral  aid  programmes,  on  economic  and  political  objectives
7 
(Article  130u), and on the consistency (coherence) of the Union's external activities as 
a whole (Article 130v). 
While recognising the complexity of the policy formulation process, we here attempt to 
offer a schematic analysis, to  identify the key interactions.  Figure 1 below describes 
some of the  key  relationships in  the fonnulation of development policy.  It depicts a 
simplified version of the EC policy formulation cycle as  it is in practice.  The figure 
shows  that  while  the  Council  of Ministers  is  the  actor  which  directly  formulates 
Sustainable  economic  and  social  development,  the  smooth  and  gradual  integration of developing 
countries into the world economy, the campaign against poverty in developing countries, developing 
and  consolidating democracy  and  the  rule  of law,  and  respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms. 
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development cooperation policies,  it  is  itself strongly influenced by the  Commission 
(which has the monopoly of policy initiation) and the Member States.  It also shows the 
internal  complexity  (and  possibility  of fragmentation)  of  some  of  the  key  actors 
(Council, Commission and Member States). 
Figure 1 also identifies some of the key instruments (formal and informal) available to 
each actor for influencing other actors, and thereby for affecting the policy formulation 
process.  The strength of each actor in the policy formulation process depends on the 
instruments available to it.  For example, the Member States have direct influence on 
development cooperation policy through their membership of the Council of Ministers, 
but  they  can  also  influence  the  Commission  by  their  participation  in  the  EDF 
Committee.  The figure also shows that while the European Parliament does not have a 
strong role  in  formulating  cooperation policies  (in  particular Council  Resolutions),  it 
can  indirectly  influence  the  Commission  through  its  control  over the  Commission's 
budget.  It  can  also  set  some  policy priorities  through  its  introduction of special  EC 
budgetary  lines.  Informally,  the  European  Parliament can  also  influence  the  policy 
formulation process through lobbying the other actors.  In tum. it is  through links with 
the European Parliament (particularly in the Joint Assembly) that the ACP countries can 
influence the  'internal' EC policy formulation process.  The Joint Assembly provides a 
forum  in  which  ACP countries  can directly  express  their concerns  to  key  European 
parliamentarians. 
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Figure 1: The 'internal' EU policy formulation process 
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In the rest of this section, we identify 'ideal' roles for each of the actors in the process 
of policy formulation and the constraints experienced by these actors in fulfilling these 
roles.  We then conclude by presenting the key outcomes of the system of development 
policy formulation.  We identify a  number of features  that are  desirable if the  policy 
formulation process is to yield policies that are relevant and coherent: 
•  There should be a clear sense of direction guiding policy formulation. 
•  Actors should take into account the Commission's implementation capacity.8 
•  There should be feedback from experience in the field to policy formulation. 
•  The Commission should have  a  strong capacity  for  policy initiation,  in  order 
that it can facilitate the three objectives above. 
•  There  should  be  coordination  both  with  other  policy-makers  within  the 
Commission  and  with  Member  States,  to  achieve  coherence  and 
complementarity. 
In order that the policy formulation process should have these features, it requires high 
capacity, and it requires communication and feedback at many levels. 
In the four Boxes below, we consider in turn each of the principal actors in the internal 
EC policy formulation process.  We isolate them for analytical purposes only.  For each 
actor, we first of all ask what role it should carry out (placed in italics in each Box) if 
the policy formulation process is to  have the ideal features identified above.  We then 
ask what 'constraints' prevent each actor from carrying out this  'ideal' role.  After the 
four Boxes,  we  then  go  on  to  identify some of the  key system outcomes that would 
seem to  be  associated with the  actual behaviour of the  actors and the constraints they 
face.
9 
This implies a choice between taking capacity as given (and planning accordingly) and taking steps to 
strengthen the Commission's capacity in order to allow it to fulfil its 'ideal' role. 
This again  is  for  presentational purposes only since the observed outcomes are associated  with  the 
entire system and not with the particular behaviour of any one actor. 
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Commission 
Firstly,  the  Commission  should persuade  other actors  (i.e.  Council,  Member  States  and the  European 
Parliament) of  the need to ground the policy formulation process on strategic development objectives and 
the knowledge of  implementation realities and the Commission's capacity constraints. 
Constraints 
Capacity: 
•  systemic weaknesses within the organisation (e.g.  fragmentation) limit its  strength as an actor (see next 
section). 
•  staff  and  resource  limitations  in  the  policy  units  affect  the  Commission's  policy  preparation 
(particularly in the social sectors and on governance, poverty, gender and environment). 
Pressure from other actors: 
•  political pressures, from Council and Parliament. to expand the policy agenda are difficult to resist. 
•  the fact that the Commission budget and EDF resources are controlled by  the European Parliament and 
the  Council  (including  the  ACP-Fin  working  group)  makes  the  Commission  particularly  subject  to 
influence by these actors. 
Secondly,  policy initiation  should be  based on  experience on  the  ground.  Lessons  learnt through  policy 
dialogue and aid management at the country level should be translated into policy proposals. 
Constraints 
Capacity: 
•  Insufficient  ability  to  monitor  aid  performance  and  learn  from  experience  (see  aid  implementation 
chapter). 
Fragmentation: 
•  Inadequate communication between: 
Delegations and Headquarters 
Geographical and Policy units 
Different Development Directorate General (Relex) 
Directorate General 
Council of Ministers 
The  Council's policy decisions  should have a  clear sense of direction.  Experiences  in  the field should 
infonn the Council's decisions through the influence of  the  Commission or through Member States,  whose 
Ministers sit in  the Council and who are also represented on the EDF Committee.  Policy decisions should 
aLso  take into account the  Commission's limitations in  terms of  hunu:m  as well as financial resources (see 
Footnote 8). 
Constraints 
Institutional: 
•  Rotating Presidency introduces some discontinuity into the functioning of the Council. 
•  Council  structures  are  very  demanding in  terms  of personnel and  time.  COREPER and the Council 
Working Groups are subject to an overload of meetings, affecting their focus (ranging from too general 
to  micro-management of the  Commission),  as  well  as  the  quality  and  continuity of participation by 
Member States. 
•  Council structures and  the  number of working groups affect the coordination among different groups 
and communication with Member States. 
•  Direct interaction between the Council and the EDF Committee is limited, affecting the direct feedback 
on the Commission's implementation experiences. 
Divergent interests: 
•  Council finds difficult to  integrate the different national development policies into a broadly consistent 
Community development policy. Member States' interest in the implementation of Council Resolutions 
is variable. 
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Member States 
While  Member States  have  their own  national interests,  they  should also  try  to  steer the  Community's 
development strategy towards the  objectives set out in  the Maastricht  Treaty,  in  panicular coordination, 
complementarity  and  coherence.  When  panicipating  in  the  Council  institutions,  they  should  take  into 
account  both  information  from  their  own  aid  programmes  and  the  Commission's  (through  the  EDF 
Committee).  They  should also  be  willing  to  foLlow  the  Council's  resolutions  in  their own  bilateral aid 
programmes, both at headquaners and in the field. 
Constraints 
Different interests: 
•  the Co'uncil's policy agenda is  to a large extent determined by  the rotating Presidency. However, often 
each Presidency has its own priorities. This adds to discontinuity and insufficient focus in the operation 
of the Council. 
•  Some Member States focus on their own bilateral aid  programmes and do not agree on the  need for a 
Community  development  policy.  As  a  consequence  there  is  a  focus  on  policy  areas  where  broad 
consensus
1 can be reached and where no difficult decisions are needed.  (For example, more resolutions 
on the social sectors than on trade). 
•  The different Council Working Groups draw their memberships from different sources. Members of the 
Development Cooperation Group (which deals with general issues of development policy) and the ACP 
Group (which prepares  the  agenda and  EU positions for  EU-ACP meetings) are  drawn from  foreign 
affairs  or  development  ministries.  By  contrast.  members  of the  ACP-Fin  Group,  which  deals  with 
financial  issues,  are  mostly Treasury officials. In  some cases, whereas representatives of development 
ministries are likely to  be concerned about the effectiveness of aid, representatives of finance ministries 
are likely to be more concerned on the need of strict financial controls. 
Fragmentation: 
•  Communication between MS  representations  in  different Council groups and  the  EDF Committee is 
often inadequate. For example, the EDF Committee should allow the Member States direct knowledge 
of the  Commission's development experience and  institutional  constraints.  Equally,  it  should share 
with  the  Commission  its  knowledge  of Member  States'  aid  experience.  However,  in  many cases, 
feedback from the EDF Committee is inadequate. 
•  Coordination  between  the  different  representatives  of a  Member State  in  the  Council  is  sometimes 
inadequate. 
•  Communication between Member States' headquarters and field offices is  often inadequate. This limits 
the learning process that should inform policy formulation as well as the MS in-country implementation 
of Council Resolutions. 
Capacity: 
•  Given  that  Council  structures  are  very  demanding  in  personnel  and  time  (see  under  Council 
constraints),  and  given  other  pressing  Union  priorities,  some  Member  States  have  difficulty  in 
participating effectively in these structures. 
European Parliament 
The  European  Parliament should indirectly influence EU development objectives  without being as much 
driven  by national  interests as  the  Member States,  and should ensure  that the  Commission's  budget is 
adequate to its aid objectives and is used efficiently. 
Constraints 
•  Attempts  to  directly expand the  Community's development policy objectives  by  focusing budgetary 
lines and by putting resources under reserve lines that can only be used if  certain conditions are met. 
•  Division between Development and Budgetary Committees can affect the  capacity of delivery by  the 
Commission. 
•  Limited resources and time of the Development Committee. 
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Outcomes
10 
The actors  involved in  the  policy  formulation  system interact in  a complex fashion. 
Outcomes cannot be attributed to particular actors since they are a product of the system 
as a whole.  In the previous section, we identified some of the constraints which prevent 
each actor in the system from behaving in  a way that would  'ideally' contribute to the 
policy formulation process.  We can now draw these observations together to see how 
these constraints combine to weaken the policy formulation system. 
1.  The policy formulation process does not appear to be guided by a sufficiently 
clear  sense  of  direction.  Ideally,  broad  policy  objectives  should  be  clearly 
identified,  and  specific  policies  should  be  aimed at  achieving  these  broad policy 
objectives.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  did  provide  overarching  policy 
objectives which were to  guide future policy formulation, such as the fight against 
poverty  and  the  support  of democracy.  It  also  expanded  the  policy  agenda  to 
political and social areas. However, there are many systemic factors which frustrate 
this sense of direction and weaken the coherence of the expanding policy agenda. 
There is weak coordination between the different actors which have a role in policy 
formulation.  There  are  divergent  objectives,  between  Member States,  and  even 
between different actors within the same Member State. As a consequence of these 
factors, although Member States are involved at all stages of policy formulation, the 
consequences of their efforts are a multiplicity of objectives, rather than  strategic 
vision.  Policies often appear in large part to reflect political compromises.  For this 
to  change,  the  Member  States  would  have  to  give  a  higher  political  priority  to 
development cooperation. 
2.  The expanding policy agenda has not been sufficiently realistic, either with regard 
to the Commission's constraints or with regard to the implementation realities in the 
field.  There  is  a  mismatch  between  an expanding  policy  agenda  and  the 
Commission's capacity to implement this agenda.  The Commission is limited in 
terms  of human  resources,  finances,  and  organisational  limitations.  The  policy 
agenda  has  expanded in  both  scope  and  detail,  but the  Commission's capacities 
have not kept pace, because of both external and internal constraints.  An important 
feature  of the  policy  formulation  system  is  the  weak  links  between  those  actors 
concerned mostly with  aid  and  those  actors  concerned  with  finances.  There are 
weak  links  between the  EDF Committee  and  the  Council  of Ministers.  between 
ACP-Fin  and  other  Council  Working  Groups,  and  between  the  budgetary  and 
development committees in the European Parliament. 
3.  The  realism  of  policies  is  also  limited  because  the  policy  agenda  is  not 
sufficiently informed by the Commission's aid implementation experience.  A 
successful policy cycle is one in which there is learning from experience, in which 
the  evaluation  of  implementation  realities  reveals  the  weaknesses  of  existing 
policies, so that future policies may be an improvement on  existing policies.  The 
learning process in the policy cycle is broken where there is insufficient monitoring 
of implementation or where policy-makers are  not well informed of the results of 
10  We are  here  separating the  analysis of the  EU policy system from  the  negotiations over the Lome 
Convention.  ACP  States  have  an  important  input  into  negotiations  on  the  Convention,  and  can 
thereby introduce a number of policy objectives, aid instruments and procedures which affect the EC 
cooperation system.  However.  in  other areas,  the  ACP  State~ have  only  limited influence on EU 
policy formulation. 
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monitoring.  Both  these  weaknesses  are  seen  in  the  policy  formulation  system. 
Most policy-makers appear not  to  be  sufficiently  informed of the  Commission's 
constraints in the field.  At the same time there is  also insufficient monitoring of the 
implementation of Council Resolutions.  These weak links break the feedback loop 
from policy implementation to policy formulation. 
These three  system consequences could be  counteracted if the Commission were in a 
position to influence the policy formulation process more effectively.  It might then be 
able to attenuate these weaknesses -guided by knowledge of its own limitations and of 
the realities in  the field, if it had sufficient capacity, it would be in a strong position to 
persuade other actors of the need to  ground the policy formulation process on strategic 
development objectives. 
In  practice, however, the Commission has not been able to persuade other actors of 
the need for strategic vision or of implementation realities in the Commission and 
in  the  field.  In  part,  this  is  because  of  organisational  limitations  within  the 
Commission, such as  its fragmented structure, inadequate systems and procedures, and 
weak capacity for  policy preparation.  But it  is  also  because  of external  constraints 
imposed upon the  Commission by  the policy formulation as  a whole - Lome and the 
EU policy  cycle - such  as  co-management of aid,  fragmentation  of instruments,  an 
over-ambitious  policy  agenda,  extensive  administrative  procedures,  and  budget 
limitations.  All  these  contribute  to  overload  the  Commission  and  thereby  limit  its 
influence in the policy formulation process. 
Role of the Commission 
The Commission has roles both in preparing and in implementing development policies 
for ACP countries.  The extent to which the Commission is able to carry out these two 
roles is affected by: 
•  constraints imposed by  the policy formulation system as  a whole (both Lome and 
EU) 
•  organisational and human resources limitations within the Commission. 
The previous section described some of the difficulties the Commission faces in playing 
its policy preparation role and the constraints that policy formulation process as a whole 
imposes on the Commission.  In this section, we examine the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Commission in the preparation and implementation of policies, particularly in the 
areas given priority by the Treaty on European Union (coordination, complementarity, 
coherence, governance, poverty reduction, gender and the environment). 
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Policy preparation 
In  the  'internal'  EC  policy 
formulation  process,  policy 
initiation begins with  the  policy 
units  within  DG  Vill preparing 
draft  communications  for  the 
Council.  These are discussed at 
senior  management  level  with 
other  Directorate  Generals,  and 
finally  at  the  level  of  the 
Commissioners,  before  they  are 
transmitted  to  the  Council. 
Although,  formally,  the  Council 
is  not associated at  this  stage,  it 
can  be  informed in  the  Council 
groups. or, at the initiative of the 
Commission, expert groups from 
Member States can participate. 
It  is  a  strength  of  the 
Commission  that  it  has 
increasingly  been  engaging  in 
consultation  with  concerned 
organisations  before  producing 
policy  proposals.  This  1s 
contributing  to  a  more 
transparent  and  participatory 
process  and  one  which 
contributes  to  more  operational 
policies.  Examples  of  good 
practice  include  the  Relief  and 
Long-Term  Development 
I 
The  Green  Paper  on  future  ACP-EU 
relations - opening up the policy debate 
In  November 1995, at the signing ceremony of Lome IV-Bis, 
the  Commissioner  announced  that  a  Green  Paper  on  the 
Mure of ACP·EU relations would be  prepared by the and of 
1996, and 'M:luld serve as a basis for debate on the reform of 
development cooperation. 
In the following 12 months, the Commission 'Reflection Group' 
engaged In  a consultation process. The group was  composed 
of  high  officials  from  DG  VIII  headquarters,  two  heads  of 
delegations  from  Africa,  and  a  member  of  the  Forwards 
Studies  Unit (attached to the  President of the  Commission). 
The group organised a conference (January 1996 in Brussels) 
and  two  seminars  (February  1996  in  Maastricht,  and  April 
1996 In  Abidjan),  and  It  commissioned  a  number of  expert 
papers. 
After publication of the paper,  a year-long consultation with a 
wide variety of Interested parties took place, both In the fifteen 
MS,  and  in  the  three  ACP  regions.  A  conference,  in 
September 1997, concluded the consultations, following which 
the  Commission  presented  a  communication  to  the  Council 
outlining  more  specific guidelines  for the  upcoming ACP-EU 
negotiations. 
The  Green  Paper  exercise  was  the  first  time  that  the 
Commission had attempted such a wide-ranging consultation 
on  development  cooperation  policy.  Many  welcomed  the 
initiative, the impetus that it gave to the debate on the future of 
Lome,  and the  responses that it  drew.  Both the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  SociaJ  Committee 
presented  reports  on  the Green  Paper.  Many MS  provided 
comments  on  the  documents,  and  a  number  of  external 
groups,  Including  academics  and  NGOs,  contributed  to  the 
discussion.  Private sector and civil society groups in the ACP 
countries were particularly positive about the extension of the 
policy debate beyond the confines of  government.  However, 
discussions  also  revealed  the  different  level  of  capacity 
between the preparations in the Commission and in the ACP 
countries for the negotiation of the post-Lome Convention. 
Communication  and  the  current  preparation  of a  Communication  on  private  sector 
development.  Similarly, in the Green Paper exercise, the Commission initiated a wider 
debate on the future of ACP development policies, presenting and discussing its own 
internal reflections (see Box). 
The  Member States  have  played  an  increasingly  active  role  in  policy  formulation. 
However, Council decisions could be made more strategic and realistic, giving greater 
consideration  to  the  Commission's  capacity  and  to  operational  implications. 
Communications and Resolutions vary considerably in their level of analysis and detail. 
In  a number of cases, resolutions provide little indication of how statements of broad 
policy intent are to be operationalised. 
While  many  Council  decisions  since  1992  have  focused  on  Maastricht  priorities 
(coordination, complementarity and coherence), others have focused on areas where the 
involvement of the Commission has been more limited (education, health, scientific and 
technological research).  See Box below. 
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There appears to be scope for improved  coordination between the Commission and the 
Council  in  the  policy  formulation  process,  in  ensuring  that  it  better  reflects 
implementation capacities in both headquarters and the Delegations.  This will probably 
require the Commission to take a more pro-active role in the process. 
Council Resolutions on development policy (1992 to 1997) 
GeneraJ Polley 
Run-up to 2000 
Structural Adjustment 
Regional economic Integration efforts 
Development Research 
Unking Relief, Rehabilitation & Long-tenn Dvt. 
Thematic Policies 
Campaign against poverty 
Food security policies 
Gender issues 
Environmental Assessment in Dvt. Cooperation 
Migration and Development 
Gender and Crisis 
Oecentralised Cooperation 
Fight aoainst anti-oersonnellandmlnes 
Policy implementation 
Sector Policies 
Family planning 
AIDS policy 
Health 
Education 
Human and Social Development 
Scientific and Technological Research 
Microfinancing 
Coherence, Complementarity and Coordination 
Priority areas for coordination 
Procedures for coordination 
Complementarity 
OperationaJ coordination 
Coherence 
Policy  implementation  includes  the  analysis  of policy  options,  the  preparation  of 
detailed  guidelines  (such  as  'Instruction  Notes')  and  the  integration  of policies  into 
programme implementation.  This process is  affected by the organisational and human 
resource limitations within DGVITI  policy units.  In  many cases,  there is  a significant 
delay in the preparation of Instruction Notes, in staff training and in the development of 
detailed operational manuals.  Collaboration with Member States in key policy areas, 
with  expert  group  meetings,  has  strengthened  the  process  through  sharing  of 
experiences and coordinated approaches on policy issues. However, there is  scope for 
more joint policy  development in  areas  where  particular Member States  have  well-
established expertise and experience. 
Difficulties in  implementing policies appear to be relatively greater for policies relating 
to  poverty reduction, governance, gender and environment than for  direct sector 
support programmes.  Some of the reasons for this are: 
•  staffing limitations in the pollcy units concerned, 
11  with very few specialist staff 
in the Delegations. 
•  implementation  is  indirect,  through  sector  programmes  and  projects, 
necessitating the  adoption of 'mainstreaming'  approaches, rather than through 
supporting direct interventions. 
II In some cases there may be a single policy adviser. 
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•  geographical units have disbursement pressures, and are  therefore wary of the 
introduction  of  new  policy  requirements  which  might  slow  down  project 
preparation and implementation. 
•  staff in  operational  units  and  Delegations  have  excessive  workloads  and  are 
therefore  reluctant to  introduce  new  policy  requirements  involving additional 
work demands. 
In sector support programmes, by contrast, good results have been achieved where there 
has been efficient networking between policy staff in DGVill, the geographical desks, 
Delegations and field-based technical assistance. For example, in the case of health, the 
Commission has been able  to  take a leading role in  the  development of a sector-wide 
approach  which  is  now  being  adopted  by  a  number of donor  agencies.  T A  health 
coordinators have been appointed in 30 major cooperating countries and are improving 
the  integration  of policies  into  programme  implementation.  Similarly,  our  country 
studies found evidence of successful policy implementation in  sectoral programmes in 
agriculture in Zimbabwe, in  the roads sector in  Cameroun, and in  the response to  the 
post-emergency situation in Liberia. 
The  two  Boxes  below  show  examples  of some  of the  Commission's  strengths  and 
difficulties in the implementation of policies.  The first Box provides an example of the 
relatively successful  implementation of a  new policy orientation in  the  health sector. 
The  second  Box  illustrates  some  of the  difficulties  in  trying  to  implement  gender 
policies. 
Policy implementation: (1) Health 
Prior to  1993  EC  health  projects  were  primarily involved  with  the development of health  facilities.  The 
concem to protect health services provision during structural adjustment. together with the growing realisation 
of the need to link  Investment in health with improvements in health services management,  led to a major 
policy review.  This resulted in the presentation of a comprehensive policy paper on health and the passing of 
a Council Resolution In May 1994. 
In  the  subsequent  policy  implementation.  there  were  twice-yearly  meetings  of  an  Expert  Group  which 
Involved the Member States.  Since 1996, the Commission has  also participated in  a wider policy debate, 
lnvolvtng  other bilateral  donors,  the Wor1d  Bank, WHO and UNICEF,  wtth  the aim of coming  up with  an 
improved sector-wide approach to health service development.  During this process there was  consultation 
with the SPA,  and leading reformers from  ACP countries were involved in reviewing the guidelines which 
were subsequently published. 
Reform of the policy framework has also been reflected in changes in the arrangements for EC assistance for 
health  service  support.  Project funds  are  increasingly  used  to  support institutional  development  and  to 
support health services in particular regions or districts.  Under the sector-wide approach, the Commission is 
obliged to coordinate its assistance with other donors and to coordinate with both government and other local 
organisations Involved in health services provision. 
These developments have been matched by an improvement In health policy management capacities within 
DGVIII.  The number of health  advisers  Increased  from  two in  1993 to  seven  in  1997.  There Is  close 
cooperation between the two units responsible for health poflcy. 
The strength of policy Implementation In this area can be seen in the management of ald to the health sector 
In C6te d'lvoire.  Our evaluation team in C()te d'lvoire found evidence that the strong policy capacity had bean 
translated Into effective aid Implementation. 
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Policy implementation: (2) Gender 
The importance of gender In  EU-ACP development cooperation was  first emphasised in  Lome IV.  The first 
Council  resolution  on ·Integrating  gender  Issues  into  development  (December  1995)  emphasised  the 
Importance of 'mainstreaming' gender analysis Into the conception and design of development policies and 
Interventions, and of the Importance of capacity building on  gender Issues and gender-sensitive approaches 
(both In ACP States and the Commission). 
Within DGVIII, It Is recognised that the ma.instreamlng of gender analysis will take considerable time.  In part 
this reflects intematlonal experience in the effective Incorporation of gender sensitivity into programme design 
and Implementation.  However, there may be particular problems within the EC system due to: Q} the minimal 
staffing of the Gender Desk; and (ii) the problems in building gender awareness among staff working in the 
Delegations. The 1997 progress report of the Gender Unit on the Implementation of the Resolution noted that 
It has been affected by the limited staffing of the Gender Desk (which comprised one expert and one support 
staff).  Using funds from an EC budget line for gender sensitlsation, consultants have  been used to provide 
advice  to  Delegations  and  ACP  governments,  undertake  policy  and  methodological  studies,  and  provide 
gender training.  However,  the  report  noted that:  'external consultants  cannot fill  the  need for sufficient 
pennanent expertise  on  gender issues  wffhin  the  Commission,  in  order to  ensure  long-term  institutional 
capacity and sustained follow-up'. 
Nevertheless,  a  number of  positive steps  have  been taken,  such as  the  revision  of the  1991  manual on 
Women in  Development (to be integrated into the Project Cycle Management approach), increased use of a 
gender questionnaire on financing proposals, and the designation of staff in 28 units in DGVIII  as Gender 
FocaJ  Points.  These staff are the link with the gender desk and are  responsible for promoting more gender-
sensitive approaches within the unit 
Coherence, complementarity and coordination 
I 
Following the  Treaty of Union and a number of Council Resolutions, 
12  the  issues of 
coherence, complementarity and coordination have  assumed increasing importance in 
policy  formulation  and  implementation.  While  coordination  has  improved  in  some 
policy areas and in some countries, there are significant difficulties given constraints on 
the Commission, the different policy orientations of Member States, and organisational 
structures for aid management. 
Coherence 
The complexities of policy interdependence, the different levels at which policies apply, 
and  the  relative  political priority  given  to  different EC policy areas have  resulted in 
considerable  difficulties  in  defining  policy  coherence.
13  In  this  section,  we  use 
'coherence' to refer to consistency between different Community policies.  The political 
focus  on  coherence  appears  to  have  led  to  closer  coordination  among  senior 
management within  a given Directorate General,  between  Directorate Generals, and 
between  Commissioners.  Within  DGVIII,  responsibilities  have  been  assigned  for 
monitoring coherence issues in the areas of food aid (including exports under the CAP), 
fisheries  policy and post-conflict interventions, and for coordination with the relevant 
DGs. 
Incoherence  problems  are  particularly  well  documented  with  respect  to  the  adverse 
effects  of subsidised beef exports  on  the  West  African  livestock industry,  and  the 
effects  of  bilateral  fishing  agreements  on  artisanal  fishing  industries  and  on  the 
sustainable management of fisheries stocks in ACP countries.  Recently, there has also 
12  'Procedures  for  Coordination'  (Resolution  of 2/12193);  'Complementarity'  (Resolution of 1/6/95); 
'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and  Long-Term Development'  (Resolution of 28/5/96);  'Operational 
Coordination' (Resolution of 5/6/97); and 'Coherence' (Resolution of 5/6197). 
13  See  'The  Europeanisation  of  Development  Cooperation:  Coordination,  Complementarity  and 
Coherence' -Christiane Loquai, ECDPM Working Paper No.  13, October 1996. 
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been particular concern about ensuring consistency between different EC interventions 
in post-conflict situations.
14 
Polley coherence- agriculture 
Problems of incoherence arise particularly  in  the  agriculture sector.  Through consultation  and  coordination 
between services, the EC has been successful in removing incoherence in the case of beef exports.  This may 
provide  a modal for dealing with  other cases of incoherence.  The EC is  now also taking steps to address 
Incoherence in cereal exports and banana Imports. More generally, trade statistics with ACP countries are now 
examined regularly  to detect any significant change in trade flows. 
Beef 
Under the CAP, exports of beef to AOC countries (West and Central Africa) used to be heavily subsidised, to 
the  benefit  of  EU  producers.  However,  these  subsidies  harmed  local  producers  in  AOC  countries,  and 
therefore conflicted with development policy.  This incoherence was  brought to the attention of the Commission 
by NGOs and MEPs in 1993. 
Over the following years, the Commission took a series of steps: 
information gathering 
•  creating an internal consultation mechanism within the Commission 
•  harmonising the level of export subsidies to all sub-Saharan Africa 
•  regular meetings between the EU and the Agriculture Ministers of AOC countries 
The incoherence has now been largely removed, with a reduction of export subsidies from 1,990 ecultonne to 
215  ecultonne,  much of this  reduction  coming since  1997.  This,  combined with the devaluation of the CFA 
franc in  1994, has led to a substantial fall in beef exports to AOC countries. 
Bananas 
Under the provisions of the lome Convention, a number of measures existed to guarantee a European market 
for ACP  banana  producers,  in  spite of the fact  that their prices  are higher than  world  prices.  This  import 
licensing and tariff system has recently been condemned by the WTO.  To avoid incoherence between the EU's 
commitment to tree trade and its development policy, the Commission has taken three steps: 
•  presenting proposals to the  Counc~ of Ministers for a new tartff quota based system which rt believes will 
comply with the Lome Convention 
•  funding projects to Improve the competitiveness of ACP banana production 
•  funding projects to help ACP countries to diversify out of banana production. 
Complementarity 
There  has  been  extensive  debate  within  the  Council  over  the  interpretation  of the 
concept of complementarity, for example over the question of whether complementarity 
implies  specialisation  between  the  Commission  and  Member  States.  The  Council 
Resolution of 1 June  1995  sees  greater complementarity of EC development policies 
with those of the Member States as  being achieved through strengthening coordination 
in defining sectora1  pol~cies and in the programming of EC aid. 
Since  1998, a number of steps have been taken in  this area although it is too early to 
assess their  impact.  For example, procedures for joint strategy exercises with recipient 
countries are  being developed.
15  Country programme co-ordination at  sector level  is 
also  being  strengthened,  with  the  assignment  of  lead  responsibility  to  either  the 
Commission or a Member State. 
14 
15 
The  Council  Resolution  also  emphasised  the  need  for  coherence  between  EC  aid  and  migration 
policies.  However, this primarily an  issue in  relations with Mediterranean countries rather than the 
ACP group. 
This will not include the preparation of a common country strategy. 
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Coordination with Member States 
The  Treaty  of  the  Union  committed  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  to 
coordinate their policies on development cooperation.  Council resolutions in  1993  set 
out the basis and priorities for operational coordination.
16  Co-ordination has focused on 
four  priority  themes:  poverty  alleviation,  food  security,  health  and  population,  and 
education and training. 
Contacts between Commission and Member States experts have increased, and this has 
increased the understanding of different donors' policies and development approaches. 
However, improvements in coordination have been made difficult by: 
•  the divergent objectives of EC and national aid policies; 
•  fragmentation within EC and national aid programmes; 
•  reductions in agency personnel establishments; 
•  differences in the level of decentralisation between different agencies; and 
•  overlap with existing coordination networks. 
In  mid-1997, it was reported that the effectiveness of operational coordination in the 6 
pilot countries  was  variable, 
17  more progress  being made in  Cote d'Ivoire and Peru. 
Specific  problems  included  insufficient  staff  in  Delegations,  links  with  other 
coordination bodies, the level of involvement of the beneficiary country and insufficient 
participation from some Member States. 
Coordination with other donors 
A number of measures have been taken to ensure more effective coordination with other 
donors, particularly the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI).  Procedures for exchange of 
information and regular contact have been initiated with the  IMF and include informal 
contact in  the  preparation of Policy Framework Papers.  Coordination  is  not always 
timely but it is  improving.  Coordination with the World Bank takes place mainly on 
issues of structural adjustment, sector programming and public expenditure.  It follows 
a  practice  that  was  formalised  in  1990.  However,  this  relationship  was  markedly 
strengthened  by  the  High  Level  Meeting in  July  1996  in  Lisbon.  This  focused  the 
collaboration  on  pilot  countries  (Mozambique,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Ethiopia).  More 
importantly,  in  the  last  meeting  (Baltimore,  February  1998)  a  number of criteria  to 
determine  the  success  or  failure  of collaboration  were  agreed  (information  sharing, 
timing  of exercises,  levels  of decision  making,  coordinatioa on  the  ground,  and  the 
clarity of focus of the collaboration). 
The  Commission also  effectively pursues  economic  reform co-ordination through its 
participation in international forums, particularly the SPA (see next chapter). 
Monitoring implementation 
In  order to  assess  whether policies are  being effectively translated into practice, it is 
important that there should be monitoring of the Commission's actions.  While the need 
16 
17 
'Priority  Areas  for  Coordination'  - Council  Resolution  of  25  May  1993  and  'Procedures  for 
Cooperation' - Council 'rt.esolution of 2 December 1993. 
Bangladesh. Costa Rica, Cote lvoire, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Peru. 
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for a system to  ensure consistency in  the  implementation of aid policies over a large 
number of countries is  common to  all  major donors,  the  Commission has  particular 
difficulties in ensuring consistency as a result of: 
•  an  over-extended  policy  agenda  in  which  policy  Irnttattves  are  sometimes  taken 
without due regard to the resources available for implementation and follow-up; 
•  insufficient intemalisation of guidelines and manuals covering major areas of policy 
implementation; 
•  differences in perceived priorities among Delegations (project-based or sectoral); 
•  limited resources, both human and financial, to provide policy back-up and support 
to Delegations or to monitor the work of consultants. 
The Internal Agreement of the EDF 
provided for  the  monitoring  of the 
implementation  of  development 
policy  and  for  the  review  by 
Member States of new projects and 
programmes
18
•  The  instrument for 
this  purpose  was  the  EDF 
Committee.  In  the  past,  this  was 
the only forum for quality control in 
the  Commission.  The  EDF 
Committee  has  had  some  impact. 
However,  its.  capacity  has  been 
limited (see Box).  It  has  therefore 
in  the  past  been  possible  for 
projects  to  be  processed  without 
adequate  scrutiny  either within  the 
Commission  (e.g.  by  policy  units) 
or outside it. 
The recent establishment ( 1997) of 
the  Quality  Support  Group  was 
The EDF Committee 
The  Internal  Agreement  between  the  Member  States 
gives  the  EDF  Committee  the  tasks of  examining  the 
programming  of  aid  at  country  level,  supporting  the 
coordination of approaches and operations between the 
EC  and Member States, monitoring the implementation 
of  aid,  and  making  decisions  on  specific  financing 
proposals in excess of 2 Mecu. 
In practice, the direct Impact of the Committee Is limited. 
While  its  mere  presence  may  improve  the  quality  of 
proposals through  a  deterrent effect,  its  ability to alter 
proposals  Is  more  limited.  Committee  minutes  of the 
last 3-4 years reveal that only about 1  00/o of projects are 
either sent back for revision or are rejected. 
Proposals are not subject to close technical scrutiny in 
the  Committee.  And  there  is  a  tendency  to  keep 
projects below the 2 Mecu level to limit exposure to the 
scrutiny that there is (IT  AD evaluation, p.24). 
In addition, the Committee's impact is limited by capacity 
constraints  and  fragmentation.  Capacity  limitations 
force Member States to send junior staff members from 
the capitals as representatives on the Committee.  And 
fragmentation arises from the different policy emphases 
that Member States bring to the Committee. 
therefore an important development.  The QSG provides a formal opportunity for Heads 
of Units
19  (including policy units and the  evaluation unit) to review and comment on 
projects before they are submitted to  the EDF Comm.ittee.
20  In the  view of experts in-
the  Commission, the  Quality Support Group  is  an  important step  towards  improving 
quality control and the monitoring of policy implementation. 
However, the performance of these functions within the Commission faces a number of 
constraints.  Policy advisers in Headquarters and in Delegations have limited time, and 
their ability to  review proposals is  made difficult by  the  fragmentation of DGVIII, by 
the  weakness of the EC project monitoring system, and by  weak internalisation of ex 
post evaluations.  If  the QSG is  to be successful, it should strengthen its focus on the 
initial stages of the project cycle and the identification of the key issues to be addressed 
during project design.21  Finally, it should be remembered that the existence of the QSG 
18 
19 
20 
21 
The EDF Committee was  also to  'seek appropriate coordination of the approaches and operations of 
the Community and its Member States in the interests of consistency and complementary'.  However, 
this role has not been adequately fulfilled. 
Or their fonnal representatives. 
Although it also briefly reviews project identification. 
Imtial  steps  in  this  direction  are  currently  being  taken.  The  QSG examines  project identification 
sheets for 10-15 minutes each. 
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does  not reduce  the  importance of the  informal peer reviews  that should always take 
place within teams. 
The Commission's limitations 
The Commission's difficulties in  both the preparation and implementation of policies 
can be attributed to: 
•  constraints imposed by  the policy formulation system as a  whole (both Lome 
and EU).  The Lome Convention imposes a number of objectives. instruments and 
operational details that the Commission needs to  follow.  In addition, the European 
actors in  the  policy formulation system have established an over-ambitious policy 
agenda while  providing limited staffing and administrative resources.  Finally, the 
EDF Internal Agreement requires extensive, time-consuming ex ante controls (see 
section on Aid Implementation). 
•  organisational and human resources limitations within the Commission.  These 
result in  part from the history of an institution that has grown quite rapidly, losing 
some of its initial cohesiveness while maintaining its focus on informal systems and 
on the administration and delivery of projects.  These constraints include: 
a)  a fragmented organisational structure in which policy and operational units 
are unduly separated; 
b)  inadequate systems and procedures: 
c)  inadequate investment in professional development and training; 
d)  shortages of specialist staff in key sectors. 
a) Fragmented organisational structure of  DGV/11 
The  current.  organigram  of 
DGVID
22  reflects  a  highly 
compartmentalised structure with 7 
directorates  and  49  units.  The 
fragmented  structure  results  in 
responsibility  for  particular  policy 
areas  being  divided  between 
different  units.  See  the  Box  for 
some  examples  of  fragmented 
responsibility. 
This fragmentation is perceived as a 
constraint to  effective coordination 
and  team  work.  Coordination 
among  directorates  and  the 
technical units  in  the  Geographical 
Directorates  varies  considerably, 
often  depending  on  personal 
initiative.  In  some  areas,  such  as 
Divided responsibility for policy 
Divided responsibility for policy is found both at the level of 
overall planning and at the level of single policies. 
Overall  policy  planning  is  divided  between:  the  Policy 
Planning,  Macroeconomics  and  Structural  Adjustment 
Support  Unit  (VIII/1);  and  the  Development  Polley 
Directorate (A). 
Responsibility  for  single  policies  is  divided  between:  a 
thematic desk  in  the Development Policy Directorate (A); 
and  a sector desk  in  either the  Sectoral  Implementation 
Directorate (G)  or the geographical directorates (D,  E,  F). 
In  some  sectors  the  division  of  responsibility  can  be 
considerably  more  complicated,  as  in  the  case  of 
agricufture and rural development. 
Example - agriculture and rural development 
Aspects  of  responsibility  for  agricultural  and  rural 
development  poticy  are  shared  between  seven 
departments In  six directorates.  This  fragmentation  has 
made more difficult the adoption of an overall policy and 
strategy for the  sector.  Policy initiatives are  sometimes 
developed  and  Introduced  within  a  single  geographicaJ 
region, even though they may have much wider relevance. 
As of July 1998.  Reorganisation plans aim to reduce the fragmentation and introduce country teams. 
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health  (see  Box  on  page  44  above),  co-ordination  is  close  and effective,  while  for 
thematic policies (governance, gender, poverty and environment) it is more difficult. 
The  weaknesses of the  present structure  have  been  recognised  within  DGVITI.  The 
current  reorganisation  is  intended  to  address  these  weaknesses  (see  Box  on recent 
initiatives within  the  Commission,  at  the  end of the  chapter).  Key  stages  of the 
reorganisation  were  implemented  after  the  completion  of  the  draft  report  of this 
evaluation.  Shortage of time  makes it difficult to  assess  the  potential impact of the 
measures taken. 
b) Inadequate systems and procedures 
The difficulties of introducing a manual-
Environment 
Lome IV introduced a specific focus on environmental issues 
as  an  area for  ACP-EU  cooperation  {Articles  33-35).  This 
was  followed  by  the  release  in  1993  of  an  Environment 
Manual  setting  out  environmental  procedures  and  the 
methodology  to  guide  Lome  IV  projects.  However,  other 
requirements necessary for the successful application of this 
manual were not put in place, with the result that its use was 
selective and limited.  In particular: 
•  limited Involvement of DGVIII environmental specialists in 
the  country  programming  exercises  meant  that 
environmental Issues were often not  adequately reflected 
in the initiaJ identification of programmes and projects; 
•  there  was  limited  awareness  among  DGVIII  staff  In 
country  and  technicaJ  units  and  among  staff  in  the 
Delegations  of  environmental  issues,  and  no  training 
programme was put in place to create such awareness; 
•  the  use  of  the  environmental  manuaJ  was  not  made 
compulsory until 1996. 
Following  an  evaluation  of  Environmental  Perfonnance  of 
EC Programmes in Developing Countries, these issues are 
now being  addressed  by the  Environment Desk  in DGVIII. 
The  Environment Manual is to be revised  and  updated as 
part  of a Joint  exercise with  DGIA  and DGlB.  A modular 
training programme is to be developed In order to  promote 
environmental  awareness  among  DGVIII  and  Delegation 
staff. 
The experience with  the  handling  of  environmental  issues 
suggests  the  need  for  more  systematic  procedures  for 
following  up  policy  decisions,  through  (I) ensuring  that 
adequate  specialist  staff  resources  are  made  available; 
(ll) determining the  implications tor programme and  project 
cycle  management;  {ilQ timetabling  the  preparation  and 
introduction  of  user  manuals~  and  0v} ensuring  that 
arrangements are In place for Information coUection and the 
monitoring of policy Implementation. 
Internal  practice  and  procedures 
within  DGVITI  have  evolved  in 
response to a series of policy and 
operational decisions.  While the 
organisation  has  become 
increasingly  complex,  it  still 
relies on limited information and 
informal networks.
23 
Firstly,  there  is  a  clear need to 
define  staff responsibilities more 
clearly.  Individual  staff  in 
DGVIII operate with insufficient 
job  descriptions  or  terms  of 
reference. 
Secondly,  while  there  are  a 
number  of  manuals  available,
24 
'there  appears  to  be  a 
disconnection  between  the 
production  of  manuals  on 
specific  topics  and  the 
incorporatirm of those procedures 
into  obligatory  working 
procedures.  This  situation 
contributes  to  the  sense  of 
confusion  about  precisely  which 
approach  is  DGVIll  policy'. 
25 
The  last  full  revision  of  the 
Manual  of Instructions  occurred 
in  1988.  Other  manuals  have 
been  introduced  with  little 
23 
24 
See 'Project Monitoring and the Use of Indicators', ITAD, September 1996. 
Manuals include: Manual of Instructions, User guide to  the financial procedures of the EDF, Manual 
of Budgetary  procedures,  Manual  for  the  preparation  and  appraisal  of projects  and  programmes, 
sectoral manuals/guidelines, practical user's guide and the Manual for Project Cycle Management 
See ITAD. p. 42. 
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trrurung.  Manuals on  gender, environment and transport have been produced but their 
impact is variable (see Box above).  However, a significant improvement was achieved 
through  the  introduction  of  the  Project  Cycle  Management  Manual,  which  was 
accompanied by  an  effective training programme (both  in  Headquarters  and in  ACP 
countries) and which now guides the preparation of financing proposals.  Its impact on 
aid implementation was noticeable in our country studies. 
These  two  factors  combine  to  lead  to  wide  variations  in  the  role  of staff,  unclear 
definition  of responsibilities,  ad  hoc decision  making  and  unsystematic  information 
flows.  All of these contribute to weaken the organisational efficiency of DGVID. 
c) Inadequate investment in professional development and training 
Systems for professional development and training are also inadequate and budgets are 
limited.  There is  no  requirement for training as part of career development.  In recent 
years,  two  main  types  of in-house  training  have  been  provided:  a  general  training 
programme  (on  project  cycle  management,  financial  procedures,  and  financial  and 
economic  analysis)  and  specialised  courses  (including  structural  adjustment, 
environment,  poverty,  gender  awareness,  and  conflict  prevention).  There  is  very 
limited training for staff going to Delegations. 
d) Shonages of  specialist staff 
Insufficient staffing is  widely perceived as  a major constraint within DGVTII.  While 
DGVID  grew  considerably  up  to  1994,  there  have  been  considerable  resource 
constraints since then.  The number of advisers in Delegations has also been reduced. 
26 
Demands on staff resources may be higher than in other aid systems as  a result of the 
EC policy formulation cycle, the operation of the EU-ACP joint structures, and the role 
of DGVTII in coordinating with the bilateral agencies of Member States.  It is hard to 
assess  what  the  optimal  level  of professional  staff should  be,  since  perceptions  of 
shortages are affected by insufficient selectivity in policy objectives and operations, an 
fragmented organisational structure, inadequate systems and procedures, and excessive 
ex ante financial controls (see Aid Implementation).  The evaluation team did not assess 
the optimal level of staffing in  headquarters or Delegations.  However, in our country 
visits, we observed a clear shortage of specialist staff in key policy areas. 
Furthermore, the  deployment of specialist staff within  DGVID reflects  the  traditional 
emphasis  on  project  implementation  in  infrastructure  and  agriculture.  There  are 
relatively  few  specialist staff in  institutional  development or in  the  areas  of poverty, 
gender, environment, despite the increasing emphasis given to these areas in the EC aid 
programme.  The  shortage  of such  staff  in  the  Delegations  helps  to  explain  the 
difficulties of following through policy initiatives at the field level.
27 
26  Pressure from  the  European Parliament and other Directorate Generals.  Priority has  been  given  to 
Eastern Europe. 
27  In health sector programmes, this has  been mitigated by the appointment of programme coordinators 
under T A contracts. 
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Recent initiatives within the Commission 
DGVIII 
The  reorganisation  of  DGVlll  merges  together  the  Development  Policy  and  Sectoral 
Implementation directorates and the technical units In the Geographical Directorates.  It will 
aJso  be accompanied  by the Introduction  of a task-oriented approach,  team  work and the 
creation  of  thematic  teams  providing  both  policy  and  programming  support  to  the 
geographical  units.  While  this  should  strengthen  the  policy  capacity  of  DGVIII,  these 
changes will  require  a change In  'culture' that will take strong leadership and some tlme to 
achieve. 
SCR 
This reorganisation Is  accompanied by  the  creation  of the  Service Commun Relex (SCR), 
responsible  for  Implementation  after the  conclusion  of  financing  agreements.  While  the 
merging of Implementation units in  the RELEX services is clearly a positive step, there is a 
risk that the  SCR  will  reinforce  the  fragmentation  between  policy and  operations.  This Is 
particularly  significant  at  a  time  when  Community  ald  Is  Increasingly  concerned  with 
supporting policy reforms in the ACP countries.
1  This risk will be averted if, as expected, the 
RELEX Directorates are subsequently merged with the SCR. 
Country Reviews 
ln June 1998, the  Director General of DGVIII  issued guidance tor the setting up of Country 
Reviews, to be earned  out at least once a year.  These are formaJ  meetings that will  bring 
together  relevant  staff  (EDF  and  budget  lines)  from  the  different  units  of  DGVIII,  the 
Delegation, and where appropriate from other services (SCR, Echo, etc.)  These reviews are 
to provide a complete and up-to-date overview of the Commission's actions, to examine the 
adequacy  of  the  Commission's  strategy,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  facilitating 
complementarity  with  Member  States  and  other  donors.  The  Country  Reviews  will  be 
followed by In-country meetings with ACP representatives. 
Coordination 
In July 1998, the Director Generals of Development of the EU Issued a draft report outlining 
the  principles  to  guide  action,  and  practical  proposals  for  coordination  at  sectoral, 
operational, and fntemationallevels.  These proposals are an important step to operationalise 
the objectives of coordination and complementarity set out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
1. This comment reflects the nsks inherent in any separation of policy and operations functions.  Since the 
roorgantsatlon took place as this report was being completed, It is too earfy to assess its fuU Impact. 
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II.  Policy dialogue between the Commission and the 
ACP States 
~  The Commission's transition from being a project-based donor to  being a policy-based donor is 
a difficult one. 
~  Policy dialogue on National Indicative Programmes has been strengthened. 
~  The Commission's Structural Adjustment Facility has supported the policy dialogue between the 
Bretton Wood Institutions and ACP governments. 
~  The Commission's in-country involvement in  the  overall policy dialogue on structural reforms 
and  its  participation  in  public  expenditure  reviews  have  often  been  limited  by  a  number of 
constraints. 
~  In  many countries.  the  Commission  has  been  active  in  sectoral  policy  dialogue.  Its  success 
depends on several factors. 
The Delegation's  staffing and sectoral expertise are  important factors.  The Commission 
needs to  be  more focused on  its  choice of sectors for  intervention, and it  needs to  staff its 
Delegations accordingly. 
The greater the  capacity and commitment of ACP governments, the  more likely is  policy 
dialogue to be effective, particularly in the presence of a clear sector policy framework. 
Technical  Assistance  provided  to  ACP  governments  has,  in  some  cases,  been  used 
effectively to facilitate sectoral policy dialogue, but in others it has undermined ownership. 
~  Some progress has been made towards improving in-country donor coordination. 
~  The Commission.  like  most  donors,  has  had  difficulties  in  integrating  key  policy  concerns -
poverty, governance, gender and the environment- into the policy dialogue and into the design 
of programmes and projects. 
The importance of policy dialogue 
There  is  an  emerging  consensus  that  aid  is  only  effective  when  it  strengthens 
institutions and policies and has full domestic support (ownership).  At the same time, 
the  evidence on  the  fungibility of aid funds  implies that donors  should be  concerned 
about the quality of all public spending and not just about particular projects.
28 
Although this evaluation examines past EC interventions, it also addresses the concerns 
of the new consensus by focusing on the policy dialogue between the Commission and 
ACP governments.  Policy dialogue is  seen as  the way in which donors can influence 
the policies and institutions of ACP governments. 
This role is difficult for the Commission, given its traditional role in providing financial 
resources to ACP countries for transport and agricultural projects.  As for other donors, 
internal incentives often result in donor performance being measured by the amount of 
resources disbursed rather than by the outcomes of interventions.  The Commission's 
28  See  'Rethinking Aid:  What Works, What Doesn't and Why', Policy Research Report, World Bank. 
June 1998.  See also: Burnside and Dollar (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1997). 
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transition  towards  a  more  policy-based  aid  programme is  also  constrained  by  there 
being a multiplicity of policy objectives, by the demands of on-going sector projects, by 
administration-intensive  aid  procedures,  by  organisational  limitations  and  staffing 
constraints. 
Indicative programming 
Under the terms of the Lome Convention, the Commission determines a financial envelope 
for  each  ACP country and  region.  The country  or region then draws up  an  Indicative 
Programme, with the advice of the  Commission.  Indicative programming is, along with 
negotiations  on  the  Lome  Convention,  one  of the  main  channels  through  which  ACP 
countries may influence the priorities of development cooperation.  The contractuality and 
procedures  of  the  programming  exercise  seek  to  ensure  a  close  link  between  aid 
programmes and ACP governments' policies. 
Progress has been gradually achieved in transforming indicative programming from an 
ad hoc collection of projects (EDF 1 and EDF 2)  into a more effective instrument for 
planning and dialogue.  In  particular,  the  most recent  Indicative  Programme exercise 
(EDF 8)  has  benefited from  the  new Strategy Papers prepared by  the  Commission, 
which are significantly more analytical than the previous Pre-Programming Documents 
(EDF 7).  The Strategy Papers often note programme constraints and interventions by 
other donors, and in some cases even include lessons learnt from previous evaluations. 
However, the Strategy Papers in some cases still continue to  underestimate programme 
risks  (e.g.  Tanzania).  The  Strategy  Papers  have  been  subject  to  consultation  with 
Member States.  Although the degree of consultation is  considered adequate, it varies 
between  countries  and  between  sectors.  Strategy  Papers  are  internal  Community 
documents and are not normally shared with the ACP countries. 
In most cases,  the  most recent National Indicative Programmes (EDF 8)  have also 
benefited  from  increased  consultation  with  ACP  governments  and  Member  States. 
Discussions with ACP governments are essential to strengthen the ownership of the aid 
programme.  In  some  cases,  there  has  been  extensive  consultation  with  ACP 
governments,  including,  for  example,  discussion  on  specific  conditionalities  on 
institutional  reform,  e.g.  the  transport  sector in  the  Cameroun NIP.  In  general,  the 
degree  of consultation  (with  ACP governments  and  Member States)  has  been  more 
limited in the countries and sectors where ACP government capacity is low.  While the 
Commission  still  has  the  strongest  role  in  the  choice  of  focal  sectors,  ACP 
governments' pressure to maintain and even increase the areas for EC intervention has 
contributed  to  insufficient  concentration  of  EC  aid  interventions  and  insufficient 
selectivity in the choice of focal sectors. 
The  greater  consultation  on  the  NIP  (EDF  8)  with  Member States  (in-country  and 
through the  EDF Committee) is  an important step to  ensure greater coordination and 
complementarity. 
While the  recent improvements in  the  Indicative Programming exercise (EDF 8)  are 
significant,  looking to the future, two issues need to be addressed: 
•  The  fact  that  donor  programming  exercises  are  carried  out  for  each  donor 
independenti  y,  and are  not linked to  the Government's budgetary process, means 
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that they overload rather than strengthen the Government's capacity. 
29  Similarly, 
insufficient  integration  into  ACP  governments'  medium  term  expenditure 
frameworks (which in any case do not always exist) means that the sectoral choices 
are probably not optimal. 
•  In  many cases,  the  focal  sectors  in  the  National  Indicative  Programmes  are  still 
insufficiently selective (for example, note the inclusion of the education sector in 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe). 
Overall economic dialogue (structural adjustment)
30 
The Commission began its participation in structural adjustment in 1990.
31  Through the 
creation  of a  small  macroeconomic  capacity  the  EC  has  supported  the  structural 
adjustment  operations  of the  BW1. 
32  The  aims  of Structural  Adjustment  Support 
Programmes have been to: 
•  take  into  account  the  social  dimensions  of the  adjustment  process  and  the 
requirements of long-term development; 
•  adapt the speed of reforms to the constraints and capacities of specific countries; 
•  facilitate  the  intemalisation  of  the  adjustment  process  by  the  national 
authorities; and 
•  focus on the regional dimensions of adjustment. 
These aims are to be achieved by supporting improvements in the budgetary process (to 
guarantee  the  transparent  use  of resources  and  the  adoption  of adequate  sectoral 
policies) and by improving coordination with Member States and the BW1. 
The structural adjustment process supported by the BW1 has produced mixed results 
in the countries we visited (particularly Jamaica, Tanzania, Cameroun and Zimbabwe). 
While trade liberalisation and domestic regulation have made relatively good (although 
sometimes  slow)  progress,  institutional  reforms  (financial  sector,  privatisation)  have 
been hampered by the weakness of governments' institutional capacity.  The impact on 
poverty and on  the social sectors also appears to  be  mixed.  Contrary to expectations, 
the  BW1  structural  adjustment programmes have not been very  selective.  'Poor and 
weak compliers with programmes received $  11  billion out of the $  15  billion lent for 
adjustment  from  1980  to  1996'. 
33  This  is  because  donors  often  have  ~nc~1lt~ . c:;  to 
continue to disburse funds even when the government's track record on reform is poor. 
This was also observed in  the  countries  we  visited.  All  of these countries have been 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
EC programming is based on a 5-year cycle and on pre-agreed ground-rules. 
In many cases,  the Commission's overall economic  policy dialogue for  the  SASP  has  been  used  to 
support sectoral policy dialogue in the social sectors, e.g. health sector dialogue in Cote d'Ivoire. 
Previously, the EC had participated in several Sector and General Import Programmes.  SASP is based 
on the Council Resolution of May  1989 and Lome IV, 1990. 
The  Commission has  only disbursed  SASP  funds  when  the  country  has  been  'on track'  in  its  IMF 
programme or when the BWI have given their explicit agreement. 
OED  1996 report quoted in the  'Independent Evaluation of the SPA', see above.  Similarly, Killick's 
( 1996) analysis shows that only 5 out of 26 ESAF programmes had been completed within the planned 
period 
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'off-track'  for  a  significant  time  period,  while  some  of them  have  been  undergoing 
structural adjustment for more than 10 years (Tanzania and Jamaica).
34 
The  Commission  has  had  to  operate  its  Structural  Adjustment  Support 
Programme  (SASP)  in  this  very  difficult  environment.  The  participation  of the 
Commission  in  structural  adjustment  issues  has  allowed  it  in  some  instances  to 
influence the  nature of the  BWI approach (see below).  Moreover, the Commission's 
focus  on  ownership of the  reform programme and  on improvement of the  budgetary 
process is  facilitating the Commission's transition from being a project-based donor to 
being a more policy-based donor.  See for example the successful SASP intervention in 
Cote d'Ivoire which is  strengthening both the  health and decentralisation sectors (see 
next chapter). 
However, the  track record of Commission's structural adjustment interventions in  the 
countries  we  visited  is  affected  by  institutional  constraints  in  ACP  countries,  by 
Commission staffing constraints and by the nature of counterpart funds earmarking.  As 
a consequence, in  most countries we  visited there has  been limited involvement of the 
Commission in policy dialogue on the overall reform programme.
35 
The involvement of the Commission in overall economic policy dialogue requires 
the  monitoring  of macroeconomic  conditions,  the  monitoring  of general  structural 
reforms  (including the  formulation of Policy Framework Papers and of BWI general 
and sectoral adjustment operations), and participation in  Public Expenditure Reviews 
(both global and sectoral).  In our view, and that of other donors we spoke to during our 
visits,  these activities are  important for a large  donor in order to  support its dialogue 
with the  Government and  with  other donors,  both  with  regard  to  the  overall  reform 
programme  and  sectoral  policy  dialogue.  In  the  case  of the  Co111Dission,  these 
activities are also important for the support of improvements of the budgetary processes 
in the social sectors. 
In  many of our visits, Member States expressed their appreciation and support for an 
increased  role  of the  Commission  in  overall  economic  monitoring  (given  adequate 
resources), even though the  Commission's expertise is  often in  sectoral issues.  With 
the  new  stress  on  aid  effectiveness,  the  monitoring  and  understanding  of overall 
macroeconomic  and  budgetary conditions is  essential  for  formulating  realistic  sector 
programmes and for adequately implementing new SASP programmes. 
The  effectiveness  of the  Commission's  overall  economic  policy  dialogue  has  been 
affected by three factors: 
34 
35 
I.  macroeconomic capacity of the Commission 
2.  limited government ownership of the reform programme 
3.  earmarking of counterpart funds. 
· ... sitting with the IMF and the World Bank over the last ten  years in  structural adjustment loans is 
something like being in the dentist chair for ten years'.  Address by Prof. 1.  Sachs at the 1998 World 
Economic Forum. Windhoek, Namibia 
·All our evaluations point out the relevance of such global objectives but criticise the paradoxically 
weak EC involvement in the policy dialogue, especially in the light of our increasing weight and role. 
The policy dialogue is found to be, in fact, the only way to build-in the EC'  s concerns into the overall 
economic  reform  process'.  See  'Learning  From  Evaluations  of the  EC  Support  to  Structural 
Adjustment in ACP Countries', Communication for the Joint EC-WB seminar of 17.12.96. EC. 
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1.  Macroeconomic capacity in DG VIII 
Headquarters 
The creation of a small macroeconomic capacity has  allowed the  Commission to  use 
international forums (particularly the SPA) to  support key Community objectives: the 
social dimension of adjustment, and ownership of the  adjustment process.  While the 
recent  independent  evaluation  of  ESAF  concludes  that  structural  adjustment 
programmes have had limited success in these areas, the  SPA evaluation shows that the 
BWI have  been  gradually  persuaded of the  importance of these  issues.
36  However, 
most SPA guidelines are often not implemented within countries.37 
The  Commission  has  also  been  instrumental  in  the  implementation  of  a  new 
conditionality  approach  in  Burkina  Faso.  This  approach  is  based  on  the  need  to 
strengthen  ownership  and  donor coordination  and  on  the  need  to  reduce  the  micro-
management of reforms.  Similarly, the  early focus of the Commission on  counterpart 
funds and the budgetary process has encouraged other donors to focus on these areas (as 
with  the  reformulation  of Public  Expenditure  Reviews  and  the  new  guidelines).
38 
However, staffing constraints have limited Headquarters' support to  Delegations in the 
preparation and implementation of SASP. 
EC Delegations 
In  our country  studies,  we  found  that  the  Delegation's capacity  to  carry out overall 
economic monitoring is  often limited by staffing constraints.  However, in some cases 
(particularly Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire), the Commission has managed to carry out 
effective  overall  economic  monitoring  even  with  limited  resources.  Member States 
were  very appreciative of these efforts. This macroeconomic capacity is also important 
in improving in-country co-ordination with the World Bank, the IMF and other donors 
supporting structural adjustment. 
While financing  agreements  often include  the  condition  that  the  Commission should 
participate in Public Expenditure Reviews, we found that the participation of the EC in 
these  exercises  has  been  limited  (e.g.  in  Tanzania,  Zimbabwe,  Cameroun,  and 
Jamaica).
39  While there are various reasons for this outcome, it is important to note that 
the new more operational approach toPERs (e.g. in Uganda and Tanzania) should make 
the presence of the EC in this process even more critical. 
2.  Limited government ownership of the reform programme 
'Despite  the  partnership  nature  of  Lome  and  the  clear  EC  orientation  towards 
government ownership, the evaluations identified several weaknesses in the government 
involvement in  SASP design and implementation ...  One of the consequences has been 
that  the  SASPs  design,  which  by  the  nature  of the  instrument  should  be  orientated 
36 
37 
38 
39 
See  recent evaluation of the SPA,  'Independent Evaluation of the SPA as  a Mechanism to  Promote 
Adjustment and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa', OED, November, 1997. 
For example on 'local compensation issues' (salary top-ups) and the integration of poverty and gender 
issues in the country programmes 
The  evaluation  of  the  PER  for  the  SPA  was  presented  in  the  report  'Strengthening  Budget 
Management  in  SPA  Countries',  NEI,  September  1995.  The  work  was  carried  out by  the  SPA 
Working Group on Public Expenditures and benefited from two seminars with African participation. 
The  new  guidelines  were  presented  in  July  1997.  The  approach  is  being  tried  in  Uganda  and 
Tanzania. 
The European Court of Auditors'  1996 report notes that the EC did not participate in the PERs of any 
of the 11  ACP countries reviewed (Official Journal of the European Communities, C340, page 300). 
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towards the  budget support,  was  very often disconnected from  the  process of budget 
formulation' (Communication for EC-World Bank seminar, 17 December, 1996. EC). 
The recent independent evaluation of the ESAF
0 has noted the difficulty of building (or 
maintaining) political support (ownership) for the BWI's structural adjustment reform 
programmes.  In many  cases,  the  BWI  have  directly  prepared  all  the  analysis  and 
documentation for the reform programmes (including PFPs, Letters of Intent and Public 
Expenditure Reviews).  The Burkina Faso pilot (see above) is trying to address these 
issues. 
However, in  many of our country studies we  noted that, although ACP governments 
appreciate the concept of the Lome 'partnership' and although the Commission is often 
seen  as  a  'listening'  donor,  SASPs  are  still  insufficiently  owned  by  the  ACP 
governments.  This  is  partly  explained  by  the  staffing  constraints  both  of  the 
Commission and of ACP governments and by the insufficiently strategic focus of these 
programmes.  ACP  governments  are  often  confused  by  the  multiplicity  of 
conditionalities, both at macro and sectoral levels (e.g. Cameroun and Tanzania).
41 
3.  Earmarking of counterpart funds 
The ownership of SASP and the possibility of greater strategic involvement in policy 
dialogue  in  the  budgetary process has  sometimes  been  affected  by  an  over-detailed 
earmarking of counterpart funds.  In the  countries that we  visited,  the  earmarking of 
counterpart funds  in  a  systematic manner has  often proved difficult.  In  the  case of 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe,
42  the aim was to simplify procedures by broader earmarking 
(sectoral and budget lines), but in practice these SASPs were mostly directed at specific 
operations (financing supplementary budgets or specific projects).  In  some cases, the 
monitoring  of diverse  project  activities  within  SASPs  has  been  particularly  time-
consuming (e.g. visits to schools around Zimbabwe).  And in Jamaica, the fact that the 
Commission insisted  that counterpart funds  should be  additional  to  budget resources 
and should be linked to specific projects created some difficulties with the Ministry of 
Finance, and delayed SASP implementation. 
In principle,  the  most detailed  earmarking should be  expected in  countries  with  the 
weakest budgetary processes.  However, in our country cases we did not observe this 
relation.  For example, there was closer targeting in Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe than 
in  Tanzania.  However,  detailed  earmarking  appears  to  have  been  a  way  for  the 
Commissi:~m to initiate its successful health sector policy dialogue in Cote d'Ivoire. 
In conformity with other donors, the EC now sees the earmarking of specific sectors or 
projects  as  a  short  run  solution  appropriate  only  when  the  budgetary  process  is 
particularly weak.  The evidence on  the  fungibility of counterpart funds in the social 
sectors and on  the  importance of institutions for  aid effectiveness has  led the EC to 
emphasise improvements to the budgetary process, rather than eannarking. 
Bottchwey K.,  Collier P.,  Gunning J.  and  Hamada K.,  Report of the group of Independent Persons 
Appointed to  Conduct an  Evaluation of Certain Aspects of the  Structural Adjustment Facility,  IMF, 
1998. 
41  'Countries  being  off-track  experienced  the  freezing  of resources  already  budgeted  for  the  social 
sectors ... whilst some countries which remained on track have not had enough resources to  comply 
with  the  agreed  expenditure  targets  in  the  same  sectors'.  Communication  for  the  Joint  EC-WB 
Seminar 1996 (see above). 
42  Zimbabwe SASP 2. 
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Improvements in A  CP budgetary processes.  In the past, the EC has often tried to use 
the SASP to  support the improvement of budgetary processes in education and health 
(e.g.  Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroun and Tanzania).  These attempts  failed  in  Tanzania 
because  of the  country's  poor  fiscal  performance  and  because  of  insufficient  co-
ordination with other donors and with the civil service reform programme.  However, it 
appears  that  some initial  progress  has  been  achieved in  strengthening  institutions  in 
both  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Cameroun.  In  Cameroun,  a  recent  Commission  team 
participated  in  the  budget  formulation  process.  In  Zimbabwe,  there  is  also  the 
intention of moving  towards  support for  institutional  improvements in  the  budgetary 
process, with less earmarking of counterpart funds.  It  is  expected that the  support for 
budgetary improvements will directly contribute to better sectoral programmes. 
This Commission objective is  consistent with its work in  the  SPA Working Group on 
Counterpart Funds,  which  was  formed  in  June  1990  and is  chaired by  the  EC.  This 
Group has consistently argued for less eannarking of counterpart funds. 
Sectoral policy dialogue 
We have analysed 12  cases of policy dialogue at the sectoral level in the countries we 
visited.'n  Table 1  presents a list of the case studies, whose details are available in the 
country reports. 
Table 1 - Case studies of sectoral dialogue 
Sector  No.  Country  Sub-sector (if  any) 
Agriculture  3  Cameroun  Cocoa 
Cote d'Ivoire  Coffee and Cocoa 
Zimbabwe 
Infrastructure  3  Cameroun  Transport 
Jamaica  Water &  Sanitation 
Tanzania  Transport 
Social  2  Cote d'Ivoire  Health 
Tanzania  Education 
Trade  4  East Caribbean  Banana Trade 
East Caribbean  Regional Trade 
Jamaica  Banana Trade 
Zimbabwe  Trade Development 
43  We  have  excluded  the important Liberia case  from  this  analysis  because of its  particular features 
(post-conflict environment). See box in next chapter. 
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Policy dialogue  between donors and  ACP countries  is  influenced by many complex 
factors.  However,  through  the  study  of our  country  cases  we  have  identified  for 
presentational purposes six factors that appear particularly relevant in determining the 
relative success of sectoral policy dialogue. These six factors are:
44 
1.  quality of the existing policy framework for the sector. 
2.  capacity  and  commitment  of  the  ACP  counterpart  tn  the  sector  (i.e. 
Government, private sector, NGOs, etc.) 
3.  quality of the technical assistance provided to Government, both short-term and 
resident. 
4.  quality of the  Commission's strategy in  the  sector, either general  (e.g.  policy 
guidelines) or country-specific (e.g. CSP). 
5.  capacity  of Commission's staff in  the  Delegations  and/or adequate  technical 
back-up from headquarters. 
6.  donor co-ordination. 
In Figure 2, using these six factors, we have summarised our assessment of the quality 
of sectoral policy dialogue in  the twelve case studies.  In each case we have rated the 
six factors on a scale from  1 (low) to 3 (high).  The aggregate rating is  the sum of the 
ratings of the six factors.
45  These ratings are based on our own country studies and are 
for illustrative purposes only.  They refer to  the average quality for the relevant period 
and do not necessarily reflect the situation as it is now.  For example, policy dialogue in 
Tanzania both in education and transport has significantly improved recently, although 
the average ratings are still low for the period as a whole (i.e. ten years for transport and 
two years for education). 
44  Note  that  four  of these  factors  are  similar to  the  preconditions  for  Sector Investment  Programmes 
(Harrold, P.  et. AI.  The Broad Sector Approach to Investment Lending, World Bank Discussion Paper 
Number 302, 1995), later refined in the SPA meeting of December 1996 (as Sector Wide Approach 
Programmes). 
45  All  six factors  are given equal weight.  We  acknowledge that simply summing the six ratings is  an 
imperfect way of assessing the  overall  quality of policy dialogue.  In some cases,  one factor  may 
override the impact of the other factors. 
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Figure 2- Rating of the Quality of Policy Dialogue in  the Twelve Case Studies 
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It must be noted that the quality of sectoral dialogue is  also often affected by the 
overall policy  dialogue.  For example.  dialogue  on  transport  in  Tanzania has  heen 
affected  hv  macroeccll1omic  considerations.  A  crisis  between  donors  and  the 
Governrner1t  arose  in  mid-!996 when  the  Government decided  not  to  allocate resources 
to  road  maintenance.  ll1  order to comply with  IMF conditionalities.  The Delegation co-
ordinated  a response  from  all  major donors  (except  the  World  Bank).  requesting  the 
Government  to  release  the  funds.  The  Government  eventually  agreed  to  do  so. 
Similarly.  the  Commission's  successful  dialogue  on  structural  adjustment  in  Cote 
d ·I voire facilitated effective sectoral dialogue in the health sector (see Box below). 
The  following  Box illustrates  how  the  six  factors  identified  above  can  interact  to 
intluence  sectoral  policy  dialogue  either  positively  (health  in  Cote  d'Ivoire)  or 
negatively (transport in Tanzania). 
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Six factors for success in policy dialogue- health in Cote d'lvoire and transport in Tanzania 
A. Cote d'lvoire- Health. The public health system of Cote d'Ivoire was relatively well developed 
at the end of the  1970s.  During the 1980s, high rates of demographic growth and decreasing public 
expenditure allocations to the sector left the health system unable to respond adequately to the basic 
needs of the  population.  In this context. the EC assisted the  Ivorian Government in developing a 
fmancially viable system of public medicine supply and distribution.  The EC is considered, by both 
the Government and other donors, to have made a very valuable contribution to the restoration of the 
public health sector in Cote d'Ivoire. 
The existence of a clear sectoral strategy (1st factor), and its  support by donors through intensive 
policy dialogue, have formed an enabling environment for donor activity in the sector.  However, the 
capacity of the Government to co-ordinate and manage donor activities (2nd factor) has been equally 
important  in  ensuring  the  coherence,  complementarity  and  successful  outcome  of  donors' 
interventions.  Since its first involvement in the health sector ( 1990), the EC has taken a lead role 
amongst donors in the health sector policy dialogue with the Government This has been due in part 
to its important financial involvement. but even more to its excellent relations with the Ministry of 
Health, facilitated  by the presence of an extremely competent EC-financed TA (3rd factor) in the 
post of adviser to the Minister.  Health is also a sector in which the Commission has developed its 
own sector strategy (41h  factor) and  institutional and human competence (Sih  factor),  which have 
enabled it  to  contribute  effectively  to  international  discussions  on health  and  to  offer effective 
support to  actions undertaken in the field.  Since mid-1997,  the EC has taken the  lead in a pilot 
initiative for improving coordination amongst Member States and other donors (6th factor) in C8te 
d'Ivoire,  in  particular  in  the  health  sector.  Quarterly  meetings  amongst donors  are  held at the 
Delegation in order to exchange information, discuss common policy stances and coordinate action 
in the field. 
B.  Tanzania- Roads.  With the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme in 1986, the 
rehabilitation of Tanzania's roads became a priority.  Preparation for the Integrated Roads Project 
(IRP) started in mid-1987. and the project was launched in March 1991. Since the end of 1997, due 
to lack of maintenance and extraordinarily heavy rains, the condition of  Tanzania's roads has started 
to deteriorate again, a reminder of the 'build-collapse-build' cycle of the 1970s and 1980s.  Several 
bridges have collapsed and the road network is interrupted at several points.  The cost of  bringing the 
road network to a maintainable good condition again has been estimated at US$240 million over a 
three-year period, equivalent to a third of the entire physical investment under the IRP. 
The sector strategy formulated by the Government had been praised by donors and formed the basis 
for the  IRP,  although the  policy  framework was  negatively affected  by uncertainties on the final 
administrative configuration for transport policy and road management (1" factor).  However, the 
Ministry  of Works  did  not have  the  capacity  to  implement  the strategy  or to  manage a  large 
programme such as the IRP (2
00 factor).  The design of the IRP was overoptimistic in assuming that 
with T A  support the MoW would  become an effective implementing agency.  In sectors such as 
agriculture, sector institutional assessments and sector management programmes now precede sector 
investment programmes by a few years.  TheTA was poorly co-ordinated and often poorly managed 
(3rd factor).  The size of TA (i.e.  320 man  years) overwhelmed the  Tanzanian counterparts and 
caused a proliferation of advice and channels of communications with donors.  The Commission did 
not have an integrated strategy in transport (4th factor) as roads, railways and ports were dealt with 
separately.  The IRP was  also designed before the comprehensive EC Transport Guidelines were 
introduced and before the current emphasis on institutional strengthening.  The Commission has had 
extremely competent engineering staff, but it has fewer resources to support sector policy dialogue 
(~factor) both at Headquarters (where there is very skilled staff but often insufficient to meet the 
needs of Delegations) and in the field. As a consequence, until 1996, leadership in the key areas of 
policy  dialogue  and  institutional  strengthening  was  provided  by  the  World  Bank.  Finally, 
coordination among donors was effective during the construction phase, but was deficient during 
implementation and follow up (6th factor).  Implementation arrangements were different for each of 
the  17  aid  agencies  supporting  IRP,  and exacerbated  the  capacity constraints  mentioned above. 
Donors, including the EC, were also relatively slow in addressing the key issue of maintenance in 
their joint policy dialogue with the Government, mostly because of the lack of  early warning signals. 
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Quality of the policy framework 
The  quality  of  the  Government's  sectoral  policy  framework  is  a  key  factor  in 
influencing the policy dialogue.  It  signals a policy dialogue with donors that is  based 
on  a  clear  set  of Government  priorities.  It enhances  the  possibility  that  the  final 
outcome of the dialogue with donors will be  'owned' by the ACP counterpart and key 
stakeholders.  It also  facilitates  coordination and ensures  that  general  donor policies 
take into account realities on the ground. 
Several examples of the  importance of a clear policy framework emerge from the case 
studies.  In  Cameroun, the government has a coherent Sectoral Transport Programme 
(PST)  recognised  by  all  donors,  and  all  7th  and  8th  EDF programmes  follow  this 
framework. The strategy includes institutional reform (privatisation), road maintenance, 
and investment in new regional roads. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, one of the foundations 
of  the  successful  dialogue  in  agriculture  has  been  the  existence  of  a  clear-cut 
government  strategy  prepared  in  a  very  participatory  way.  Recognising  the  need  to 
articulate  an  appropriate  sector  policy  linked  to  the  macroeconomic  reform  process 
started  in  1991,  the  Government  prepared  the  Zimbabwe  Agricultural  Policy 
Framework (Z4.PF)  1995 - 2020. The two-year long preparatory work was led by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which involved stakeholders in the sector. 
There is  also evidence of the negative impact of the absence of such a framework.  In 
Cameroun, the absence of a clear strategy in cocoa partly explains why dialogue in the 
sector has  been  much less  satisfactory than  in  transport.  In  the  water and  sanitation 
sector in Jamaica, only recently, following the publication of a paper on Social Water 
in 1994, has the Government started to  address the issue of lack of policy and strategy 
for  water and  sanitation.  One  result of the  absence of a water strategy has  been the 
orientation  of policy  in  the  sector exclusively  towards  engineering concerns,  to  the 
neglect of issues of water supply management, financial sustainability and social policy. 
Capacity and commitment of the ACP counterpart 
In order to be reliable and credible partners in policy dialogue, ACP governments need 
to have the capacity to  elaborate their own policies and to  discuss them with donors. 
This is  a crucial process as  'aid can only be as  effective as  the policy, economic and 
administrative  environment  in  which  it  operates.' 
46  However,  the  in"titutional 
weakness  of  ACP  governments  often  makes  this  very  difficult.  There  are  many 
examples of the impact of weak government capacity on the quality of policy dialogue: 
Tanzania  (transport  and  education),  Cameroun  (cocoa),  Jamaica  (water),  and 
Zimbabwe  (trade).  See  next  chapter  on  governments'  capacity  to  manage  aid  in 
different institutional settings. 
Technical  Assistance  provided  to  ACP governments  has,  in  some cases,  been  used 
effectively  to  facilitate  sector  policy  dialogue,  but  in  others  it  has  undermined 
ownership.  The  use. of TA to  strengthen  government institutions  by  training  local 
government counterparts has proved difficult given the weaknesses of many ACP civil 
services.  This  has  not encouraged  policy  ownership.  When  T A  supports  both  the 
government and  the  Delegation, ownership may  also  be  compromised.  Government 
institutions  are  also  weakened by  the  practice  among  donors  of supplementing civil 
Development Assistance Manual, DAC Principles for Effective Aid, OECD, 1992. p.  5 
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servants'  salaries  in  certain  ACP  countries.  This  practice  contradicts  the  DAC 
Principles for effective aid.
47  In  some countries, sector programmes have aggravated 
rather  than  reduced  these  problems.  As  noted  in  another  recent  evaluation,
48  'in 
Tanzania the official policy is not to supplement local civil servant salaries.  However, 
given the unsustainably low remuneration level in public service, donors provided and 
employees obtained supplements through indirect means.  In fact donors competed for 
capable  civil  servants  to  improve  the  chances  for  proper  implementation  of their 
projects.' 
Strengthening institutions  in  ACP countries  is  a  very  difficult  task.  The BWI have 
recently focused on the importance of weak institutions, especially the civil service, in 
hindering development.  However; the BWI and bilateral donors must be careful in their 
new emphasis on  institutional issues.  Institutional development is  a complex process 
that can only  be  driven  by local commitment.
49  Civil  service reforms in  Africa have 
improved the effectiveness of the civil service to only a limited degree.
50  The  record of 
the BWI in technical assistance for institutional capacity building is patchy. 'Outcomes 
have  varied  widely,  but  overall  the  efficacy  and  cost-effectiveness  of T A  has  been 
disappointing, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. '
51  The BWI have limited comparative 
expertise  in  supporting  institutional  processes  in  countries  with  poor  human  and 
financial  resources.  A  coordinated  donor  approach  to  support  the  institutional 
capacities of ACP governments is  required.  We did not find  such an approach in the 
countries we visited. 
When capacity is low one option is to build Government capacity through the provision 
of technical assistance and/or training, as discussed in the following sub-section. In the 
short  term,  however.  there  are  two  other possible  approaches.  The  first  approach, 
discussed in  the  1997  World Development Report,
52  is  to  help  the  State to  focus  on 
fundamentals  (matching  the  State's  role  to  its  capability)  while  raising  the  State's 
capability by  reinvigorating public  institutions.  A  State is  focusing on  fundamentals 
when it has clear priorities and well-defined, simple strategies. If  it does not have these, 
donors could help it to focus on fundamentals by together preparing clear-cut strategies 
(the first factor for an effective policy dialogue, discussed above).  A good example of 
such an  approach to  easing capacity constraints is the  transport sector in Cameroun, 
where the Government's strategy in the sector is stronger than its overall capacity. 
The other approach  is  to  broaden  the  dialogue,  involving  other partners  beyond the 
Government.  This approach is recommended in the Commission's Communication on 
Guidelines  for  the  negotiation  of a  new  agreement  with  ACP Countries.  There  are 
some good examples of the opportunities that derive from broadening the dialogue.  In 
Jamaica. policy dialogue on bananas has taken place between the EC and the Banana 
Export Company (BECO).  BECO is  a private company owned by banana exporters, 
which is  one  factor in  the  relative  success of the policy dialogue.  In Tanzania, the 
Stabex programme is  supporting dialogue with the private sector.  The policy dialogue 
47 
49 
50 
51 
52 
'Rather  than  topping-up  salaries,  donors  should  encourage  recipient  governments  to  articulate  a 
strategy to  address civil service reform.  Donor assistance can only be effective when governments 
themselves are seriously committed.' Development Assistance Manual, DAC Principles for Effective 
Aid, OECD, 1992. p. 55. 
OED, Independent Evaluation of the SPA as  a Mechanism to Promote Adjustment and Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  1997, p. 62. 
See for example, 'Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy' by R. Putnam. 
See 'Decade of Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa', IMF Working Paper 179, 1997. Lienert, 
Ian. 
OED-WB, Lessons & Practices, May 1996. 
The World Bank. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, 1997. 
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on  trade  in  both  the  East Caribbean and  Zimbabwe has  suffered from  the lack of 
involvement of the  private sector.  The private sector often  has  a stronger interest in 
trade issues than the Government and greater capacity to carry out meaningful dialogue 
on these issues. 
Quality of technical assistance 
For effective  policy  dialogue,  both  parties  need  to  be  well  prepared and competent. 
Given the  limited human and  financial  resources available  to  both Governments and 
Delegations, expertise is  often brought in  from  abroad, either on a short or long term 
basis.
53  Technical assistance, however, needs to  be  properly selected and managed, as 
discussed  in  more  detail  in  Chapter ill, and  it  therefore  presupposes  at  least  a 
minimum level of capacity on the side of the client.  In addition, technical assistance is 
not  a  sustainable  solution to  capacity problems.  When  capacity is  present, technical 
assistance can be effective in  facilitating policy dialogue at the sectoral level.  In  such 
an  environment,  T A  are  very  conscious  of their  role  and  mindful  of the  need  to 
represent  their  client's  interests  when  dealing  with  the  donors  who  fund  their 
assignments.  However,  when  the  TA  is  not  managed  adequately,  it  can  undermine 
policy ownership.  In  Zimbabwe, the  Ministry of Agriculture has  been successful in 
adequately managing its TA.  In  the same country, however, the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce has not benefited much from technical assistance because of its inability 
to manage consultants.  In Cote d'lvoire, the presence of an extremely competent EC-
financed  T A  in  the  Ministry  of Health  has  facilitated  policy  dialogue  in  the  health 
sector.  In Tanzania, by contrast, there have been difficulties in adequately managing 
the T A programme in the structural adjustment and education sectors. 
The availability of good short term advice can also be important in  making adequate 
preparations for policy dialogue.  In the East Caribbean, for example, a donor group, 
which  included  the  EC,  commissioned  a  preliminary  study  to  analyse  the  major 
deficiencies of the banana industry and to identify key restructuring measures.  This led 
to the adoption of an action plan by the donors and the OECS governments at a meeting 
in Kingstown in September 1995, to support the development of a core banana industry 
capable of competing in liberalised markets by the year 2002. 
Quality of the Commission's strategy in the sector 
A clear strategy is  as important for donors as it is for ACP Governments.  The strategy 
might be  sector specific or country specific.  As  noted elsewhere in  this report,  both 
have improved in  the last few  years.  The Commission has prepared Country Strategy 
Papers that  have  helped  to  define  the  objectives and  activities  in  each  ACP country. 
Guidelines  have  also  been  prepared for  key  sectors,  e.g.  transport and health.  Both 
developments have had a positive effect on policy dialogue.  At the same time, NIPs 
often are not selective enough and cover too many sectors and sub-sectors. 
Clear  strategic  choices  explain,  for  example,  the  increased  role  of the  EC  in  the 
transport  sector  in  Tanzania,  where  dialogue  is  now  centred  on  the  key  issue  of 
maintenance (see Box on page 44).  At the end of 1997, the EC decided to reallocate 
ECU  100  million  from  road  rehabilitation  programmes  to  reduce  the  backlog  in 
maintenance of priority roads.  This strategic shift is opposed by Government officials, 
who  have  insufficient  interest  in  institutional  reform  and  who  are  under  political 
pressure  to  build  and  to  rehabilitate  roads.  However,  this  change  in  priority  is 
53  Technical Assistance under Lome is formally only for the use of the Government. 
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supported  by  other donors  and  has  made  the  Commission a  significant - if not  the 
leading- player in transport policy dialogue in Tanzania. Similarly, in Jamaica, the EC 
Delegation has recognised past failings in water and sanitation (i.e. the neglect of water 
supply  management,  financial  sustainability  and  social  policy)  and  has  changed the 
emphasis in the NIP for EDF 8 away from direct infrastructure investment and towards 
(i) management and maintenance of water facilities and waste disposal; and (ii) poverty 
alleviation  through  the  better  targeting  of potential  beneficiaries  in  the  design  of 
projects.  In Cote d'lvoire, the  close involvement of donors  in  health  sector policy 
discussions  has  enabled  the  Government  strategy  to  be  largely  validated  by  donors, 
thereby ensuring  their  financial  support.  A  first  two-year plan to  redress  the  health 
system ( 1992-1994) was developed by  the Government as  a result of discussions with 
donors at the  1991  Round Table Conference.  Following the wave of structural reforms 
launched in  1994, a new ten-year health development plan ( 1996-2005) was developed 
by the Government and discussed with donors in 1996. 
Capacity of Commission staff 
It is  not easy for the Commission to  make the transition to  being a policy-based donor. 
The Commission continues to  be involved in  too many sectors, and its traditional co-
administration  of  EDF  projects  hinders  its  effective  involvement  in  policy-based 
sectoral dialogue and operations.  The capacity of staff in Delegations to carry out day-
to-day  policy  dialogue  in  a  number  of sectors,  and  the  capacity  of headquarters  to 
provide  technical  back-up  for  Delegations,  are  key  factors  influencing the quality of 
policy dialogue.  These capacities  are  constrained significantly by  the  administrative 
burden associated with aid management (see next chapter). 
The presence of skilled technical advisers in the Delegations in Jamaica and Tanzania 
has clearly contributed to  the  recent improvements in  policy dialogue in the water and 
education  sectors.  Similarly,  a  history  of skilled agricultural  advisers  in Zimbabwe 
explains the effective role played by the Commission in policy dialogue in this sector. 
Meanwhile, the quality of technical back-up from headquarters is an important factor in 
explaining the successful dialogue on health in Cote d'lvoire. 
The capacity of EC Delegations is  sometimes reinforced on  an  as-needed basis using 
Technical Assistance contracted by  the Government using EDF funds.  While this  is 
sometimes  seen  as  critical,  given  the  capacity  of the  Delegation,  these  TA end  up 
having  a  dual  role,  supporting  both  the  Government and  the  Delegations.  This  has 
sometime~ cr~Jted difficulties in policy dialogce as  well as  policy imr!en:1~ntation (see 
next chapter). 
Coordination, complementarity and coherence 
Coordination, complementarity and coherence have become increasingly important in 
the  formulation  of  Community  development  policies  (see  Chapter  D.  Greater 
complementarity  between  the  aid  programmes  of the  Commission  and  the  Member 
States is seen as being achieved through strengthened coordination.
54  The Commission 
has focused its efforts on  improving operational coordination in six pilot countries, of 
54  'This approach will  be based on  the strengthening of operational coordination and on concentration 
both  on  the  programming  and  on  defining  sectoral  policies  with  a  view  to  establishing  common 
priorities  in  order to  facilitated  complementarity  and  consistency  between  Community  action  and 
those of the Member States', Council Resolution of 1 June 1995. 
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Bananas  in  the  East  Caribbean  ..  a  Coherent 
Policy Response 
The economies of a number of East Caribbean islands states are heavily 
dependent on Income from  bananas.  As high cost producers they have 
relied  on  preferential  access  to  European  markets  secured  through 
country-specific quota allocations allocated to traditional ACP exporters.  In 
1997  these  arrangements  were  challenged  in  the  WTO  by  the  USA 
supported by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.  While reform of 
the  banana  regime  will  allow for greater coherence  with  wider  EC  trade 
policies, it will create severe adjustment problems for the banana exporting 
countries with implications for EC aid priorities. 
In reality banana exports from the Caribbean had been facing deteriorating 
market conditions  for some  time.  In  1994  following  a  request  from  the 
Secretariat of the Organisation of East Caribbean States (OECS) a donor 
contact  group  on  bananas  had  been  formed  comprising  the  EC,  DfiD, 
UNDP and  the Caribbean Development Bank.  The group decided that it 
was  not appropriate to  provide aid  funds  in  the  form  of price support as 
likely changes  in  trade  policy and  in  the market for bananas required  a 
more  fundamental  restructuring  of  the  banana  Industry.  A  preliminary 
study was undertaken to analyse the major deficiencies in the industry and 
identity key  restructuring  measures.  This  provided  for the retention  of a 
smaller core banana industry capable of competing in liberalised markets 
by the year 2002.  The main actions to be taken included: 
•  increasing  the  efficiency  of  Windward  Islands  growers  by  directly 
targeting and supporting their efforts to improve farming practices; 
•  commercialising the activities of the  Banana Growers'  Associations 
which are the monopoly purchasers of the banana crop; 
•  reforming the price mechanism to give producers Incentives to either 
leave the industry r increase their efficiency: and 
•  simplifying  and  dismantling  the  distribution  chain  so  as  to  transfer 
back part of the marketing rent to distributors. 
The  strategy  was  confirmed  at  subsequent  meetings  of  the  Prime 
Mlnlsters'  of  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent  and  Dominica.  Rnanclal  support 
totalling  103  Mecu  was  made  available  from  Stabex  entitlements  to 
support  implementation of the  restructuring  programme and  for assisting 
banana farmers  displaced  by the  reforms.  The  programme agreed  not 
only  represents  a  coherent  policy  response  to  the  changes  in  the 
International  trade  regime,  but  also  provides  an  example  of  a  well 
coordinated donor resoonse. 
II 
which  Cote  d' I  voire 
was  included  in  the 
field  study  sample. 
Coherence  between 
the  different  areas  of 
Community  policy  is 
addressed between the 
different  Directorates 
General.  In  the 
country  studies  we 
found  two  examples 
where  incoherence 
appears  to  have  been 
properly addressed:  in 
the policy dialogue on 
international  trade  in 
bananas  in  the  East 
Caribbean (see  Box), 
and  in  the  transition 
from  emergency  to 
development 
assistance in Liberia. 
Some  progress  has 
been  made  towards 
improving  in-country 
donor  coordination. 
Positive  developments 
on  the  Commission's 
side  include  the 
discussion  of  the 
Strategy  Paper  and 
National  Indicative 
Programmes with Member States.  Where there is particularly strong common purpose 
and interest between the Commission and the Member States, as in the case of Liberia, 
effective coordination has taken place.  The success of coordination depends strongly 
on the will of Member States. 
The most important factors determining the strength of coordination are the existence of 
a  well  developed  policy  framework  and  institutional  capacities  within  ACP 
Governments.  These  promote  coherent  and  transparent  policy  dialogue,  encourage 
donors  to  adopt  common  positions  in  their  dealings  with  Governments,  and  guard 
against  different  donors  introducing  divergent  approaches  into  the  programmes  and 
projects  which  they  support.  The  relative  success  of the  operational  coordination 
initiative in Cote d'Ivoire was in large part due to these factors (see next Box).  Other 
relevant factors  were  the  strength of the  Delegation,  the local representation of other 
donors,  and  their  institutional  set-up  (particularly  the  decentralisation  of decision-
making). 
In all  the countries we visited there were regular meetings between the Delegation and 
the Member States, with development cooperation included on the agenda.  However, 
such coordination has been limited in scope.  Coordination has generally not extended 
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beyond information exchange to  include coordination in  aid policy and programming 
decisions.  Informal coordination, particularly among 'like-minded' donors seems to be 
more effective.  In  a few cases (e.g. agriculture in Zimbabwe), coordination has moved 
further, to  include joint operations.  Nevertheless, we generally found that, in the field, 
Member States stated their willingness to increase joint operations and evaluations with 
the  Commission  (e.g.  Microproject  Programmes  in  Zimbabwe),  although  in  some 
countries their commitment to initiate coordination or to exchange information with the 
Commission has been limited. 
The  following  two  Boxes  summarise  two  particularly  successful  examples  of 
coordination: Cote d'Ivoire (a pilot country chosen by the Council) and Liberia (where 
coordination  took  place  in  absence- of  a  functional  government,  and  where  the 
Commission played an important role in conflict prevention). 
Operational coordination in Cote d'lvolre 
The 1993 Council Resolution on Operational Coordination emphasised the need to make better use 
of existing instruments of in-country coordination.  While no specific measures were outlined, it 
emphasised the  importance of regular contacts between the Delegation and  representatives of the 
Member States, and proposed the carrying out of  joint studies, analysis and evaluations. 
Coordination with Member States 
Of the  pilot countries, Cote d'lvoire is  regarded  by the  Commission as  the  only one in which 
operational  coordination has gone beyond  the  terms  of the  pilot exercise. 
55  Key aspects  of the 
coordination  mechanism  include:  (i) regular  meetings  between  the  Delegation  and  the Member 
States; (ii) co-ordination on aid programming with joint discussion of  the Country Strategy Paper for 
EDF 8 (although this does not extend to joint discussion of  the programming of bilateral aid); (iii) the 
definition of common positions on sectoral objectives and policies as the basis for programming of 
EC  and bilateral  aid~ and (iv) a de facto division of labour between key sectors. involving France 
(education),  Germany  (agriculture)  and  the  EC  (health).  Member  States~  particularly  France, 
regarded  the  level of coordination as  adequate.  The sectoral concentration of European  donors 
suggests  that  the  process  has  extended  beyond  coordination  towards  achieving  operational 
complementarity among aid programmes.  However~  there were also examples of  poorly coordinated 
interventions, such as in vocational training for farmers, which has been simultaneously pursued by 
both the EC and France. 
Coordination with other donors 
The relatively successful experience with co-ordination among the EU donors led to a decision in 
1997 to  intensify coordination among the wider SPA group of donors~ particularly involving the 
BWI.  Subsequently, regular donor meetings have been held to discuss technical and policy issues in 
macroeconomics,  health,  education, and  decentralisation.  On health and decentralisation, the EC 
coordinated  with  other  donors  in  the  presentation  of a  common  position  to  the  government 
expressing concern over some areas of the sectoral reform programme.  However. in other areas 
coordination has been much weaker, for example in the coffee sector initially there were important 
differences in approach between the Commission and World Bank over the pace of  reform. 
Role of the Government  -- ,  .  , 
Strong Government institutions and participation are regarded as having ptayed a  crucial tole in 
establishing effective coordination and dialogue  with the donor agencies.  The Government has 
maintained  a  strong  and  consistent policy  framework of its  own~  This  has  all~wed donors' 
interventions to be consistent with established national policies and programmes.  The Government 
has also facilitated donor participation in policy dialogue and programming through' the creation of_ 
sectoral  policy  working  groups  in  which  the  EC,  the Member  States  and  other _-donors  have 
participated. 
ss  See 'Operational Coordination', Working Paper from the Commission, 3 April 1997. 
IDC - September 1998  50 Policy dialogue  II 
Coordination is also affected by the factors which influence the effectiveness of sectoral 
policy dialogue, discussed in  the previous section.  For example, a clear government 
strategy  facilitated  coordination  in  Cameroun.  A  strong  transport  sector  policy 
framework  ('Programme  Sectoriel  de  Transport')  has  provided  the  basis  for 
coordinating donor inputs, and has led to  some complementarity among EU donors, 
with the Commission supporting maintenance of unpaved roads, Germany supporting 
the maintenance of paved roads and France concentrating on financing national bridges 
and air transport.  In  Tanzania, effective coordination among donors in the education 
sector  has  proved  difficult  to  achieve  mainly  because  of  the  limited  capacity  of 
government institutions.  In agriculture in Zimbabwe, a relatively efficient civil service 
has allowed the  Government to  coordinate aid effectively even while donors initially 
had  somewhat  different  approaches  towards  the  Agriculture  Services  Management 
Programme. 
The  ability  of the  Commission  to  play  an  effective  role  in  operational  coordination 
depends on the  capacity and expertise available within the Delegation.  This is in 
part because coordination in some countries is  very time-consuming.  In  the countries 
we visited, capacity was found to be strongest in the agriculture and transport sectors, 
although in a few Delegations, such as Zimbabwe, there is also a good macroeconomic 
monitoring capacity.  However,  in  Tanzania,  the  Commission  was  chosen  to  act as 
coordinator for Member States in the education sector, although it had very limited in-
country capacity in that sector. 
Liberia- Coherence and coordination in a post-conflict situation 
The coordination of aid in the post-conflict situation in Liberia represents a special case for a number 
of reasons.  First, there was a need to ensure coherence in the response of the EC, which involved a 
number of DGs and incorporated a political dimension, a humanitarian assistance programme and a 
rehabilitation programme.  Second, coordination had initially to  be achieved in a  situation where 
there was no functional government.  Third, there was limited in-country representation.  Few donors 
were directly represented on the ground, and the EC only maintained an Aid Coordination Office in 
Monrovia, staffed by consultants. 
In the absence of a Delegation. management responsibility for the Liberia programme was given to 
the Desk Officer in DGVIII Headquarters.  Operational issues were addressed by an inter-service 
Task Force in Brussels which involved all parties including financial controlt ECHO, the Food Aid 
Unit and the health advisers.  Strategies were introduced for ensuring coherence in the EC response, 
with emergency and humanitarian responses being backed up by longer-term support for institution 
building and rehabilitation. 
A  feature  of the  Liberia  programme  has  been  the  very  close  and  successful  coordination  and 
cooperation between the EC and  the Member States.  In  some cases this has extended to Member 
States placing resources from their own assistance programmes under the management of the EC'  s 
Aid Coordination Office in Liberia, as occurred with the support provided for the elections and with 
a fleet of trucks provided by the Netherlands Government.  The policy dialogue with Member States 
bas mostly been carried out in Brussels and Abidjan. 
Effective coordination networks were established involving the Member States through the monthly 
meetings  of the  Africa  Working  Group  and  meetings  with  Member  States'  representations  in 
Abidjan.  With a good information flow, transparency and mutual respect.' there has been a firm basis 
for  policy  co·ordination  between  the  Desk  Officer and  Member  States.  Discussions  with  MS 
representatives in Abidjan showed that they appreciate the  role of the EC in Liberia. They also 
appreciate the quality of  the technical programme, which they regard as meeting humanitarian needs, 
working at a community level, and being executed by competent T A. 
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The effectiveness of coordination  is  also  affected  by  donors'  organisational  set-ups, 
both  in  their presence in  the  field  and in  the  delegation  of decision-making to  field 
offices.  Figure 3 presents two different models followed by donors.  The first model is 
based  on  centralised  decision  making  and  ex  ante  controls  in  aid  management  (an 
indication  of extensive  administrative  procedures  as  discussed  in  the  next  Chapter). 
The  second  model  is  more  decentralised  and  less  administration-intensive.  In  most 
ACP  countries,  donors  have 
very different institutional set-
ups.  both  in  terms  of  in-
country  capacity  and  in  their 
degree  of  decentralisation. 
Coordination  among  donors 
belonging  to  these  two 
different  models  is 
complicated,  as  donor  In-
country  representation  will 
have  very  different 
responsibilities  and  powers. 
For example, several Member 
States in Tanzania noted that 
because  the  World  Bank  had 
limited in-country  capacity in 
the  transport  sector, 
coordination  with  the  World 
Bank  was  inefficient.  The 
Member  States  and  the 
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Figure 3 - Decision Making by Selected Donors 
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Commission have  more regular technical coordination in  the  transport sector through 
formal and informal meetings. 
Key policy concerns: Poverty, governance, gender and 
environment 
Under  Lome  IV.  poverty,  governance,  gender  and  the  environment  have  received 
greater emphasis in  the Community's development policy and have been the subject of 
a  number  of Council  decisions.  Increasingly,  the  approach  adopted  has  been  to 
·mainstream'  these  issues  into  the  policy  dialogue  with  ACP countries  and  into  the 
programming of Community aid, rather than to seek to  address them through separate 
projects.  This reflects current donor consensus. 
Policy  units  in  Headquarters  are  responsible  for  developing policies,  for  generating 
'awareness'  and  'sensitivity'  among  Commission  staff  in  other  units  and  in  the 
Delegations,  for  providing  training,  and  for  developing  operational  guidelines  and 
manuals.  The aim has been to equip staff within the geographical units, technical units 
and Delegations with the basic skills and knowledge to handle these issues.  This is a 
difficult process for most donors and for the Commission, given its organisational and 
staffing limitations. 
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In  general. Delegation advisers are  aware of the importance of incorporating poverty, 
gender,  environment  and  governance  issues  into  their  interventions.  However,  the 
extent to which they have been able to  focus on these issues varies considerably.  The 
use  of  the  Structural  Adjustment  Support  Programme  instrument  has  raised  the 
importance  of protecting  social  sector  expenditures.  Also,  although  budget  lines 
introduce fragmentation into aid management, they appear better suited to the pursuit of 
issues such as democracy and human rights, as budget lines do not require the approval 
of the Government. 
However,  there  is  limited  capacity  for  integrating  poverty,  governance,  gender  and 
environmental concerns into aid delivery and the monitoring of results. In particular: 
•  there  are  severe  manpower  limitations  in  the  Delegations,  in  terms  of both  the 
number of personnel and their specialised skills.  There is  also limited capacity for 
providing technical back-up and support from policy advisers in Headquarters. 
•  there  is  a  lack  of agreed  monitoring  criteria  and  baseline  and  time  series  data 
against  which  to  plan  policy  and  programme  initiatives  and  to  monitor  the 
outcomes. 
Poverty 
Considerable difficulties  have  been  experienced in  integrating poverty  reduction  into  the 
design  and  implementation  of programmes  and  projects.  The  Commission,  like  other 
donors, faces problems in  identifying appropriate responses that are technically sound and 
can be feasibly implemented.  A forthcoming study on Zimbabwe
56 has found that, with the 
partial  exception  of Sweden,  donors  have  not  consistently  prioritised  the  objective  of 
reducing poverty.  Most donors have  tried to  improve the  well-being of the  poor through 
specific interventions, but the poverty reduction content of their programmes has been quite 
limited.  Moreover,  in  their  operations,  donors  have  not  been  applying  best  practice  in 
poverty reduction issues. 
In particular, there seems to be a lack of specific and clear strategies for reducing poverty in 
the countries we  visited.  A recent evaluation of the SPA
57  also found that 'there has  not 
been a well  articulated poverty alleviation strategy in  any of the  I  0 countries visited until 
recently.' 
National indicative programming can be used to frame such a strategy, and this is beginning 
to  be  done  more  consistently  in  some  countries  (e.g.  Zimbabwe).  In  several  countries, 
given the significant changes brought about by the structural adjustment prc&<.t.;  .. ;lcs,  the 
protection  of the  social  sectors  has  proved difficult.  In  particular,  our country visits  are 
consistent  with  the  conclusion  that  for  Structural  Adjustment  Support  Programmes  'all 
evaluations underlined the extreme difficulty to achieve a significant degree of protection of 
the budgeted expenditure in  the  social sectors and to  facilitate  the  improvement of actual 
service delivery' .
58  However, in some cases the focus of the Commission on the protection 
of the  social  sectors  has  helped  to  maintain  these  issues  high  on  the  agenda  of both 
governments and other donors 
There are several examples where EC  projects have contributed to poverty reduction.  In 
particular, in Zimbabwe the Micro-projects programme shows a successful way to address 
poverty  and  gender issues  in  a  direct  manner.  The project  is  an  excellent example  of 
56 
57 
58 
Killick,  Carlsson  and  Kierkegaard  'European  Aid  and  the  Reduction  of Poverty  in  Zimbabwe: 
Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and the EC'. 
OED. Independent Evaluation of the SPA as  a Mechanism to Promote Adjustment and Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 1997, p.  80. 
Communication for the Joint EC-WB seminar, 1996. 
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community participation and  one  which  Member States appear willing to  co-finance.  In 
Cote d'Ivoire, the Commission's support to service delivery institutions in the health sector 
has contributed in a sustainable way to social objectives, while the progressive liberalisation 
of  the  coffee-cocoa  sector  has  increased  the  revenue  of farmers.  In  Cote  d'  lvoire, 
Cameroun  and  Tanzania,  Stabex  funds  were  distributed  directly  to  farmers  as 
compensation payments.  An evaluation study of the programme in Tanzania indicated that 
it  had  been  well  mana~ed and  that  the  farmers  had  used  the  resources  mostly  on  food, 
school  fees  and  inputs. 
9  The impact on  poverty  of direct payments, compared with the 
alternative  of  supporting  services  which  benefit  the  poor,  probably  requires  further 
evaluation.  In  the  East Caribbean countries, the gradual approach to  the  phasing out of 
preferential treatment of the banana regime is intended to allow time for farmers to move to 
different crops. 
Governance 
Good governance is  not only a desirable political objective, but is also a crucial factor 
for successful aid delivery, as it affects the way national resources are allocated and the 
quality of local  institutions.  For example, a recent study argues that 'analysis of the 
determinants of project success shows that both government credibility and freedom 
from corruption are positively related to project outcome. '
60 
Good governance can best be achieved by ensuring that Governments are accountable 
to  their  electorates.  The  promotion  of democracy  and  human  rights  and  the  fight 
against  corruption  are  therefore  all  part  of  the  dialogue  on  good  governance. 
Commission activities in both areas have been fairly limited in the countries we visited 
and  have  mostly  been  carried  out  through  budget  lines,  a  sign  that  dialogue  with 
Government on these topics is still difficult (as budget lines are frequenCy used because 
they do not involve joint decision-making with a Government). 
Conflict prevention in Uberia 
Following the Second Abuja peace agreement for Liberia, which was 
signed In August 1996, the EC, with an established presence on the 
ground, was in a position to respond quickly and to play an influential 
role  in  developing  a  well-coordinated  set  of  measures  aimed  at 
consolidating  peace.  A  key  initiative  was  a  three day  workshop 
organised  by the  EC  In  September 1996 which  was  attended  by 
faction  representatives  from  the  National  Disarmament  and 
Demobilisation  Committee  as  well  as  by  other  donor  agencies. 
Bringing the faction leaders together was  a key stage in the peace 
negotiation~.  f>.t  the  workshop,  the EC took the lead in presenting 
proposals for the reintegration of the fighters into civil society.  These 
included  a  'Jobs  for  guns'  programme,  assistance  for  the 
reintegration  of  child  combatants  into  the  community  and  a 
programme to support the restoration of democratic government and 
the holding of elections in  1997.  Another critical area of EC support 
was a programme for the  rehabilitation of roads and bridges which 
facilitated  the  deployment  of  ECOMOG  peace-keeping  forces 
throughout the country. 
In  Liberia,  the  EC  maintained good cooperation with  other donors 
and  with  the  UN.  The  effectiveness  of  the  EC's  operation 
encouraged other donors  to channel  resources  through  the ACO, 
particular1y  in  assisting  transport  and  logistics  operations  and  In 
supporting organisation of the 1997 elections. 
The  most  important 
success  in  this  area  has 
been the role played by the 
Commission, supported by 
a  number  of  Member 
States,  in  the  post-conflict 
situation  in  Liberia  (see 
Box).  In  Zimbabwe,  a 
budget  line  has  been 
successfully  used  to 
support initiatives aimed at 
promoting  human  rights 
(e.g.  a  grant  to  the  Legal 
Resources Foundation, and 
assistance in the reform of 
the  prison  system).  In 
Tanzania,  governance 
issues  have  been  pursued 
forcefully, in the context of 
59  Tibaijuka, A.  'Study on the Impact of the  19990 Stabex Compensation Payment to Coffee Farmers,' 
1994.  University of Dares Salaam. 
60  OED. The Annual Review of  Development Effectiveness (ARDE),  November 1997, The World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
IDC - September 1998  54 Policy dialogue  II 
the misuse of the Road Fund, through sector policy dialogue and public speeches by the 
Delegation.  The Commission is  also  in  the process of supporting the  Government in 
strengthening adequate controls for the use of counterpart funds.  In  Cameroun, while 
the governance issue has become an overriding concern, it has remained an  area where 
fruitful policy dialogue has yet to be established. 
The focus  on  governance can  also  be  strengthened  by  broadening the  Commission's 
dialogue in  the  ACP countries.  By involving civil society, as  suggested in the Green 
Paper,  the  EC  can  achieve  two  objectives:  having  a  stronger counterpart and greater 
transparency.  This approach is also being tried by the Commission in Tanzania in the 
coffee sector. 
Gender 
A review of gender integration in  EDF submissions over a six  month period in  1996 
revealed that while 80% of proposals had annexed the gender questionnaire, only 12.5% 
of the projects could be classified as  either integrating or specifically relating to  WID 
objectives.  This is  important as  gender has  a significant impact on aid effectiveness. 
According to a World Bank study,  'projects with gender-related actions achieved their 
overall objectives - that is, received a satisfactory outcome rating- in relatively greater 
proportion  than  projects  similar  in  sector  and  year  of approval  but  without  gender 
actions. '
61 
Our case studies did not find any significant example of dialogue on gender issues. This 
relative  neglect  may  also  partly  explain  the  weak  supply  response  to  structural 
adjustment, as women dominate both the informal and the agricultural sectors but lack 
control  over  economic  resources,  an  impediment  which  is  not  being  addressed 
effectively either by Governments or donors. 
Within  DGVIII.  it  is  recognised  that  the  mainstreaming of gender analysis  will  take 
considerable  time.  In  part  this  reflects  international  experience  in  the  effective 
incorporation  of  gender  sensitivity  into  programme  design  and  implementation. 
However,  there  may  be  particular  problems  within  the  EC  system  due  to:  (i) the 
minimal  staffing  of  the  Gender  Desk;  and  (ii) the  problems  in  building  gender 
awareness among staff working in the Delegations. 
In Tanzania, a National Gender Training Workshop was held in January 1998, but it 
was  pc;cei  ved  to  lack  focus  and  has  not  yet  had  any  operational  implications.  In 
Zimbabwe, elaborate targeting procedures for  women  in  the  agricultural  sector have 
not been considered necessary, given the assumption that most farmers are women.  At 
the same time, the Micro-Projects Programme has added the following criterion to those 
given  by  Article  252 of the Lome Convention: projects must, inter alia,  'in the main 
benefit the poor and vulnerable groups in society, especially women' .
62 
Environment 
Lome IV introduced a specific focus on environmental issues as  an area for ACP-EU 
cooperation  (Articles  33-35).  This  was  followed  by  the  release  in  1993  of  an 
Environment Manual setting out environmental procedures and methodology for Lome 
61 
62 
OED, Mainstreaming  Gender in  World Bank Lending: An Update,  March  1997, The World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
Background Paper, National Management Unit, March 1988. 
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IV development cooperation projects.  However, other requirements necessary for the 
successful application of this manual were not put in  place with the result that its use 
was selective and limited.  In particular: 
•  the  limited  involvement  of  DGVIII  environmental  specialists  in  the  country 
programming exercises meant that environmental issues were often not adequately 
reflected in the initial identification of programmes and projects; 
•  there was limited awareness of environmental issues among DGVIIT staff in country 
and technical units and among staff in  the Delegations, and no training programme 
was put in place to create such awareness; and 
•  the use of the environmental manual was not made compulsory until 1996. 
Following  an  evaluation  of  Environmental  Performance  of  EC  Programmes  in 
Developing Countries, these issues are now being addressed by the Environment Desk 
in DGVIII. 
Our observations in the field are consistent with a recent evaluation of environmental 
performance  of EC  programmes  that  concluded  that  environmental  policies  had  not 
been translated into  strategic plans or specific  targets  at  country level,  and that there 
was  limited  awareness  of the  environmental  issues  in  the  design  of projects  either 
within  DGVIII or in  recipient country  institutions.
63  However,  the  design  of recent 
projects  has  benefited from  the  Manual.  In  the  transport  sectors  in  Cameroun and 
Tanzania, environmental  appraisal  techniques  are  increasingly  being  applied  in  the 
planning  and  implementation  of road  projects.  This  is  a  significant  improvement, 
particularly in Tanzania where a recent environmental evaluation
64  found  that, in the 
past,  environmental  impact  assessments  had  not  been  widely  carried-out.  In  Cote 
d'lvoire,  the  Commission  has  been  active  ~n supporting  the  implementation  of the 
National Environment Plan. 
63  'Evaluation  of  the  Environmental  Performance  of  EC  Programmes  in  Developing  Countries', 
Environmental Resources Management, December 1997. 
Environmental  Resources  Management,  Evaluation  of the  Environmental  Performance  of EC 
Programmes in Developing Countries, June 1997. 
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III.  Aid implementation 
~  The practice of sharing responsibilities in aid implementation does not bring efficient results. 
~  Where the  government's weaknesses lead the  Delegation to  assume more responsibility for aid 
implementation, the Delegation's capacity becomes even more overstretched. 
~  Where  there  is  low  government capacity,  the  strengthening of institutions should precede the 
transfer of responsibilities. 
~  While T A provided to  the government can be useful as a short-term measure, in the long-term it 
is only beneficial if it contributes to institutional strengthening. 
~  Project preparation: 
Improvements in  the  quality of project preparation have  resulted  from the  introduction of 
Project Cycle Management but identification screening is still weak. 
~  Implementation: 
The implementation and monitoring of EC aid  has been affected by the extensive nature of 
ex ante financial controls. 
Monitoring the performance of on-going projects has generally been weak 
~  Evaluation: 
The  Commission  undertakes  many  good  evaluations,  but  their  lessons  are  still  not 
sufficiently internalised. 
This chapter presents the findings from our seven case studies on aid implementation. 
Section  A  discusses  the  importance  of aid  implementation.  Section  B  reviews  the 
institutional arrangements for EC aid at the government, delegation and project levels. 
Section C  outlines the  key  issues affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of EC aid 
along the project cycle.  Section D presents strategic options on how to  address these 
six issues by linking on-going initiatives with successful experiments on the ground. 
The importance of aid implementation 
Aid implementation is a learning process which is essential for the effectiveness of aid. 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the weakness of aid implementation is widely 
recognised  as  a  key  constraint  on  the  Commission's  policy  dialogue  with  ACP 
governments.  Unfortunately,  aid  implementation  issues  are  often  discussed  at  a 
technical  level,  and  decision  makers  are  often  not  aware  of  their  importance  in 
constraining the  effective  implementation  of policy objectives.
65  However,  most of 
these issues can only be addressed with the active participation of key decision makers 
(including Member States). 
65  For  example,  'although  technical  and  sectoral  staff  work  to  develop  policy  guidelines  for  their 
specialties - such as  gender or health  issues - there is  no  guarantee that staff in  Brussels or at  the 
delegations  will  read  them  - far  less  act  on  them.'  IT  AD.  Project  Monitoring  and  the  use  of 
Indicators.  1996.  p.31. 
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Aid  implementation  as  a  learning  process  should  consist  of  simple  and  rational 
procedures.
66  Possible  solutions  to  development  problems  should  be  conceptualised, 
tested and adapted continuously in a series of trials and errors.  Having recognised the 
learning dimension of aid,  many multilateral and bilateral donors have abandoned the 
blueprint approach, where implementation  was limited to carrying out a series of pre-
determined tasks.  They have adopted instead a process approach, where solutions are 
defined starting from local conditions and working with the various stakeholders, and 
are  constantly  modified  in  line  with  experience  to  meet  the  changing  needs  of 
beneficiaries.  The Commission started to  change its approach to  aid management with 
the introduction of Project Cycle Management in  1993, precisely in order to learn from 
past experience.
67 
Institutional arrangements 
Roles and responsibilities 
The partnership envisaged in the Lome Convention between the Commission and ACP 
countries is  a cornerstone of EC aid.  It  is  based on the  assumption that both partners 
have  equal  capacities  and  can  therefore  take  on  similar  roles  and  responsibilities. 
Experience has shown instead that co-management is highly dependent on the uneven 
and  frequently  insufficient  capacities  of  the  two  partners.  With  hindsight,  true 
partnership should be  an objective of EC aid, where responsibilities are transferred to 
the ACP countries as capacity is built. 
Tasks relating to the management of EC aid under the Lome Convention fall into one of 
the following categories: 
1.  Sole responsibility of the EC or the A  CP:  all  tasks for which one partner is  not 
required to consult the other before making a decision; 
2.  Primary responsibility of the EC or the ACP: all  tasks for which one partner is 
responsible but needs to work 'in close collaboration' with the other; and 
3.  Joint responsibility: all tasks for which both partners are equally responsible 
Table  2  on  main  roles  and  responsibilities  under  the  Lome  Convention  shows  the 
situation we observed during our field visits to six countries and one region. It presents 
an  average  as  there  are  substantial  variations from  country to  country and even from 
sector to sector.  The table is therefore only illustrative and shows that: 
•  according to  the  Lome Convention only four out of the twenty tasks indicated in 
Table 2 do not involve some sharing of responsibilities between the partners; and 
66 
67 
The Lome Convention, which included the co-management of EC aid, was intended to ensure that the 
cooperation partnership was  'earned out with a minimum of administrative fonnalities using simple 
and rational procedures so that projects and programmes may be implemented rapidly and efficiently.' 
Lome IV Art 221  (g). 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  Manual.  Project  Cycle  Management.  Integrated 
Approach and Logical Framework. (1993). 
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•  the  Commission  is  involved  in  many  of  the  functions  assigned  by  the  Lome 
Convention to its ACP partners. 
Whenever  we  found  a  situation  substantially  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Convention, we wrote 'Real=Lome', while any discrepancy has been shaded, with what 
we observed on the ground marked as  'real' and what the Convention envisages marked 
as  'Lome'. 
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Table 2 - Main roles and responsibilities under Lome IV bis 
Joint 
Stage  ECOnly  EC  EC-ACP  ACP  ACP 
Leads  Leads  OnlY 
A. PROGRAMMING 
1.  Indication  of  the  total  indicative  programming  Real 
allocation (Art. 281.1)  = 
Lome 
2.  Prepare draft NIP (Art. 281.2)  Real  Lome 
3.  Exchange v1ews on draft NIP (Art. 282.1)  Real 
= 
Lome 
4.  AdoptiOn of NIP (Art. 284.2)  Real 
= 
Lome 
5.  Report on Implementation of NIP (Art. 284.3)  Real 
= 
Lome 
B. PROJECT PREPARATION 
1.  Identification  &  preparation  of  projects  and  Real  Lome 
programmes (Art. 285) 
2.  Appraisal of projects and programmes (287)  Real  Lome 
3.  Preparation of financing proposals (288.1)  Real 
= 
Lome 
4.  Adoptwn or reJection of financing proposals (288.4)  Real 
= 
Lome 
5.  Drafting of financing agreements (  291)  Real  Lome 
6.  Signmg of financing agreements (291)  Real 
= 
Lome 
C. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
1.  Prepare invitations to tender (313.l.c)  Real  Lome 
2.  Approve invitation to tender (317.d and e)  Real 
= 
Lome 
3.  Issue invitatwns to  tender (313.l.b)  Real 
= 
Lome 
4.  Open tenders  Real 
= 
Lome 
5.  Evaluate tenders and select contractor  Real 
= 
Lome 
6.  Sign contracts and riders  Real 
= 
Lome 
7.  Approve delegated appropriation  Real  Lome 
8.  Payments (319.4)  Real  Lome 
9.  Monitoring and evaluation (320 & 321)  Real  Lome 
IDC - September 1998  60 Aid implementation 
All  seven  case  studies 
confirmed  that  in  practice  co-
management  has  reduced  the 
effectiveness  of EC  aid.  Our 
observations are also consistent 
with  several  statements 
contained  in  the  Green  Paper 
and  in  the  Guidelines  for  the 
Negotiation  of  a  new 
Convention.  as  shown  in  the 
Box. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it 
is  now  recognised by  both  the 
Conunission  and  most  ACP 
countries 
69  that  co-
management  of  EC  aid  has 
diminished the effectiveness of 
its  implementation.  Co-
management  IS  highly 
dependent  on  the  capacity  of 
both partners and often implies 
the  duplication  of  functions 
and  the  dilution  of 
responsibilities.  In  ACP 
countries with well-functioning 
governments  and  sufficient 
capacity,  it  can  be  resented  as 
'paternalism'.  In  countries 
with  poor  governance  or 
administrative  capacities,  'co-
management'  does  not  really 
exist. 
III 
Views on the co-management of  EC aid 
Green Paper 
20 years' experience. however, shows the Convention to 
be  an  ambitious  but  sometimes  unrealistic  framework 
based  on  assumptions  about  the  ACP  countries' 
institutional and political  capacities  that have  not been 
fulfilled. (p. 6) 
In  its  eagerness  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  aid 
operations, the Community has tended to take  the place 
of its  weaker  partner,  adopting  a  more  interventionist 
role that is hard to reconcile with the recognised need to 
encourage the recipient countries to take charge of their 
own  development  process.  (p.  7)  It  is  however  a 
'vicious circle' (p. 11) 
Institutional  and  economic  policy  situation  in  the 
recipient  countries  has  often  been  a  major  constraint, 
reducing the impact of aid operations (p. 7) 
The  cwrent  Lome  system  whereby  commitment 
decisions  on  cooperation  activities  and  expenditure 
monitoring  are  both  jointly  managed  has  shown  its 
limits.  In practical terms, the to-ing and fro-ing between 
national and chief (i.e. Community) authorising officers 
is time-consuming and  so  makes aid  less effective. (p. 
46) 
Guidelines for Negotiation of  New Agreement
68 
'All evaluation studies show that the cumbersome joint 
management system has hampered  the effectiveness of 
aid.' 
It  must  be  recognised  however that  the  partnership  envisaged  under Lome,  and  the 
approach to aid implicit in  such a partnership, was and still is  more advanced than the 
one adopted by  other multilateral donors, as  showed by  a comparison  wi~:1  ~he World 
Bank project cycle in Figure 4.  It should be noted that Figure 4 compares the rules of 
each organisation  and  not  the  actual  behaviour on the  ground.  Formally,  the  Lome 
Convention  assigns  a  much  greater  role  to  the  recipient  country  during  project 
preparation  than  the  World Bank does.  Considering  how  important  this  stage  is  in 
determining the success of a project and local ownership, the Convention was clearly 
far-sighted in this respect.
70 
68 
69 
70 
Communication from  the  Commission to  the  Council and the  European Parliament.  Guidelines for 
the  negotiation  of new  cooperation  agreements  with  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP) 
countn'es. October 29, 1997, p.  30. 
See  for  example  ECDPM, Beyond Lome  IV:  Exploring  Options for Future  ACP-EU Cooperation, 
1996  and  Price  Waterhouse,  Study  of the  causes of delay  in  the  implementation of  financial  and 
technical cooperation, 1992 
Note the recent Round Table on Partnership organised by t.he World Bank, see Chapter I. 
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Figure -1:  ACP States' role in the EC and \VB project cycle 
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III 
Thc 1ssuc  \)f Govcrnmcnt capacity and  commitmcnt is  central  to  aid  management.  A 
recent  cconometric  analysis  of a sample of more  than  900 complc'tcd  projects  by  the 
\V or! d  Bank· s  F \al uations  Department  found  that  ·borrower  performance  is  most 
critical  to  dctcrmining  projcct  outcome.  Good  borrower  performance  raises  the 
probability l)f a s;1tisfactory outcome by J5 to  ~0 percent;1ge points.· 
71 
Each  ACP  h;1s  different  institutional  arrangements  for  EC  aid  at  three  levels:  the  co-
ordin;ltion  of EC  aid  with  ~ud from  other donors:  the  overall  management of EC  aid: 
and  the  management  structures  for  EC  projects/programmes.  The  ~arious set-ups are 
rrescntL'd  111  Table 3 hekn.v. 
OLD.  Tht'  Annuul Rn·tt'H' of' Dt'vt'lornwnr £ft(-'crivo1t'SS  IARJ)£1,  ~llvcmber l9lJ7.  The  Wurld  Bank. 
Wa~hmgt()n DC. 
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Table 3  - Institutional arrangements for  EC aid  management in six  countries and one 
region 
f~h..,-."_  -~-:~::,~~~;  ..  ::.;  ;  ~. _: __ NAO Office-;~~-.:,·-.-~}~.,_,:;- -'Project/Programme Management~~::~: ._-:~;Lead  Role.,~\;;;_:., 
;J;:.';~;~~:  "  t  .:' ·  .. ··- ~~Ji=tl?~~s~~~1£~~~,;~~~  ~tt~~ 
-;"~-;'"<  ~-;  :::c:.:.;.:~.;-_ A- -,  ·- -Separate  lnte~  Ministries·.:  ·  Parastatals  Skmd-alone.PMU'-· ·  ,;:·'· Govtt:  :~ ,\  »>tiiifi~~'-
Zimbabwe  ./  ./  ~ 
Cote d' I  voire  ./  ./  ~ 
Cameroun  ../  ~ 
Tanzania  ./  ./ 
Jamaica  ~ 
Liberia  ./  ~ 
East  ./  ./  ./ 
Caribbean 
There are essentially two institutional models for EC aid, as shown in Figure 5. 
The  first model comprises countries  whose  governments  have  sufficient capacity to 
manage  EC  aid,  and  to  ensure  that  it  is  consistent  with  their  own  development 
strategies,  well  co-ordinated with  the  aid  from  other sources and  properly managed 
(Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and Jamaica).  These countries are characterised by an NAO 
office  fully  integrated  in  a  particular  ministry  (usually  the  Ministry  of Finance); 
~ 
~ 
./ 
procurement  and  disbursement 
procedures consistent with national ones 
(e.g.  resources  are  disbursed  following 
normal  budgetary  procedures); 
projects managed by  line  Ministries 
Figure 5: Aid management structures and 
capacity in six countries and one region 
72 
or by units mostly staffed with civil 
servants;  and  donor  co-ordination 
firmly  in  the  hands  of government. 
This capacity is of course not evenly 
distributed  and  different  sectors 
presents  different  situations.  In 
Zimbabwe  for  example,  capacity  in 
agriculture is  much  stronger than in 
health  or in  trade,  while in  Jamaica 
capacity is  stronger in health than in 
structural adjustment. 
lflGH 
c 
A 
p 
A 
c 
I 
T 
y 
LOW 
LOW 
ROLE IN IMPLEMENfATION AND 
COORDINATION 
mGH 
Various  implementing  structures  coexist  in  all  countries.  We  refer  here  to  the  prevailing  set  up  for  EC 
projects/programmes in each country. 
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The  second  model  (i.e., 
Tanzania,  Cameroun)  is 
characterised  by:  (a)  a 
detached  NAO  office  staffed 
mainly  (if not  exclusively as 
in the case of Cameroun- see 
Box)  with  consultants;  (b)  a 
proliferation  of  parallel 
management  structures  by 
which  the  Commission  as 
well  as  several  other  donors 
have  tried  to  bypass  the 
capacity issue in  a way that it 
is  sometimes  efficient  in  the 
short  term  but  not 
sustainable; and (c) donor co-
ordination  mostly  centred 
around  the  donors 
themselves.  These countries 
leave the  impression that the 
aid  programmes  are  larger 
than the country's capacity to 
manage them.  It should also 
be  noted  that  parallel 
management  structures  are 
inconsistent  with  the  DAC 
Principles for Effective A.id.
73 
The  East  Caribbean  is  in 
between  the  two  models,  as 
projects  and  programmes  are 
identified  and  prepared  by  a 
III 
Institutional arrangements for EC aid management in 
Cameroun 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
There are three support units to the NAO responsible 
for managing the three most important instruments of 
EC aid to Cameroun: a Stabex uni~ a SASP Unit and 
a Co-ordination Unit 
These units  are  staffed  with consultants.  No  civil 
servants  work with  them.  T As  were  supposed to 
have  counterparts  in  the  civil  service,  but  the 
counterparts were never designated. 
There is no structure officially in charge of  donor co-
ordination. 
There is almost universal  use  of T A-staffed  PMUs 
loosely attached to line ministries and monitored by a 
Co-ordination Unit (also staffed by TAs). 
Government budgetary procedures are not followed 
for commitment and disbursement of  EDF funds. 
A separate  Tender Board has been created for EDF-
funded  projects,  using  EDF procW'ement procedures 
instead  of  local  procedures.  Although  this  has 
speeded  up  procurement  (from  an  average  of  12 
months  before  its  establishment  to  2-3  months  per 
procurement  at  present),  this  solution  is  not 
sustainable. 
The presence  of three  NAO support units  and  the 
decision  not to  use  local procedures have made the 
management of EDF aid more efficient  This short-
term improvement however has a long term impact of 
diminishing the pressure to strengthen local capacity~ 
Other  donors  that  have  worked  within  the 
Government  system  have  had  to  accept  slower 
disbursement. 
regional  structure  (CARIFORUM)  but  implemented  by  national  ones.  Its  Regional 
Authorising Office is  separate, not  because governments lack capacity to  manage EC 
aid but because of its regional nature.  Liberia is another exception because it refers to 
an  emergency situation where a consultant-staffed unit,  the  Aid Co-ordination Office 
(ACO), links directly with Headquarters.
74 
These  different  institutional  set-ups  have  evolved  based  on  realities  on  the  ground. 
They  reflect  the  differences  existing  among  ACP  countries  and  the  difficulties  in 
finding one solution for all circumstances.  The evidence from our case studies seems to 
point to  two  possible  approaches for the  Commission:  a  'hands off approach to  aid 
management in  countries with  good  capabilities (first model)  and a more  'hands on' 
approach  to  aid  management  in  countries  where  these  capabilities  are  not  present 
(second model),  though  with  an  'exit strategy'  centred on strengthening government 
capacity  and  transferring  more  and  more  responsibilities  to the  ACP partner in  due 
73 
74 
'Technical Co-operation should build on existing institutions and capacity, public as well as  private, 
and avoid the promotion of parallel structures established for the operation of aid-supoorted activities.' 
Development Assistance Manual.  DAC Principles for Effective Aid.  1992, p. 55 
The  Liberian  National  Transitional  Government  bad  transferred  the  authority  of  the  National 
Authorising Officer (NAO) to the Chief Authorising Officer of the EDF in 1994. In the same year, the 
Aid Co-ordination Office (ACO)  was  established in Monrovia. to  provide a base for EC operations. 
As a result, EDF financing no longer required the authorisation of the Liberian government. 
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course.  Similar approaches have been discussed in the Green Paper. 
75  See discussion 
in the previous chapter on capacity and commitment of ACP counterparts. 
As  far  as  procedures  are  concerned,  according  to  DAC  Principles,  information  and 
reporting requirements in project selection, implementation, accounting and evaluation 
should be related as closely as possible to recipients' own administrative practices and 
requirements.  This ideal situation is approximated by EC aid only in the first model. 
An  excellent example of successful  application  of this  principle  in  EC aid  is  Cote 
d'Ivoire, where the implementation of EC aid follows national procedures, sometimes 
adapted to suit EC requirements but without creating parallel procedures for the EDF. 
3.  Capacity of Delegations 
Often  facing  weak  ACP  partners,  Delegations  need  strong  capacity  to  foster  their 
partners' institutional development over time.  Being the Commission's main presence 
on  the  ground  they  are  also  essential  in  the  learning  process  involved  in  aid 
management and are the Commission's best-informed decision makers. 
The actual capacity of Delegations varies significantly from country to country.  Some 
Delegations appear relatively understaffed, particularly in key specialist areas.
76  Some 
Delegations  also  suffer  from  protracted  vacancies,  frequent  turnover  of staff and  a 
mismatch between the skills of staff and their project portfolio. 
77  In recent years, the 
number of Delegation advisers in ACP countries has been reduced. 
The capacity of Delegations is further weakened by several factors: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
75 
76 
77 
Delegations carry out too  many tasks falling within the responsibility of the ACP 
partner and are required to  carry out administrative controls that are too extensive 
(particularly ex ante), as discussed below; 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  I,  Delegations  operate  without  up-dated  operational 
manuals,  adequate  policy  guidelines,  job  descriptions  or  a  clear  division  of 
responsibilities with headquarters; 
There is limited delegation of decision-making to Heads of Delegation; and 
Delegations receive  little  technical  back-up from  headquarters  (e.g.  few  missions 
from  HQ,  high  turnover of desk officers)  and  they  have  limited interaction with 
other Delegations. 
·A  phased and  ind1 vi dualized approach  should be  adopted in  which the degree of responsibility for 
administrative  and  financial  management  of the  aid  grows  as  good  governance  improves  in  the 
recipient  state.  The aim  would  be  to  give  beneficiaries steadily  more  responsibility for  managing 
programmes, justifying and monitoring expenditure and assessing the economic  and social impact of 
assistance.  (. .. )  In countries  where institutional and  administrative conditions would rule out this 
approach  in  the  short-term,  the  EU  would  take  sole  responsibility  but  would  simultaneously help 
strengthen the local skills needed to  take over responsibility.  It would be best not to set up specific 
units but to work within existing local structures.'  (Green Paper on relations between the European 
Union and the ACP Countries on the eve of the 21st Century', p. 47). 
This  is  a  judgement  which  is  difficult  to  make  given  some  organisational  limitations  of  the 
Commission (See Zimbabwe and Tanzania country reports). 
The  last  DAC  Review  of EC  Aid  (OECD,  Development  Co·operation  Review  Series:  European 
Community,  No.  12,  1996)  found  that  the  'EC needs  to  further  strengthen  both  its  in-house  and 
contracted capabilities to  plan, manage and implement its new generation of projects.  The need for 
reinforced capabilities in the areas of poverty alleviation, gender, population and environment, as well 
as evaluation, is needed in the field delegations and headquarters.' 
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The Delegation in  Zimbabwe has  been strengthened through  the  recruitment of four 
National Programme Officers (NPOs)  funded by the  EDF.  NPOs were introduced in 
Zimbabwe  as  part  of a  pilot  scheme  to  assist  the  NAO  in  the  implementation  of 
development policy, but they effectively work for the Delegation.  Their support to the 
Delegation is important and they also facilitate relations with the NAO Office. 
4.  Institutional arrangements at the project/programme level 
Institutional  arrangements  for  project  implementation  are  of  three  types:  fully 
integrated, parastatal and parallel management structures. 
Several projects are implemented by  Government departments.  Implementation of 
SASP and  Stabex in  Zimbabwe or the  road programme in  Tanzania, are integrated 
within Government structures - a very positive feature.  In  the case of agriculture in 
Zimbabwe,  the  Ministry  has  been  arguing  against  the  creation  of a  separate unit  to 
manage the  Agriculture Services and Management Programme  (ASMP) and believes 
that the ASI\1P implementation should be the responsibility of the Ministry itself.  The 
Commission has supported this Government position. 
A second approach, rare today, is project implementation through parastatals which 
might  have  been  created  during  project  design  but  whose  purpose  was  not just the 
implementation  of the  project.  In  Zimbabwe,  older  projects  in  agriculture  were 
implemented  by  the  Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), 
78  and a 
trade development project was implemented by ZimTrade, a parastatal created when the 
project was being prepared.  In the East Caribbean and Jamaica, parastatal bodies are 
also frequently involved in aid management. 
78  Although day-to-day implementation was delegated to semi-autonomous PMUs. 
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A  third  modality  is  a  Project 
Management  Unit  (PMU), 
staffed by consultants and whose 
sole  function  is  to  manage  a 
project.  This  has  become  the 
most popular approach in  many 
countries  and  reflects  donors' 
attempts  to  circumvent  the 
weaknesses  of  Government 
institutions, rather than  to  try to 
strengthen  the  Government's 
capacity.  P}v1Us  are  very 
common  m  Tanzania, 
Cameroun,  and  East 
Caribbean, but are  also present 
in  , countries  with  stronger 
capacity.  The successful Micro-
Projects  Programme  1n 
Zimbabwe,  for  example,  is 
being  implemented  by  a 
National  Management  Unit 
staffed with consultants.  There 
have  been  discussions  on  the 
possibility  of creating  a  similar 
unit to assist the  NAO office in 
carrying out its functions. 
III 
Institutional arrangements for aid management in 
the East Caribbean 
•  CARIFORUM  is  a  regional  organisation 
established specifically to manage the EC regional 
programme. It is funded by the Regional Indicative 
Programme. 
•  The Delegation in  Guyana performs most of the 
tasks  relating to  the  regional  programmes (there 
are 8 Delegations and 2 EC offices in the region) 
•  The  programme  includes  complex  management 
structures  (needed  to  involve  15  countries in the 
management of the regional programme).  Once a 
project is  approved. the  responsibility shifts from 
CARIFORUM to the country's NAO (or Deputy 
Regional  Authorising  Officer)  and  the  local 
Delegation. 
•  Regional bodies often have limited accountability 
to individual countries. 
•  Most  evaluations  reviewed  during  Phase  I  also 
highlighted  the  complex  institutional  set  up  of 
regional  projects  as  one  of  their  major 
weaknesses.  They also found that centralisation of 
paper work for regional projects in one Delegation 
has  sometimes caused additional delays and that, 
as  Delegations  are  'national',  they  feel  less 
ownership of  regional programmes. 
Institutional  studies  indicate  that  the  first  implementation  arrangement  is  the  most 
sustainable,  although  all  three  approaches  are  characterised  by  a  substantial  use  of 
technical  assistance.  The  third  arrangement  (parallel  management  structures)  is 
probably the least sustainable and the most popular.  Too often donors seem to believe 
that each new problem should be addressed by creating a new unit (e.g. in  the  1990s 
the  World Bank has recommended the creation of 15  units to work on the integrated 
roads  project in  Tanzania).  In  doing so,  donors often overlook the fact  that parallel 
structures  still  need  to  interact  with  the  Government  system  without  having  any 
leverage over it.  In the words of a Tanzanian civil servant, they create 'patches' on a 
huge, inefficient system. 
In  some cases too many units are involved in the implementation of projects and this 
complexity is addressed by creating co-ordination units or Steering Committees.  These 
cornminees were common in all the countries we visited and were particularly complex 
in the case of regional projects in the East Caribbean (see Box above), while they were 
a positive factor in Cote d'lvoire as they allowed the adaptation of project designs to 
changing circumstances.  Most evaluations agree, however, that Steering Committees 
are an indication of complex design.  Large steering committees do not always ensure 
better coherence and co-ordination.' 
79 Similarly in Agriculture and Rural Development, 
'heavy co-ordination committees aimed at involving stakeholders did not improve the 
d  . .  aki  ,go  ec1s1on m  ng process. 
79 
80 
Phase I Report 
Phase I Report 
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Programme and Project Cycle Management 
There are  two  issues of a  general  nature  affecting all  stages of the  project cycle:  the 
complexity of EC aid instruments and delays in project preparation, implementation and 
evaluation.  We tum to them first. 
The complexity of EC aid instruments has had a negative impact on all  stages of the 
EC project cycle.  Even when a country team makes a special effort to  coordinate the 
use  of these  instruments  (SASP  and  NIP  in  the  health  sector in  Cote  d'Ivoire),  the 
fragmentation of instruments introduces different procedures and  inefficiencies. 
The use of budget lines introduces further complexities in the EC system.  They do not 
follow  the co-management arrangement of the  Lome Convention and can be  used on 
delicate issues like human rights and democracy.  However, they also have problems. 
First, they are  too  numerous and small  to justify the  supervision effort required from 
Delegations  (e.g.  in  Tanzania alone  there  were  30 operations funded  through  budget 
lines).  Second, there are no clear procedures for their preparation and implementation. 
Third,  budget  lines  are  often  created  by  the  European  Parliament  and  they  further 
expand policy objectives (see Chapter I). 
The  complexity of EC aid  instruments  has  long  been  acknowledged,  and  there  is  a 
agreement that a drastic simplification is  needed.  The Green Paper for example noted 
the  'difficulty  of maintaining  consistency  between  instruments  which,  even  if they 
interact  in  closely  related  areas,  are  governed  by  different  criteria'
81  and  that  the 
'cooperation with the  ACP countries is now overburdened with instruments which are 
tailored  to predetermined uses and are increasingly difficult to run in a coherent way.'82 
While  delays  are  still  common  in  project  preparation,  implementation  delays  are 
generally within the reference limits set in the Post-Fiji study.  We analysed delays in a 
sample  of seven projects  in  three  countries (details  on  Zimbabwe and Tanzania are 
presented in Table 4 below).  None of the projects we analysed was prepared within the 
reference limits identified in  the Post Fiji study, 
83  while three were prepared in a time 
longer than the maximum limit.  Delays in implementation were instead minimal in the 
case of the awarding of works contracts (only one case out of three was higher than the 
reference  limit),  while  the  awarding  of supply  and  service  contracts  was  generally 
higher than the reference limit but still  below the maximum limit. 
81 
82 
83 
Green Paper. p.  8. 
Green paper, p.  43. 
Price  Waterhouse,  Study  of the  causes  of delay  in  the  implementation  of  financial  and  technical 
cooperation, 1992 
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Table 4 - Implementation delays •  examples from  Zimbabwe and Tanzania 
T 
A 
N 
z 
A 
N 
I 
A 
z 
I 
M 
B 
A 
B 
w 
E 
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-
Plwle  Price Waterhouse Report: 
Time Umits (months) 
Ret.  Max.  value of 
delay recorded 
A. Project Preparation  6  18 
(preparation of finandng 
proposal to signing of 
financing agreement) 
DraWing up financmg proposal  2  6 
Approval of financmg proposal  2  !0 
S1grung  financmg agreement  2  3 
B. A warding of contracts 
(preparation of dossier to 
signing of contract) 
Works (Open IT)  20  46 
Supply (Open IT)  13  39 
Semce (Resmcted IT)  8  33 
Excludmg orne for 
prequalificanon 
~  Price Waterhouse IUport: 
Time Umits (months) 
Ret.  Max. value 
of  delay 
A. Project Preparation  6  19 
(preparation of finandng 
propasa! to signing of financing 
agreement) 
DraWing up financmg proposal  2  6 
Approval of financmg proposal  2  10 
S1grung of financmg agreement  2  3 
B. Awarding of contracts {under 
Restricted IT) 
Supemsmg consultant (total)  16.5  41.5 
Prepare doss1er · tenders made  11.5  22.5 
Evaluanon to approval  3  8 
Approval · contract s1gned  2  11 
Contractor  20  46 
Prepare dossier- tenders made  14  26 
Evaluanon to approval  4  15 
Approval- contract s1gned  2  5 
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Small Scale  ZIMTRADE  Mashonaland 
Irrigation  Support  East Fruit and 
Programme  Vegemble 
24  12  16 
13  7  8 
~  2  7 
7  3  1 
19  -
- 20 
14  9.5  14 
Road Projects 
(6th and 7th EDF) 
lbanda- Musoma- Jbmuna..S. 
Uyole  Slrari  Irinp 
8  24  29 
2  17  18 
3  5  5 
3  2  6 
20.5  30 
(as of Mar 
9R) 
18  18 
1  2 
- l.5  10 
12 J  18  -
3  1  -
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Project/programme preparation 
Quality and flexibility are two key principles that should guide project preparation.  As 
stated in the DAC Principles for Effective Aid, 
Many  of the  problems  encountered  during  implementation  can  be 
avoided  through  strengthened  project  appraisal,  greater  rigour  in 
project  selection,  clearer  and  more  realistic  setting  of objectives, 
greater flexibility in design,  and quicker adjustment when shortcomings 
are identified. 
Identification is,  in  the  view  of the  evaluators 
84
,  one  of the  weakest points in  the 
preparation of EC aid. Continuity with the past seems to  have been a decisive factor in 
many  instances  (Jamaica,  Cameroun,  Cote  d'Ivoire)  and  there  was  very  limited 
evidence of rigorous screening of projects at the identification stage.
85  As stated in  the 
DAC Principles for Effective Aid, 
8  the  initial  project  screening  process  is  critical. 
Experience  shows  that  rejections  of project  proposals  are  rare  once  major  project 
preparation  has  started.  In  most  cases,  projects  were  identified  by  the  Commission, 
consultants or other donors.  In a few cases, however, identification  was carried out by 
the ACP countries themselves, although not always in a rigorous way.  In  Cameroun 
and  Cote d'lvoire, the  identification  of programmes/ projects  reflected Government 
priorities whenever the sector policy was clear (in  transport and in cocoa processing). 
The  opposite  was  true  in  the  absence  of such  a  policy  (e.g.  cocoa  production  in 
Cameroun).  In  the  East Caribbean.1  individual  countries  presented ad hoc lists  of 
projects  that  were  often  too  ambitious  and  were  led  by  national  instead  of regional 
interests.  In  Jamaica,  programming  was  heavily  influenced  by  the  parastatal 
implementing agencies. 
Consultation  with  beneficiaries  has  been  very  limited  in  most  countries.  Notable 
exceptions relate to rnicroprojects, NGO projects and a few sector programmes (like the 
Agriculture Sector Management Programme in  Zimbabwe where the Government has 
consistently involved stakeholders in designing policies and programmes).  In the East 
Caribbean  region,  consultation  with  civil  society  has  been  more  extensive  in  the 
Commission's  new  areas  of  intervention  (e.g.  decentralised  cooperation  and  the 
environment) than in traditional sectors (e.g. tourism or trade). 
The  quality of preparation and appraisal has  been  gradually  improving since  the 
successful  introduction  of  Project  Cycle  Management  in  1993.  Lessons  from 
experience  have  also  been  better incorporated in  the  design  of several  new projects. 
Feasibility studies were well prepared in transport both in Cameroun and in Tanzania. 
Satisfactory economic cost-benefit analysis is  a strong feature of the transport sector, 
and  internal  rates  of  return  calculated  in  feasibility  studies  have  generally  been 
confirmed  by  evaluation  reports.  Transport  is  also  one  of the  sectors  where  the 
introduction  of PCM  has  improved  the  effectiveness  of interventions,  because  the 
85 
86 
Phase I of this evaluation also found that poor identification has been a weakness of EC aid in several 
sectors (i.e.  transport, co-operation with  NGOs,  agriculture and rural development; environment and 
forestry;  trade development and tourism; education and training and regional co-operation).  See also 
Project Monitoring and the Use of  Indicators, ITAD, September 1996, p.55. 
Some  EU  Member  States  (in  particular  Germany  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands) have instead a very rigorous screening  process. 
Page 34. 
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design is better geared to achieving planned objectives.
87  In other sectors, weak project 
preparation is still common.  In Cameroun, projects in the cocoa sector and those using 
SASP 1  's counterpart funds were poorly appraised and have had limited effectiveness. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, projects funded by  Stabex had limited input from the Government 
d .  ffi  .  1  .  88  an  msu  1c1ent ana ysts. 
In some cases, the EC allocates insufficient manpower resources for project preparation 
and this limits the possibility of Government participation in the process.  In structural 
adjustment  in  Tanzania,  time  and  manpower  constraints  of EC  officials  in  the 
preparation  phase  resulted  in  limited  co-ordination  with  the  Government,  and  in  an 
underestimation of the difficulties involved in  managing the SASP and monitoring its 
assumptions.  The preparation of similar operations by other donors would normally 
require a larger internal project preparation team. 
Several  unrealistic  assumptions  are  made  during  preparation,  particularly  regarding 
sustainability.  It is widely accepted that the central notion of sustainability needs to be 
assessed  during  appraisal.  In  particular,  project  design  should  correspond  to  the 
managerial  and technical  capacity  of recipients  and  the  proposed project  should  be 
'affordable'.  Unrealistic  assumptions  were  particularly  common  in  structural 
adjustment and transport.
89  In Zimbabwe, for example.1 project preparation frequently 
overlooked the actual monitoring and implementation capacity of the Government and 
the Delegation.  In the case of SASP 1, it was believed that the targeting of counterpart 
funds to nine sub-programmes would facilitate the control of counterpart funds.  But the 
design did not take into account the limited capacity available in the Government and 
the  Delegation  to  monitor  this  approach.  In  Tanzania, the  Integrated Road Project 
overestimated  the  Government's  capacity  to  manage  such  a  substantial  sector 
investment  programme  and  its  ability  to  properly  maintain  the  rehabilitated  road 
network.  The  Government's  commitment  to  reform  was  also  significantly 
overestimated. 
90 
87 
88 
89 
90 
See Phase I  report.  . 
This situation has improved since Stabex 93. 
Phase  I  identified  similar  problems  also  in  other  sectors:  energy,  microprojects,  tourism.  trade 
development and health. 
A similar conclusion had been reached by the ODI Study, How European Aid Works  (1997;  p.  44): 
'The  EC  has  neglected  to  pay  attention  to  the  structure  and  effectiveness  of the  implementing 
institutions in  its  projects.  Commitment has usually ended with the physical completion of projects 
with little attention to long-term viability.'  In transport:  ' the Commission has been slow to address 
transport  policy  and  the  management  structures  concerned  with  the  satisfactory  operation  and 
maintenance of roads.  Similarly in railways (Tanzania), project preparation was flawed, especially in 
relation to local management and maintenance capabilities.' (pp. 66-67). 
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Substantial  use  of consultants 
is  made  during  project 
preparation,  often  without 
adequate  management  of their 
work  either  by  the  ACP 
administration  or  by  the 
Delegation.  An  excessive 
reliance  on  consultants  affects 
the  Commission's  ability  to 
learn  from  experience  and  its 
institutional  memory.  It  also 
does not take advantage of the 
Delegations'  knowledge  of 
local  conditions  as  consultants 
are  often  brought  in  from 
abroad  and  lack  a  thorough 
appreciation  of reality  on  the 
ground.  They  are  therefore 
knowledgeable  on  technical 
Issues  but  tend  to  make 
unrealistic  assumptions  on 
local  capacltJes,  political 
realities and the Commission's 
institutional  constraints.  We 
The role of consultants in the preparation of a 
project in Zimbabwe 
Ill 
The project was  identified  in  1991  by the consulting 
company that was implementing its predecessor.  The 
process started with the preparation of a draft financing 
proposal  by  the  consultant,  with  limited  input  from 
Government or the Delegation.  The proposal, both in 
its  draft as well  as  in its final  form,  did  not include 
cost-benefit  analysis  nor  detailed  implementation 
arrangements. 
The consulting company designed  and  negotiated the 
project  with  the  EC  Delegation.  The  project  (10.2 
Mecu) included  a TA contract of over 7 Mecu. The 
project was supply-driven at a time when best practice 
in the sector was already pointing to the advantages of 
demand-driven  approaches.  The  project files  contain 
very  limited  evidence  of  consultations  with 
Government 
The consulting team advised  the EC on the  type  of 
contract to use and prepared the project budget.  h  then 
took part in the tender for the contract and eventually 
won it. 
also found a significant reliance on consultants in countries where government capacity 
was relatively strong, such as Zimbabwe and Jamaica.  An example from Zimbabwe is 
presented in  the  Box.  In Jamaica, several evaluations found  that heavy reliance on 
consultants during preparation resulted in poor design of projects, as foreign consultants 
usually  lack  the  required  insight  into  political  and  implementation  constraints.  The 
reliance  on  consultants  is  even  stronger  in  countries  where  government capacity  is 
weaker than in Zimbabwe and Jamaica, e.g. Tanzania and Cameroun.  In this respect, 
our findings  are  consistent with those of other studies.  The Green Paper for example 
also  concluded  that:  'the  EC  has  tended  to  rely  excessively  on  TA consultants  to 
determine the procedures for the implementation of its aid operations.' 
91 
Some  of these  weaknesses  are  attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  process  of quality 
control and peer review of project preparation in the Commission is  still weak.  The 
financial pre posals often acquire an advocacy rather than a due diligence function.  The 
Quality  Support  Group,  established  only  last  year,  could  strengthen  the  process. 
Although early indications are promising, it is as yet too early to judge the full impact 
of the  QSG.  The  EDF Committee  has  a  screening  role  but  much  less  of a  quality 
control  function.  Being  the  target  audience  for  the  advocacy  present  in  financing 
proposals it could even have a negative impact on the quality of project preparation: 
'since the [financing] proposal is also used as part of the presentation of the project to 
the  EDF  Committee,  there  is  a  danger  that  risks  may  be  minimised  and  benefits 
exaggerated to  facilitate the passage of the project through the committee.'
92  During 
the  period covered  by  this  evaluation,  the  process of quality control of project and 
programme preparation appeared stronger in many other donors. 
93 
91 
92 
93 
Green Paper, p. 7 
ITAD.  Project Monitoring and the use of Indicators.  1996.  p.21. 
We did not review projects that had been submitted to the QSG. 
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Programme and project implementation 
The effectiveness of EC interventions has been affected by the extensive nature of EC 
ex ante  financial  controls.  This  affects  the  entire  project cycle and,  in  particular, it 
hinders the implementation and monitoring of projects and programmes.  Where these 
controls have been reduced (e.g.  in emergency and rehabilitation assistance in Liberia, 
and  the  Microprojects  Programme  in  Zimbabwe),  EC  aid  seems  to  be  both  more 
efficient and effective. 
In  general,  the  emphasis  is  on  ex  ante  financial  controls  rather than  on  monitoring 
project performance or ex post financial audits.  In Tanzania, no project had up-to-date 
financial  audits.  In  Zimbabwe, we examined a sample of fourteen EDF 7 projects to 
determine what share of the total amount disbursed as of December 31,  1997 had been 
subject to ex post controls.  We found  that only 21 o/o  of expenditures had been fully 
audited. 
Because  of  EC  financial  arrangements  and  requirements  from  Member  States 
(particularly the provisions of the Financial Regulation of 29 July  1991 
94  adopted by 
the  Council),  ex  ante  financial  controls  are  applied  without  selectivity.  Table  S 
summarises the use of ex ante financial  controls in  Jamaica, Liberia, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe.  Out of 1,800 procurement decisions under EDF 6 and 7,  less than 40% 
(those above Ecu 1  00,000) accounted for 95% of the total amount of Ecu involved.  As 
economies of scale in  procurement and disbursement decisions are minimal, a  move 
towards removing ex ante controls for procurement decisions below Ecu 100,000, while 
extending financial  audits  to  all  expenditures under EDF-funded programmes,  would 
save considerable staff time. 
Table 5- Number and distribution of ex ante controls in EC aid to Liberia, 
Jamaica, Zimbabwe and Tanzania 
Indicators  Liberia  Jamaica  Zimbabwe  Tanzania  Total 
No of Procurement  183  316  480  844  1,823 
Decisions 
% of decisions > ecu  69%  47%  25  o/o  33  o/o  38 o/o 
100,000 
% of total value  97%  97%  84%  96%  95% 
explained by decisions 
> Ecu 100,000 
The effect  of these  controls  is  that  the  Delegations'  limited  staff resources  spend a 
substantial amount of time verifying every expenditure. We estimated that the amount 
of time  spent processing payment orders  by  the  EC  Delegations  in  Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania was 1.5 and 2.1  person years respectively. 
We also found some good examples of a more selective approach.  In Liberia, two of 
the  T A  firms  have  'iceberg'  contracts  which  combine  the  provision  of T A  with 
responsibility  for  managing  operational  budgets  for  the  programme,  and  include 
systems for covering procurement costs.  While the system has still several flaws,
95  it 
94 
95 
Financial Regulation of 29 July 1991  applicable to development finance cooperation under the fourth 
ACP-EEC Convention adopted by the Council of the European Communities. 
In panicular consultants need to pre-finance several expenditures. 
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substantially simplifies implementation.  In the new Ruvuma and Southern Iringa Road 
Maintenance Programme in Tanzania, procurement decisions below 250,000 ECU will 
be made by the implementing agency (the Ministry of Works) and paid using an imprest 
account.  Replenishments of the imprest account will  be  made half-yearly, subject to 
full  audit reports from an independent auditor and subject to  the Government fulfilling 
its committed contributions (i.e.  10% for rehabilitation and 90% for maintenance). 
Monitoring SASP counterpart funds in Tanzania 
Since July 1992, the EC has  provided Tanzania with three SASPs, totalling 120 million ECU. 
The SASPs are intended to support the overall reform programme as well as the accessibility and 
quality of health  and  education services.  This  was to  be  achieved  through counterpart fund 
support  to  the  Government  budget  and  through  the  support  given  to  sectoral  budgetary 
improvements.  The SASPs were to provide counterpart funds to the non-wage recurrent budget 
of the health and education sector, and SASP conclitionality was linked to both the ESAF and the 
social  sectors.  However.  during  implementation  this  budgetary  approach  proved difficult  to 
follow. 
SASPs represent almost 40% of the EC's total commitments to Tanzania under EDF 6 and EDF 
7.  It is the largest EDF financed operation.  However, insufficient manpower in the Delegation 
and  support from  Headquarters did not facilitate  effective  economic  monitoring or an active 
policy dialogue with the Government on refonns in the social sectors (including budgeting). 
A  Programme  Support  Uni~ supporting  the  NAO  and  the  administration  of EDF-funded 
interventions,  was  in  charge of the  monitoring of counterpart funds.  However,  it has  faced 
difficulties in carrying out its  functions adequately.  As a unit staffed with consultants working 
exclusively in EC programmes, its communication with Government departments has sometimes 
been  insufficient  Its  weakness  in  accounting  and  financial  controls  may  have  affected  the 
monitoring of some EDF projects, particularly the management of  counterpart funds.  In the case 
of SASP, its implementation and monitoring arrangements were weak. Neither the Government 
nor the Commission had the manpower to monitor such an ambitious programme effectively. 
Monitoring has generally been weak in EC projects as IT  AD noted in its evaluation
96 
and as illustrated by the case of SASP counterpart funds in Tanzania in the Box.  This 
weakness is due to a combination of the following four factors: 
• 
• 
• 
96 
98 
Monitoring  responsibilities  are  shared  between  the  ACP  and  the  Commission, 
without anyone having a clear lead responsibility. 
As discussed above, the EC focuses mostly on the financial management of projects 
rather  than  on  their  overall  performance.  Staff in  the  EC  Delegation  who  are 
required  to  monitor _the  financial  management of projects  do  not  usually  have 
finance  or accounting skills,  while  the  Delegation's Administrative Attache,  who 
does have such skills, monitors only the Delegation's operating budget.
97 
While  the  introduction  of Project  Cycle  Management  haS  certainly  improved 
monitoring, the lack of a standardised system 
98  to summarise the indicators from 
'Basic monitoring of the physical progress of projects within DGVID remains rudimentary.'  IT  AD. 
Project Monitoring and the use of  Indicators.  1996.  p.35. 
In the past, financial attaches were responsible for the monitoring of financial matters in projects and 
programmes. 
Different  monitorin~ tools have been  used by the  Commission over time.  The  'traffic light'  report 
was  introduced in  1988/89 but not used for long.  The Impact Fiche was introduced in 1994 but was 
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various logical frameworks using a common format makes comparing performance 
among projects practically  impossible.  A  standardised system has recently  been 
adopted by  DFID and the World Bank, two organisations that also use the logical 
framework as a project preparation and monitoring tool. 
•  There  is  often  too  much information  produced,  much  of which  is  irrelevant and 
therefore  not  utilised.  For  example,  a  recent  evaluation  of EC-funded  trade 
development  in  Zimbabwe  found  that  'elements  of  the  budget  are 
incomprehensible.  ( ... ) ZSP produces annual  and quarterly progress reports  ( ...  ) 
resulting in little or no feed-back, so the Programme proceeds as it set out with only 
minor corrections to its direction.' 
Few project or programme designs appear to  have  been substantially modified during 
implementation as  a  result of the  results  of monitoring or supervision.  Whereas (as 
discussed below) the results of evaluations of completed projects are starting to be fed 
into  the  design  of new  ones,  only  a  few  on-going  projects  (e.g.  Microprojects  in 
Zimbabwe and Stabex projects in Tanzania) have been flexible enough to adapt their 
design to changing circumstances.  In practice, the Commission's projects still follow a 
blueprint approach. 
Technical Assistance 
TA is  not  a  sustainable solution to  ACP governments'  institutional  weaknesses.  As 
noted in the previous chapter, the  effectiveness of TA in  Africa has been low, and it 
depends on  governments'  management capacity.  TA in  low capacity countries often 
substitutes for local capacity.  In  these countries, there are great difficulties in training 
counterpart government staff. 
However, because of the  difficulty of strengthening ACP capacity, the  use of TA by 
donors  is  extensive.  Short-term  benefits  include:  (a)  TA  allows  quick  results,  an 
attractive  feature  for 
donors  who  are  under 
pressure  to  show  results; 
(b)  T A  can  support  the 
donor's activities on an as-
needed  basis  (as  T A  in  a 
low  capacity  country  is 
unlikely  to  be  closely 
supervised  by  the  ACP 
counterpart);  and  (c)  TA 
can  sometimes  facilitate 
policy dialogue. 
In  some  cases,  T A 
programmes  have  been 
successful.  The  Box 
presents  an  example  of 
successful  T A  from 
Liberia.  The  key  factors 
Technical Assistance in Liberia. Why is it successful? 
The Aid Co-ordination Office (ACO) in Liberia has done a 
commendable job under  trying circumstances.  Its apparent 
success is due to: 
•  Private sector-like management of the ACO; 
•  A focused  recruitment strategy - staff were  selected to 
provide  a  mix  of  emergency_ relief_ management  and 
technical  skills,  as  the  operation  did  not  require  EC  · 
officials  or NGO  staff  who  might  not  have  had  key 
specialist skills;  . 
•  The  inter-linking  of  TA  contracts  into . a  mutwlny·· 
supportive network (co-ordination ofT  A);  ~  .·  ·  ·- "  · 
•  Strong and well co-ordinated multi-disciplinary staff; and · 
•  A  clear· ·subdivision  ·of·  responsibilities  :(no  ·co-"· 
management of  aid). .  ·  · ·  .. 
later put on hold.  Both systems were deemed by some staff to be too subjective (Project Monitoring 
and the  Use of  Indicators, ITAD. 1996, p.34). 
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for success seem to  have been the design of the technical assistance, which focused on 
efficiency, the recruitment process, and the clarity of roles.  We also found a few other 
examples  of effective T A  in  low-capacity  countries.  In  these  cases,  there  has  been 
success in improving the implementation of EC aid.  However, these T A  programmes 
have had more difficulty in  strengthening the  institutional capacity of ACP countries 
(see Box on page 64 on the use ofT  A in Cameroun). The effective use of TA requires 
strong management capacities in both the ACP government and the Delegations. 
Because  the  management  capacities  in  ACP  governments  is  often  weak,  the  first 
capacity that needs to  be strengthened in ACP governments is that for the management 
of T A programmes.  A strengthened management capacity would avoid two problems 
we encountered in the field. 
The first problem is the confusion generated by the dual role ofT  A in supporting both 
the Government and the Delegation.  For example, the difficulties in donors' Technical 
Assistance programmes in Tanzania and Cameroun are linked to their Governments' 
limited capacity to  manage and monitor these programmes.  In  many cases, the TA is 
perceived by Government as  an additional conditionality of an aid package and is  not 
adequately managed or supervised. In  this context, while T A  is nominally provided to 
support the Government, in many cases (given the Delegation staffing constraints), the 
TA supports central Commission activities.  This dual responsibility (Government and 
Commission)  can  often  compromise  the  effectiveness  of the  TA  in  strengthening 
Government capacity.  In Cameroun, the NAO support units are seen as an extension of 
the  Delegation and the  Government believes that they should therefore report to  the 
Delegation. 
The  second  problem  usually  arises  when  the  T A  programme  is  not  sufficiently 
monitored, given the Government and the Delegation capacity constraints.  This has led 
to considerable inefficiencies in some of these programmes.  In Tanzania, for example, 
the T A programme in  the SASP aimed at improving budgeting in the social sectors but 
had very limited success in strengthening government capacities. However, with limited 
supervision,  the  T A  programme  was  initially  extended  to  another  government 
department. In  this case, the programme was run through a special unit outside normal 
government structures.  In Zimbabwe, the ZimTrade Support Programme T A seems to 
have had a large role in both programme design and implementation (see Box under 
policy dialogue). 
Evaluation 
To  be  effective,  aid  organisations  need  to  learn from  experience  and  to  incorporate 
these lessons in their operations.  The Commission has been very thorough in ex post 
evaluations of its projects in ACP countries, more so than many other donors.  Only in 
Tanzania  did  we  find  a  backlog  of ex  post  evaluations.  At  the  same  time,  the 
dissemination of evaluation results is gradually improving, although the feedback from 
ACP governments is still very limited, and the field offices of Member States had often 
not received  copies of evaluation  reports  from  their own headquarters.  The recent 
dissemination  of  evaluation  summaries  through  DGVTII' s  Web  page  is  also  an 
important step taken by the Commission. 
There is probably a need to concentrate resources on key evaluations and to ensure that 
the  main evaluation lessons  are  implemented in  key  operations.  As  a  Commission 
official put it  'The focus should be only in avoiding our big mistakes).  The fact that 
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most of our findings had already been identified by other scattered evaluations but had 
not  been  acted  upon  illustrates  the  difficulties  of implementing  evaluation  lessons. 
However. in some cases, this also reflects the fact  that corrective measures can not be 
taken by the Commission alone.  Other actors need to be involved (e.g. Member States). 
According to  ODI, 
99  'the EC' s ability to  learn lessons appeared less satisfactory; for 
example,  in  transport  it  persisted  with  new  construction  rather  than  promoting  the 
maintenance  or rehabilitation  of existing  infrastructure.'  However,  in  our visits  we 
noted that in Tanzania, for example, the latest road projects have  incorporated lessons 
from experience on maintenance, government commitment and capacity building.  In 
Cameroun,  the  evaluation  of SASP  recommended  a  shift  from  the  earmarking  of 
counterpart funds for specific projects to  budget support, a recommendation heeded by 
the  Commission.  In  the East Caribbean, the recent evaluation of CARIFORUM has 
led to significant changes in  the way projects are prepared, with a greater involvement 
of Project Management Units in project design. 
Nevertheless. the evaluation function in the Commission needs to have a strong profile 
and  be  separate  from  the  line  management  responsible  for  planning  and  managing 
development, as recommended by DAC principles. 
100 
99 
100 
How European Aid Works ( 1997) 
Page 133. 
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AnnexA: 
Suggested terms of reference for Phase III 
The  following  terms  of reference  relate  to  the  third  phase  of an  evaluation  of EU 
development aid to the ACP countries.  It is part of a major evaluation decided upon by 
the European Council of Development Ministers, on 1 June 1995, concerning EU aid to 
the African Caribbean, Pacific (ACP), Asian and Latin American (ALA) and South and 
East-Mediterranean  (rvfED)  regions.  The  exercise  involves  a  full  and  detailed 
evaluation of development programmes and instruments of the EU. 
A.  Background 
The global evaluation of EU aid is divided into three stages: (i) an inventory of the EU 
(Commission and EIB managed) aid to  the ACP, ALA and MED regions, its policies 
and objectives; (ii) an  evaluation of each of the three aid programmes (ACP, ALA and 
MED) and their related instruments; and (iii) a general summary of the EU'  s aid policy 
and a synthesis of all the evaluations and recommendations for improvement. 
The evaluation of EU aid to the ACP countries is divided into three phases: 
•  First Phase:  a desk study to provide an assessment of the achievements of EU aid in 
terms  of  (i) relevance  of  the  development  aid  policy;  (ii) effectiveness; 
(iii) efficiency; and (iv) impact. 
•  Second Phase:  a field study to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of:  (i) EU aid 
policy formulation; (ii) the policy dialogue between the EU and the ACP countries; 
and (iii) the implementation and management of EU aid. 
•  Third Phase:  a summary and synthesis of the ACP programme evaluation. 
The first phase took place during 1996-97 and the second phase during the first half of 
1998.  The third phase will  be  undertaken during the period September to  November 
1998. 
B.  Description of the assignment 
Phase ill will involve a synthesis of the strategic findings of Phase I and Phase IT.  This 
will  be  presented in  a  short report,  suitable for  wide circulation, a  draft of which is 
intended to be submitted to the Council of Ministers in November 1998.  The purposes 
of the  report  will  be  draw  out  the lessons  of the  experience  of EU aid  to  the  ACP 
countries  and  to  provide  a  basis  for  identifying key  measures  to  improve  its  future 
effectiveness.  Specifically the report will: 
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•  present  the  key  issues  affecting  the  performance  of EC  aid  to  ACP  countries 
emerging from Phase I and II.  Phase I will provide information on the performance 
of EC  aid 
101
;  while  Phase  2 will  provide insights into the  actual  operation of the 
Commission. 
•  identify the main thrust and key components of a possible strategy to address these 
Issues. 
In  particular,  a  possible  strategy,  whose  main  thrust  and  key  components should  be 
identified  in  the  report,  is  to  address  the  following:  (i) how  to  integrate  policy 
formulation, policy dialogue and aid implementation into an overall learning cycle; (ii) 
what principles should guide each stage of this process; (iii)  what practical solutions 
have  been  tried  in  the  field  and could be  worth  mainstreaming; and  (iv)  the possible 
impact  that  the  Commission's  on-going  internal  re-organisation,  and  the  proposed 
changes to  be  included in a new agreement with ACP countries, are likely to have on 
the issues identified during Phase I and II of the evaluation.  Due to time constraints, the 
above analysis will be based exclusively on information available from Phase I and IT, 
and on a few additional interviews with Commission staff. 
Resources, timing and outputs 
A draft report will be submitted to the Heads of Evaluation by October 7,  1998 and will 
be  discussed  between  the  Heads  of Evaluation  and  the  Consultants.  Following  the 
receipt of comments, the final report will be submitted by mid-November, 1998. 
The Phase ill study will be carried out within a total time allocation of 5 person months. 
101  This  information  will  be  complemented  by  a few  additional  evaluation  reports  that  have  become 
available. 
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Annex B: 
Terms of Reference for Phase II 
MAIN GUIDELINES FOR THE 2ND (FIELD) STAGE* 
* excluding Main Findings of the desk study phase. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
After detailed consideration of the  stage  1 (desk study) report of Consultants ICS-ADE-ITAD, in  accordance 
with the mandate given to  them by the Council in June 1995, the Heads of Evaluation of the Member States and 
the Commission propose these main guidelines for the 2nd (field) stage of this evaluation. 
The  purpose  of the  Heads  of Evaluation  is  to  provide  to  the  Council  an  evaluation  "aimed  at  gtvmg  an 
assessment  of the  results  achieved  in  light  of the  objectives  of (EU)  aid  and  at  drawing  the  appropriate 
lessons"
102
.  They emphasise the importance of ensuring as  complete, clear, thorough and objective an analysis 
as possible of EU/  ACP cooperation in order to facilitate a full and well-informed debate on its future. 
2.  BACKGROUND 
The information provided by  the desk study
103  was  by  definition limited, since the study was based on written 
materials (policy documents, statistics and evaluation reports). It could not take into account recent changes in 
policies, administrative arrangements and current situations; it did  not have access to  information in the field; 
and it could not provide an in-depth analysis of the institutional structures and the respective roles of the various 
stakeholders  (ACP  States,  Member States  and  the  Commission)  in  policy  formulation  and  implementation. 
Moreover, the  views of the  ACP national authorities, Member States' representatives and EU Delegations and 
staff involved in EU/ACP cooperation could not be obtained and analysed in the desk study. 
To obtain a more complete and balanced view of European aid, the findings and conclusions of the desk study 
should be complemented by specific further studies, mainly in the ACP States. 
Furthermore, as  mentioned in  the terms of reference of the desk study, the intention here is  also to propose and 
justify "a representative sample of countries/sectors/themes where speC'ific  aid activities of EU Member States 
can  be  taken into  :onsideration for  a comparative analysis with Commission-managed aid interventions.  This 
will be done with due regard for the issues of coordination, complementarity and coherence." 
2.2 
• 
• 
102 
103 
The main issues for the field phase therefore are 
how policy objectives are defined and translated into relevant actions (policy formulation and negotiation); 
the efficient implementation of the actions (aid management)  . 
Council instructions of 1.6.1995 
For full information, refer to Consultants' report entitled "Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP Countries- Stage 1: 
Analysis of existing documents." 
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These  issues  concern  mainly  the  criteria  of relevance  and  efficiency,  and  involve  also  the  questions  of 
coordination, coherence and complementarity, referred to  in  the original Terms of Reference for the evaluation 
established by the Council. 
3.  POUCY FORMULATION AND NEGOTIATION 
Two interrelated studies  should  investigate  the  policy  formulation  process  by  looking at the  way  overall EU 
policy has  been elaborated and  at the  way  it  is  adapted to  the  specificity of selected ACP countries (in  which 
field visits will be organised 
104
).  Priority will be given to very recent - mainly the last 5 years but referring also 
to the negotiation and programming of Lome IV (7th ED  F)- and current practices. 
3.1  Policy formulation 
At central  level  (Brussels),  one study  will  analyse  the  way  the  EU/  ACP cooperation system and policies are 
designed and controlled by  the ACP countries, the Commission and the Member States.  In particular, the study 
will assess : 
•  how, and to what extent, the policies and views of Member States, ACP States and the Commission are taken 
into account; and of other major donors also; 
•  how, and to  what extent these policies are reflected in  the orientations (rules and conditions) established for 
the use of the different forms of EU aid
105
; 
Special attention will be paid to: 
•  The  functioning  of the  various  institutions  through  which  the  Commission interacts with the Member 
States for policy design,  such as the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the EDF Committee, the 
Food Aid Committee, thematic Working Groups organised with the Member States, etc. 
•  Relationships within the EU/ACP joint institutional framework. 
•  The internal organisation of the Commission for policy preparation, such as the role of the different units 
in  charge  of  policy,  the  institutional  and  practical  relationship  between  these  units,  operational  units 
(geographical and technical) and units in charge of programming, information management and analysis; and 
the role  of the  Quality Support Group and of other institutions in  charge of ensuring that concrete actions 
implement and fit with the established policies. 
The practical experience of the preparation, negotiation and progranuning of Lome IV bis, the preparation of the 
Green Paper, preparation of Council resolutions and their translation into practical actions, etc. are relevant. 
3.2  Policy negotiation 
Beginmng in  Brussels, but mainly through fiP.ld  visits to  selected ACP countries, the second study will analyse 
policy dialogue through examining the preparation of the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and National Indicative 
Programmes (NIP's) - and Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) in  one regional case - and the policy dialogue 
in  the  main areas of concentration of EU aid.  The progress and reports of the recent pilot coordination efforts 
which included 3 ACP States -"'0f whi<;h-one·is among the selected countries to be visited -~will also be taken into 
account. 
For each country, the following questions will be addressed: 
•  Do the  documents include a  clear view of the  local  political and economic situation? Do they include an 
assessment of the extent to  which the conditions for an effective aid are met? Do they include any form of 
risk assessment?  To what extent are they believed to reflect the ACP States' policy? 
•  To what extent do these documents reflect European (Member States and Commission) policy? 
104 
105 
A list of countries is proposed below. 
Including, to a limited extent, trade as well as aid, in order to maintain a balanced overall view ofEU/ACP 
cooperation 
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•  What has been the impact of the CSP's and NIP's on actual changes in  EU interventions in the country (view 
from Brussels)? 
•  To what extent did the strategy papers facilitate/ improve negotiation of the NIP's? 
•  On the basis of which data have they worked? 
•  Which units have been involved? 
•  With whom have  the  documents been discussed,  within the  Commission, in  Europe,  in  the  ACP country, 
with the IFI's and other donors? 
•  Who approved these documents and on what basis? 
This information  will  then  be  cross checked during missions in the ACP countries where particular attention 
will be paid to the  local policy dialogue. 
The field missions wlll focus on: 
•  the  relevance of EU aid  allocation and the  instruments chosen, to  needs in each country, in  the context of 
expenence to date, the CSP's and NIP's and the evolving national policy framework; 
•  the  coherence of EU aid  with  other EU  policies,  and complementarity  between the  EU and  the  Member 
States' development co-operation programmes; 
•  the  co-ordination among the EU, and the Member States in  the  fust place, and secondly with the IFI's and 
other  major  donors.  as  demonstrated  by  formal  and  informal  meetings,  studies,  field  visits  and  analysis; 
agreements on action and joint initiatives; 
•  the extent to which the views expressed in the strategy papers and in the NIP's
106 compare with a) the views 
of the  Government;  b)  the  views  of the  Member States  locally;  c)  the  views  of the  other major donors 
locally; 
•  how issues of good governance, human rights and democracy, gender, environment and poverty alleviation 
have been taken into account in the process of establishing CSP'  s and NIP's; 
•  relevance and coherence of the main ongoing activities will be assessed against the NIP's; 
•  the  impact of the  CSP' s  on  the  NIP's, and of both on actual changes in  EU interventions in  the country 
(view from the field); 
•  the  relationships between the  Delegations and  the National Authorising Officer, other ministries, Member 
States'  representatives.  local  authorities,  implementing  agencies,  NGO's  and  private  sector,  for  policy 
analysis/ design/ negotiations; 
•  how the  Government, and the  local representatives of the Member States, the  IFI's and other major donors 
perceive the EU Country Strategy Papers and the NIP's; 
•  the extent to  which the DelegatiOns have been involved in the preparation of Country Strategy Papers and in 
the NIP negotiations; 
•  the interaction between the Delegations and Brussels for policy analysis/ design/ negotiation. 
4.  AID IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT 
The aim of the 3rd study - also to  be done mainly through the same field  visits - should be to  identify the main 
constraints hindering implementation capacity at the level of the ACP administration, the Commission, and other 
operators.  "How - and  how well  - does  the  system work"? are  the  questions.  Initial  investigations would be 
made m Brussels. followed by work in the sample countries. 
The  resources  and  mechanisms  for  implementation  of  EU  aid  should  be  assessed  against  the  formal 
responsibilities of all concerned- both the recipient authorities (in the fust place) and the donor. 
As regards the  Commission, an insufficient number of staff is  presented as  a  major constraint by DG VTII  to 
explain  many  of the  difficulties  faced  by  EU aid,  including implementation delays  and  limited capacity for 
policy design and  negotiation.  For reasons presented in  the  1st (desk) stage report,  this  view is  likely to  be 
justified
107
,  but the  magnitude and (especially) the  causes of the  problem must be better assessed and how the 
Commission has tried to solve them. 
106 
107 
Although the NIP's are by definition accepted by the government, they may include somewhat different priorities 
than those which appear to lead Gvt's policy 
In How European Aid Works? ODI; 1997, Table 2.1  shows that DG Vill has a lower number of staff at the HQ per 
$1 0 m than all other European aid agencies studied 
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Study of these issues should focus on the recent past and current issues, and should be supported by the views of 
the stakeholders locally  ~ ACP authorities. Member States and Commission in particular. 
The  focus  should  be  on  some of the  main  areas  of concentration  of EU aid  in  the  sample  countries.  Key 
questions should include: 
Identification  procedure:  Who  took  the  initiative?  With  whom  was  it  discussed  in  the  country,  in  the 
Commission,  with  Member  States  representatives?  Who  made  the  decision  to  start  project  preparation 
(instruction) and on what basis?  What has been the role of the local stakeholders (Gvt, NGO's, private sector)? 
What has been the role of the Delegation. the Desk Officer, the Technical Unit?  Has the Quality Support Group 
had any role at  this stage?  Did any Member State have any influence?  How long from the identification to the 
financing proposal'? 
Financing decision:  How long  after  the  first  draft  of the  financing  proposal?  Role  of the  Quality Support 
Group?  On what basis did the  EDF Committee make the decision?  Role of the  Member States?  Role of the 
Commission's Financial Control service? 
Implementation: How long after the financing decision?  Tendering procedures, (transparency, delays, role of 
the  NAO and of other stakeholders; any role of Member States?  Contract signature (delays, role of the NAO, 
Financial Control).  Contractor invoice management and payment delays.  (Role of the NAO, Financial Control, 
of local payment procedures). 
Efficiency of the  works,  of the  TA,  of institutional  building efforts,  etc.  ...  Stakeholders'  participation and 
ownership ...  alternatives (e.g.  local expertise).  In case of multidonor programmes: quality of co-ordination at 
implementation stage. 
Ability to adapt to economic and political changes. 
Supervision and  monitoring:  Who  is  responsible?  Who does  it?  To  whom  is  information  sent?  What 
reactions, from whom?  Who is responsible for reacting?  How well is  it planned in the design stage? 
Evaluation and feed-back: are the  lessons drawn from experience?  Where, when?  Feed-back to whom?  To 
the  governmental  decision  makers?  To  which  unit  in  the  Commission?  To  the  local  beneficiaries  and 
stakeholders?  To the  European citizen and taxpayer directly or through the media; to or through the Parliament 
or Member States' representatives?  What are the instruments used for feed-back? 
5.  "WODALITIES OF THE FlEW STUDIES 
The coverage of the  field  studies should be limited as  much as  possible to approximately the past 5 years, also 
including the negotiation and programming of Lome IV (7th ED  F). 
The  issues  of  policy  dialogue  and  aid  implementation  (including  coordination/complementarity/ 
coherence)  will  be  looked  at  in  key  areas  of concentration of EU aid  (see  table,  point 6,  below); and  in  the 
cooperauon with NGO's :f possible in  the time available.  Attention to  gender and environment as cross-cutting 
issues, both in the policy dialogue and within aid implementation. will be assessed in all visits. 
The studies will  be based on  stakeholder interviews and relevant texts (Strategy Papers and NIP's, the Internal 
Agreements and Financial Regulations of each Lome Convention, etc).  Interviews will not only aim to improve 
the  understanding/assessment of the  way  things are  really  working,  but  they  should also allow to  reflect the 
subjective  perception of the  different stakeholders among which : the  local administrations and the operating 
agencies,  the  Commission's  and  Member States'  representatives  in  Europe and  in  the  ACP States,  NGO's, 
contractors, etc ... 
108
• 
108  A more systematic appraisal of the perception of European aid would be useful, right to the level of project 
beneficiaries, but is too long and too expensive to fit within the delays and the budget of the current evaluation. 
Such an enquiry has already been done but may  be outdated: Appraisal of  the image of  EEC aid in the ACP 
countries; SECODIP, Chamhourcy; November 1989 
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6.  THE SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
The studies covering policy negotiation (3.2 above) and aid management (point 4), should begin in Brussels but 
mainly take  place in  a small  number of countries.  Within  the  limits  of time and  resources available,  6 ACP 
States and  one region  are  the  best representative sample, provifed that  there  is  adequate information,  whether: 
locally or in Europe. 
The selection of countries should be based on choosing 
•  four countries where minimum social stability, minimum economic stabilisation and minimum effectiveness 
of resource allocation make a reasonable, identifiable 
109  dialogue possible between Government and donors 
in particular the EU (Commission/Em) and Member States.  The degree of difficulty of dialogue should vary 
somewhat between these countries.  (See Desk Phase Report, end of Chapter 3.1) 
•  one  country  representative  of the  significant  number of ACP States  where  the  dialogue concerns conflict 
prevention and management, with high donor coordination needs 
•  one island country to  take  account of the  many small island ACP economies.  A Caribbean country would 
avoid over-concentration on Africa, and be more quickly accessible and at less cost, than a Pacific country 
•  one ACP region, representative of the particularities of regional cooperation. 
In each country selected. the main areas of concentration of EU aid will be examined in terms of policy dialogue 
and implementation. 
In addition, in selecting countries, it is  necessary to bear in mind that some other major ongoing evaluations and 
other  multidonor  actions  could  reduce  the  availability  of essential  interlocutors.  Such  actions  are  already 
significant  in  several  countries  (Mali  - DAC exercise;  Burkina Faso  : SPA exercise  & others).  Also  some 
countries (e.g.  Mozambique, Angola) are  more appropriate for  the  (parallel) evaluation of Humanitarian Aid. 
Moreover, in  some countries - notably Ethiopia - recent major evaluations reduce the potential added value of 
field visits. 
The areas of concentration indicated in  the table below (i.e.  underlined) are representative of the  main areas of 
current EU  aid,  in  which  policy  dialogue  should  be  significant  : structural  adjustment,  agriculture,  transport, 
health and education; and coordination.  Trade development is also an  issue of particular importance in regional 
cooperation.  As several areas of concentration feature in more than one case, comparison will also be possible to 
take account of different contexts/countries and degrees of difficulty of dialogue.  The major cross-cutting issues 
of gender and environment, and (subject to the resources available) any significant cases of policy dialogue and 
implementation involving cooperation with NGO's, will also be considered during the field visits. 
The resulting list of suitable ACP States, with the main areas of concentration of special interest, is as follows : 
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CAMEROUN  Typical  «area  of  concentration>>  approach  m  transQort;  stop-go 
problems in structural adjustment 
Policy dialogue difficult over long period (cocoa sector) 
COTE D'[VOIRE  After  the  devaluation  of  the  CFA  test  case  for  a  new  departure 
(structural adjustment).  Interesting health sector policy. 
Coffee/cacao also key sectors.  Pilot country for coordination 
TANZANIA  Difficult  adjustment  for  civil  service  and  public  management  -
Interegting structural adjustment-record (on track/off track). 
Interesting sectoral experience (transport and education) 
ZIMBABWE  Structural adjustment (on/off track) dialogue interesting. 
Extensive a_griculture sector dialogue.  Trade development 
jAMAICA  Small, diversified island economy with restructuring problems 
Innovative social programmes (health, education) 
LIBERIA  Country  in/close  to  conflict,  requiring  special  donor  dialogue 
(  oreventionlanticioation) and coordination 
REGION:  Significant  regional  cooperation  dialogue  with  OECS  on  bananas, 
EAST CARIBBEAN  health and interregional trade 
Thus excluding countries such as Zambia, where IMF/World Bank leadership dominates Government/donor 
dialogue to the extent that identification of specific EU & Member States dialogue is not always feasible. 
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7.  PROPOSED TEA}J STRUCTURE, BUDGET AND TIMETABLE 
The three studies of this 2nd (field) stage will be undertaken in Brussels and in the above countries by four teams 
of three peoole each.  The first will  conduct study 3.1  in  Brussels; and the three others will conduct studies 3.2 
and 4 simultaneously, each team working in  two countries.  One team will  also cover the regional cooperation 
(East Caribbean).  The  country  visits  will  last about 3  weeks  per country,  and  less  in  the  cases of the  East 
Caribbean and Liberia.  Each of the 4  teams should consist in  principle of one economist/policy analyst; one 
rural economist/social development expert;  and one organisational  management expert.  The leader of the  1st 
team (Brussels) should be very familiar with the political and policy aspects of multilateral aid organisations. 
Taking into consideration the  need to  conduct investigations and gather data in  Brussels and from the Member 
States  prior  to  fieldwork,  plus  the  need  to  synthesise  reports  from  six  countries  and  one  region,  the  overall 
budget comes to approximately 29 person months plus per diem and travel costs. 
Timetable: 
The country reports would be available after an estimated 3 months. 
The synthesis and any  further  research would be  made by  the  four  team leaders (one of whom would be the 
overall team leader) and would take 1 1/2 more months. 
Thus, according to this  programme, a  (first) draft report would  be provided to  the  Working Group (Heads of 
Evaluation) within five  months after mobilisation. 
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